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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Civil Procedure-Use and Constitutionality of the Federal
Interpleader Act
After the passage of the Federal Interpleader Act,1 uncertainty
developed as to the extent to which the Act should be available to
insurance companies defending assureds against two or more injured parties.2 The question also arose whether its authorization
of federal jurisdiction on the basis of minimal diversity is constitutionally permissible. In State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. TashireO
the United States Supreme Court addressed itself to both problems in defining the proper use of the Act and holding it constitutional.
Tashire arose out of a collision between a truck and a bus in
Northern California in which many passengers were injured. Four
passengers from California brought suit in a California state court
against the bus line and bus driver, both citizens of California,
and the truck driver, a citizen of Oregon. It was anticipated that
other passengers from California and elsewhere would also sue.
Before other suits were brought or judgment was reached in any
pending suit, State Farm, representing only the truck driver on
a liability insurance policy for 20,000 dollars,4 interpleaded in the
'The first Federal Interpleader Act was passed in 1917 and successive
amendments expanded its usefulness. For legislative history see 3 J. MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 22.06 (2d ed. 1967).
Relevant portions of the Act
read as follows:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
of interpleader . . . filed by any person, firm, or corporation . . .

having in his custody or possession money or property of the value of
$500 or more, or having issued a . . . policy of insurance . . . of
value or amount of $500 or more . .. if

(1) Two or more adverse claimants, of diverse citizenship . . .
are claiming or may claim to be entitled to such money or property,
or to any one or more benefits arising by virtue of any . . . policy

... ; and if
(2) the plaintiff has . .

.

paid . . . the amount due under such

obligation into the registry of the court, there to abide the judgment
of the court ....
28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1965).
'See, e.g., 2 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 551 (1961, Supp. 1967).
386 U.S. 523 (1967).
"The policy was a standard automobile liability insurance contract in
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United States District Court for the District of Oregon. State
Farm asked that all persons who were suing or might sue the assured, i.e., persons with potential claims to the proceeds of assured's insurance policy, be enjoined from any action in any other
court against both the assured and insurer, and that such actions
be confined to that district court. When the injunction was granted,
it appeared that State Farm, which could not be made a party to
any state court suit until a judgment against the assured might be
had, would be able to force all persons suing the assured into a
federal district court of its own choosing both for trial on liability
and for apportionment of the insurance policy proceeds.5
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals construed the statutory
language, "claimants . . . [who] are claiming or may claim," to

mean only persons with judgments against the assured who would
then be entitled under the insurance contract to sue the insurer
and held that interpleader did not lie against potential claimants to
the insurance fund.' On appeal to the Supreme Court, it was held
that the words "may claim" do permit the insurer to interplead potential claimants to the insurance proceeds.7 But it was further held
that the scope of interpleader should be limited to proration of the
which State Farm promised to defend the assured in any action against

him arising out of an automobile accident. State Farm was required under

the contract to pay only if the assured were found liable for the accident or
upon settlement. Under California law and the contract an injured party
could not maintain a direct action against the insurance company until
a final judgment against the assured was reached. 386 U.S. at 539.
'Interpleader is a procedural device, arising out of equity, in which
a stakeholder asks the court to determine the rights of parties with conflicting claims that equal or exceed the amount of a fund in the stakeholder's
possession. The classic example of an interpleader is one who has found
a treasure trove to which he has no right and whom is being sued or
threatened by several parties claiming the money. The interpleader pays the
money into court and asks the court to bring in the parties and adjudicate
their rights. Haynes v. Felder, 239 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1957). The Federal
Interpleader Act was passed primarily to make this device available in the
situation where there are claimants in several states and no state process
would be sufficient to bring all the parties into a single forum. See generally
Chafee, Interpleader in the United States Courts, 41 YALE L.J. 1134
(1932); Chafee, The Federal Interpleader Act of 1936, 45 YALE L.J.
1161-67 (1936) ; Chafee, Federal IinterpleaderSince the Act of 1936, 49 YALE

L.J. 377, 414-17 (1940).

' Tashire v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 363 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1966).
The theory of the Ninth Circuit was that since the injured parties had
no direct action against the insurance company until after judgment, they
could not be "claimants" against the insurance company.
7 386 U.S. at 533.
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insurance proceeds.8 Under this construction, the Act amounts to
a device for impounding insurance funds for eventual proration
among parties successful in securing judgments on liability in whatever courts they chose to bring their actions.
In addition, the Supreme Court raised, on its own motion,9
the question of the use of minimal diversity'0 in the Act and held
that it is consistent with the grant of federal jurisdiction in article
III of the Constitution "to controversies . . . between citizens of
This question was left in the wake of
different states . . . ""

Strawbridgev. Curtiss,2 the famous case that laid down the rule of
complete diversity. In Strawbridge a plaintiff from Massachusetts
was not permitted to join a defendant from Massachusetts with a
defendant from Vermont. In holding that jurisdiction would not
lie unless every party to the suit could sue in diversity every party
aligned against him, the Court seemed to construe only the general
diversity statute. Nevertheless, the similarity of the statutory
language "or the suit is between the citizen of a state where the
suit is brought, and a citizen of another state

. . .

,,s to the word-

8Id.at 537.
' Even if an issue of the court's jurisdiction is not argued, the Supreme

Court may still raise it. This procedure was followed in Treinies v. Sun-

shine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939) where the Court considered the

constitutionality of the Interpleader Act of 1936 and held that if claimants
were from different states and the interpleader was from the same state
as one of the claimants, there was still complete diversity because the interpleader was not a real party in interest.
10 The Act grants jurisdiction where there is minimal diversity between
claimants regardless of the citizenship of the interpleader. Where all the
claimants to a fund are from state A and the stakeholder is in state B, the
Act is not available for lack of diversity among the claimants, but the
stakeholder in state B can interplead through FED. R. Civ. P. 22 because
there is complete diversity between the claimants and the stakeholder. If
claimants are citizens of states A and B and the stakeholder is a citizen
of state C, there is complete diversity and there are claimants of diverse
citizenship, but only under the Act can the stakeholder get service of
process on all claimants. Under rule interpleader, service of process is
limited to the state where the action is brought. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f). 28

U.S.C. § 2361 (1965) gives, on the other hand, nationwide service of

process when the Act is used. Where claimants are citizens of states A
and B and the stakeholder is a citizen of State A, there is incomplete or
minimal diversity, and only the Act is available. This unusual use of
minimal diversity to support federal jurisdiction is dramatically illustrated
in Haynes v. Felder 239 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1957), where a stakeholder
from Texas was allowed to interplead one claimant from Texas along
with a rival group of persons with a joint claim, of whom three were from
Texas and one was from Tennessee.
"U.S. CONsT. art III, § 2.
17 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
1

Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 78.
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ing of Article III gave rise to the question whether the Constitution
likewise requires complete diversity.1 4 Later cases limited the force
5 and critics argued that the rule of complete
of Strawbridge,1
diversity should be applied solely to the general diversity statute."0
In so holding in Tashire the Supreme Court settles the issue and
leaves Congress free to expand or contract the use of diversity as
long as there is at least minimal diversity.
The construction of the Federal Interpleader Act in Tashire
presents an ironic situation. The holding allowing expansion of
interpleader to potential as well as judgment claimants for proration is at least a technical victory for insurers. But it is actually
of much greater benefit to claimants because there is no other device
available at present by which claimants can procure proration of
insurance funds.' 7 The holding limiting the use of interpleader
solely to proration denies insurers, however, a great advantage
sought from the statute, i.e., to use the statute as a joinder device
to bring trials on liability into a single court."8 It will remain to be
" In Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130, 145 (1855) the Su-

preme Court indicated that complete diversity might be required by the
Constitution.
"E.g., Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 48
(1922): Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921);
Louisville, C. & C. R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 554-56 (1844).
3 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcricE § 22.09 [1] (2d ed. 1967); Chafee,
FederalInterpleaderSince the Act of 1936, 49 YALE L.J. 377, 393-98 (1940).
" The "first-in-time, first-in-right" rule, followed in most states that
have decided the question, gives an insurance fund to the first of several
claimants to get judgment against the assured. Thus one of several injured
parties may not petition the court to have the insurance fund impounded for
distribution or require the insurers to settle with all claimants. Alford v.
Textile Ins. Co., 248 N.C. 224, 103 S.E.2d 8 (1958); Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d
416 (1960). In Comment, Pro-Rating Automobile Liability Insurance to
Midtiple Claimants,32 U. CHI. L. REV. 337 (1965) four significant reasons
from the opinions for denying proration to plaintiffs are listed:
1. The injured party has no standing to sue an insurer.
2. Prqration would result in undue delay for the parties.
3. The insurer should not be burdened with duty to judge the settlement value of all possible claims.
4. If an insurer is not free to settle as it will, it might result in
higher judgments for which the insurer might later be liable to
the assured for failure to settle in good faith.
For suggested solutions to the problems in this complex area see Keeton,
PreferentialSettlement of Liability-Insurance Claims, 70 HARv. L. REV. 27
(1956).

"8In Tashire the District Court not only required that trials on liability

against State Farm be tried in Oregon, but later broadened the injunction

to require that all suits against the bus line and bus driver, citizens of
California, also be tried in Oregon. For a dramatic report on the reaction
this kind of tactical move can have on plaintiffs, see Travelers Indem. Co.
v. Greyhound Lines Inc., 260 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. La. 1966).
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seen whether the advantages to insurers of the right to interplead
potential claimants will be sufficient to motivate insurers so to use
the Act and thereby make the device of proration available to all
claimants.
It has always been held that once two or more injured parties
obtained judgments against an assured in excess of policy limits,
the insurer could interplead them to prorate the fund.' 9 This procedure has several advantages to the insurer. It relieves him of
the need to go into several courts to defend against several judgment creditors racing for execution. It also eliminates the possibility of liability in excess of the policy limits because the insurer
is absolved of responsibility for distribution of the fund." Finally,
other claimants to the fund are cut off.2 ' Although the first-in-time
rule would usually protect the insurer after the fund is exhausted,
it has been suggested by at least one court that if an insurer exhausted funds in a state that applies the first-in-time rule, it might
still be held liable for failure to apportion funds equitably between
the injured parties in a state that does not recognize that rule.22
Although two early cases, decided before the words "may claim"
were written into the Interpleader Act in 1948, limited the use of
interpleader to injunctions against parties that had obtained judgments on liability in other courts,2 3 later decisions permitted the insurer to interplead all claimants whether or not any judgment had
been reached.24 In upholding this construction of the 1948 Act, the
Supreme Court in Tashire noted that it would, by negating the first" E.g., Pan American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474, 482
(E.D. La. 1960) See also, Kiaber v. Maryland Cas. Co., 69 F.2d 934 (8th
Cir.2 1934) (implying this possibility under 1926 Act).
Pan American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. La.
1960).
21
Burchfield v. Bevans, 242 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1957).
23
Underwriters at Lloyd's v. Nichols, 363 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1966).
Klaber v. Maryland Cas. Co., 69 F.2d 934 (8th Cir 1934); American
Indem. Co. v. Hale, 71 F. Supp. 529 (W.D. Mo. 1947).
"Underwriters at Lloyd's v. Nichols, 363 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1966);
Pacific Indem. Co. v. Marceaux, 263 F. Supp. 892 (W.D. La. 1966);
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 530 (W.D.
La. 1966); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Adams, 231 F. Supp. 860 (S.D.
Ind. 1964); Pan American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474
(E.D. La. 1960). But cf. Burchfield v. Bevans, 242 F.2d 239 (10th Cir.
1957) (applying state law); National Cas. Co. v. Insurance Co. of North
America, 230 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (rule interpleader). For
state cases allowing interpleader see Century Indem. Co. v. Kofsky, 115
Conn. 193, 161 A. 101 (1932); Underwriters for Lloyds v. Jones, 261
S.W.2d 686 (Ky. 1953); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. LePage, 105 N.H. 327, 200
A.2d 12 (1964).
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in-time rule, eliminate the motivation for a race to judgment on the
issues of liability and therefore allow an insurer a more orderly defense.'
Implicit in the decision, however, is the idea that since
proration allows an equitable division of funds that is otherwise
unavailable, it is hoped that public-spirited insurers will often use
26

it.

Nevertheless, the second holding in Tashire, limiting the use of
the Act to proration alone, may discourage insurers from using the
Act. Probably the real motive behind the increased use of the
Act by insurers has been a desire to sweep into a single court all
litigation arising out of an accident, including the issues of liability.' That this use of interpleader as a bill of peace could also
be advantageous for claimants is illustrated by the recent case of
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Adams"8 in which an insurer interpleaded seventy persons of diverse citizenship who were injured in a
gas explosion. In granting an injunction against all trials on liability in any state or other federal court, the district court said it
was "essential that the claims be determined by the same trial of
facts .

.

. in order to minimize the disparity that would otherwise

result" in the later proration of claims.2 9
Under the facts in Tashire, however, it was obviously unfair to
the claimants to force them into a district court in another state for
trials on liability, and one may suspect that this was a tactical move
largely designed to pressure claimants into unfavorable settlements." The opinion also points out that the claimants in Tashire
had joined several defendants and it would be especially anomalous
to allow a party with a relatively minor stake in a case to choose
the forum for all litigants. 3 1 Federal courts are, in addition, properly reluctant to deprive claimants of their choice of courts or to re.386 U.S. at 533.

28Id.

See recent cases cited supra note 22.
F. Supp. 860 (S.D. Ind. 1964).
at 867.
30 386 U.S. at 534. This could be cured, however, by change of venue
under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) (1964).
8" In Tashire the suits against the bus line and bus driver were more
important than those against the truck driver. Assuming that the truck
driver was insolvent, the most that claimant could hope to collect would be
20,000 dollars on the policy. Suits against the other defendants involved
large sums as they were financially responsible. See also Travelers Indem.
Co. v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. La. 1966) where
relief similar to that in Tashire was given for similar reasons.
21

28231
28Id.
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move litigation from state courts unless a statute clearly so requires.3
The Supreme Court was undoubtedly correct in its construction
of the Act. Even though the use of interpleader to effect proration
among all claimants will result in delay before any successful claimant can get execution against an insurer, and even though a claimant will have to go into a second court to collect, the benefits of an
equitable distribution will inure to all claimants and outweigh the
procedural disadvantages. This is the only effective device at present to achieve proration, and it might be desirable for Congress to
extend the provisions of the Act to allow an insurer to bring in the
underlying litigation in appropriate cases, 33 since this would in turn
encourage insurers to interplead all claimants. But the better solution might be other legislation, based on minimal diversity,s" to
allow a claimant to demand proration, leaving injured parties free
to bring their actions on liability in whatever courts they choose.
HENRY C.

MCFADYEN,

JR.

Constitutional Law-De Facto Segregation-The Courts
and Urban Education
In the controversial decision of Hobsen v. Hansen,' the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia found evidence
of discrimination in the policies, practices and administration of
the School Board and in the continued existence of de facto segregation in the school system. The court concluded that the Negro
" E.g., National Cas. Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 230 F.
Supp. 617 (N.D. Ohio 1964). Professor Chaffee argued that interpleader
should not extend to trials on liability. Chaffee, Federal Interpleader Since
the Act of 1936, 49 YALE L.J. 377, 420 (1940).
" For example, when most of the claimants are from a single state and
the interpleading insurer is the principal fund holder as in Commercial
Union Ins. Co. v. Adams, supra note 28.
" In the words of the Supreme Court, "Art. III poses no obstacle to the
legislative extension of federal jurisdiction, founded on diversity, so long
as any two adverse parties are not co-citizens." 386 U.S. at 531.
'269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967)
'Judge J. Skelly Wright, a member of the United States Court of Appeal
for the District of Columbia, was sitting as District Judge in this suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 291 (c) (1964).
'De facto segregation is a term used interchangeably with racial imbalance denoting a fortuitous separation of races. A predominantly northern
and western phenomenon, it occurs when rigid neighborhood pupil assignments are imposed on racially homogeneous neighborhood populations. See
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students were being unconstitutionally deprived of their right to
equal protection under the law as guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment.
The decision itself is susceptible to various interpretations, for
educational, social, and political considerations are intricately interwoven within it. To acquire a meaningful understanding of the
court's position it is necessary to make a threefold analysis of the
decision: (1) the legal and constitutional issues in the decision,
(2) the practical effect of the decision on the D.C. school system,
and (3) the impact of the decision on the national level, particularly as it relates to the development of educational policy in the urban public schools. No attempt will be made to resolve the problems raised in this analysis, but certain alternatives to the court's
position will be suggested.
Legal and Constitutional Issues
The conclusions of law enunciated in Hobsen v. Hansen were
based on a close scrutiny of the evidence presented, which included
a detailed empirical study of the D.C. School System. The court
subsequently made the following findings of fact: the school authorities, relying principally on the neighborhood concept of pupil
assignment, were indifferent and apathetic to the resultant de facto
segregation and demonstrated in their attitudes an affirmative
acceptance of the status quo;' discriminatory practices were used
in the placement of teachers and principals; inequality existed in
Comment, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: Constitutional DimenVANDEPnILT L. Rav. 1290, 1291 (1965).
'In Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the companion case of
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Supreme Court held that
the equal protection clause's proscription against de jure segregation was
an element of due process in the fifth amendment and thereby applicable to
the District of Columbia. Recent developments in the field of constitutional
law, including the frequent "incorporation" of parts of the first eight amendments in the fourteenth amendment due process clause and the increasing
use of the equal protection clause to protect individual liberties, lead the
court to conclude that "the doctrine of equal educational opportunity-the
equal protection clause in its application to public education-is in its full
sweep a component of due process binding on the District under the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment." Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp.
401, 493 (D.D.C. 1967)
' The neighborhood concept of school districting and assignment has
long been considered a basic tenet of American public education. The critics
feel that this concept, which originated in a predominantly rural environment, no longer has relevance in the complex, urbanized, and more impersonalized school systems of today. Id. at 409.
6
Id. at 503.

sions, 18
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the distribution of educational resources to the segregated schools ;7
and the track system s discriminated in practice, if not in theory, as
it grouped students on the basis of their socio-economic or racial
status instead of their natural ability.
In response to these findings, the court permanently enjoined
the District of Columbia school system against racial and economic
discrimination, abolished the optional zones9 and the track system,
ordered bussing of volunteer Negro students who wished to transfer to undercrowded (white) schools, and ordered substantial integration of the faculty of each school."0 The court further ordered
the Board to submit a plan to the court by October 2, 1967, concerning reasonable alternatives, such as educational parks or school
pairing,1 ' to correct the racial imbalance.' 2 The court refused to
support plaintiff's contention that an "area-wide" metropolitan
system, crossing state lines, was constitutionally required, although
it did suggest that defendants inquire into the possibility of such
an alliance with the surrounding suburbs.' 3
"The court considered the following factors: (a) age of buildings, (b)
physical condition of schools, (c) physical congestion within the schools,
(d) quality of faculty, (e) textbooks and supplies, (f) per pupil expenditures, and (g) curricula and special programs. Id. at 431-442.
8The track system is a form of ability grouping at both the elementary
and the secondary levels in which students are placed on certain curricula
tracks according to their ability to learn as determined by teacher evaluation
and standardized tests. Approximately 50 of the 114 pages of the original text
were devoted to an examination of the system, evidencing the court's awareness of the danger of abolishing a legitimate, even if poorly administered,
educational technique.

The optional zones allowed students to choose from two or more schools
instead of being assigned to a specific neighborhood school; this had the
net effect of allowing whites to escape from predominantly Negro schools
to predominantly white schools. Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401,
415-18 (D.D.C. 1967).
oId.*at 516.
11
1d. These are the two most frequently mentioned methods to integrate
schools, but both require that white communities be reasonably close to
Negro communities.
Racial balance is a physically impossible goal in the District schools,
for over 90 percent of the students enrolled are Negroes, and this percentage
is increasing annually.
"sId. at 516. If this case had involved only school districts within a
single state, a different result might have occurred. See Wright, Public
School Desegregation: Legal Remedies for De Facto Segregation, 40
1"

N.Y.U. L. REv. 285, 305-06 (1965): "Undoubtedly if and when the Supreme Court tackles the suburban vis-a-vis the slum problem, it will again
remit the remedy to the district courts [as it did in the reapportionment
cases] with instructions to ignore the state-created political lines separating
the school boards and to run its orders directly against the state, as well as
local, officials."
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The court's recognition and application of the equal educational opportunity principle in the de facto context represents the
most controversial aspect of its decision.14 It examines the evidence in light of three distinct theories-separate-but-equal, de jure
segregation, and de facto segregation-to arrive at the conclusion
that the Negroes have not received an equal educational opportunity
under the law.
The separate-but-equal principle, a modern day reformulation
of Plessy v. Ferguson," means simply:
[I]f white and Negroes, rich and poor, are to be consigned to
separate schools .

.

. the minimum the Constitution will require

and guarantee is that for their objectively measurable aspects
these schools be run on the basis of real equality, at least until
all inequalities are adequately justified. 16
This theory is novel in the de facto context, but it has precedent
in cases which preceded Brown v. Board of Education. 7

Although

Brown appeared to reject any further application of this theory,
the recent Supreme Court decision of Rogers v. Paul,8 has been
interpreted as implicity revitalizing this approach.1"
The real importance of the theory lies in the larger question of
whether a disproportionate share of resources need be given to the
Negro schools to provide an equal educational opportunity. The
court speaks of equality under the separate-but-equal theory in
terms of "objectively measurable" aspects, but if the Negro is to
overcome environmental and psychological handicaps and achieve
at the same grade level as his white schoolmates, the quality of
the facilities, teachers, and curricula must be superior to those in
predominantly white schools.
In the court's discussion of necessary remedies, it speaks of
the necessity of including measures of compensatory education in
"' This concept has been subject to close review recently by legal scholars.
See T. EMERSON, P. HABER, AND N. DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 1779 (3d ed. 1967); Fiss, Racial Imbalance in
the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 564
(1964) ; Rousselot, Achieving Equal Educational Opportunity for Negroes
in the Public Schools of the North and West: The Emerging Role of Private
ConstitutionalLitigation, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 698 (1967).

5163 U.S. 537 (1896).

16

Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 496 (D.D.C. 1967).

17347 U.S. 483 (1954).

18382 U.S. 198 (1965).
19
See United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th
Cir. 1966), aff'd per curiam on rehearing en banc, March 29, 1967.
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the court-ordered plan, but it is uncertain whether this arises from
the separate-but-equal theory. 0 Since it is equal educational opportunity rather than equality of expenditures that is the controlling
constitutional principle, the distribution of unequal resources might
well be justified:
[C]ultural deprivation [suggests a] .

.

. classification wherein

equality of concern and the equalization of educational opportunity requires the energetic and imaginative use of unequal
resources in order to achieve essentially equal results. 21
Under the de jure segregation theory, the court held that the
system of assigning teachers and principals to schools according
to personal preferences put the School Board in the position of
sanctioning the resultant segregation patterns and thus was unconstitutional. A question arises whether the Board is constitutionally required to have a definite ratio of white and Negro teachers in each school. The court explicitly rejects the proposal for
the present time.'
The use of optional zones was also declared
unconstitutional under this theory, as it constituted a subtle discriminatory policy allowing whites to escape from integrated schools
to predominantly white schools.
The most important segment of the opinion, in terms of the
constitutional issues involved, dealt with the third theory that de
facto segregation in the D.C. school system unjustifiably denied
Negro students the opportunity of an equal education. Following
the lead of previous decisionsm and recent views of legal commen"Where because of the density of residential segregation or for
other reasons, children in certain areas, particularly the slums, are

denied the benefits of an integrated education, the court will require that the plan include compensatory education sufficient at
least to overcome the detriment of segregation and thus provide,
as nearly as possible, equal educational opportunity to all school
children. Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 515 (D.D.C.
1967).

21 COMM'N ON RACE AND EDUCATION, RACE AND EQUAL EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY IN PORTLAND'S PUBLIC ScHooLs 187 (1964), as quoted in

Rousselot supra note 14 at 717. See also Horowitz, supra note 4 at 1167.
22 Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 516 (D.D.C. 1967).
2"

See Blocker v. Bd. of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208, remedy considered on

rehearing, 229 F. Supp. 709 (E.D.N.Y. 1964). The court found unconstitutional segregation where the most that could be said of the Board, as
in Hobsen, was that it had failed to correct an obvious racial imbalance for

which it was not responsible. Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59
Cal.2d 876, 382 P.2d 878 (1963). Barkesdale v. Springfield School Comrnm'n,
237 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1965), vacated and remanded with direction to
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tators, 2 4 the court interpreted Brown as requiring an independent
assessment of the effects of segregation. Brown established the
principle of equal educational opportunity, and it held that any segregation sanctioned by the "mandate of law or public policy pursued under color of law" was inherently unequal and unconstitutional.' But it did not speak to the question of whether a quantum of official discrimination was necessary to invoke the principle
when significant harm was visited upon the Negro student, as determined by a close study of the fields of education, sociology, and
28
psychology.
Thus, where there is de facto segregation, for which the government is not responsible, the focus of inquiry must shift from an
examination of the official's motives to an evaluation of the amount
of detriment which occurs in the racially imbalanced schools. The
Brown rationale is not applicable, however, if the court can find
adequate justification for the inequality-producing classification-in
this case adherence to the neighborhood school system of pupil
assignment :27
[W]ith every inequality producing classification there remains
the question of justification. Ordinary statutory classifications
resulting in inequalities economic in nature are traditionally
upheld whenever the reviewing court can imagine a reasonable
or rational basis supporting the classification . . . [T]he objectives they [the classifications] further must be unattainable
by a narrower or less offensive legislative course; and even so,
those objectives must be of sufficient magnitude to override,
dismiss without prejudice, 347 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965), unequivocably takes
the position adopted in Hobsen:

The question is whether there is a constitutional duty to provide
equal educational opportunities for all children within the system.
While Brown answered that affirmatively in the context of
coerced segregation, the constitutional fact-the inadequacy of
segregated education [based on expert testimony presented]-is
the same in this case, and I so find....
Id. at 546-47.

24 Sedler, School Segregation in the North and West: Legal Aspects, 7
ST. Louis L.J. 228 (1962) states this concept in the form of a question:
Can the state still educate him [the Negro] on an integrated
basis thus providing equal educational opportunities and preventing feelings of inferiority and at the same time effectively operate
its educational system?
Id. at
256. v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 493 (D.D.C. 1967).
" Hobsen
20
Id. at 419-21.
2
"Id at 506-07.
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in the court's judgment, the evil of the inequality which the
28
legislature engenders.
The court also justifies the need for careful consideration of
the merits of the neighborhood policy because this particular practice operates in such a way that the Negro and the poor are harshly
and disproportionately disadvantaged, even though neither group is
intentionally singled out for special treatment. 29 The cases which
are cited to support this position, Griffin v. Illinoi,3 0 and Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections,81 are concerned primarily with economic discrimination. Taken by itself, a single reference to the
economic factor is unimportant, but when it is added to references
of economic discrimination in other parts of the opinion, specifically in the discussion of the track system and the separate-but-equal
theory, the court's approach becomes ambiguous.
This constant equation of the Negro and the poor might be the
embryonic beginning of a non-racial attitude by the courts toward
the whole problem of urban living. This may mitigate the effects
of the monolithic approach of many judges who are so preoccupied
with the integration problem that they lack the prospective to comprehend the interrelated economic problems. The decision also
avoids saying that de facto segregation is unconstitutional on its
face; but it is doubtful that this court will ever accept a de facto
segregation situation as permanently justified or necessary, at least
from a legal standpoint. When the court balances the different
considerations mentioned above, the educational and social advantages of integrated schools accrued to both white and Negro children outweigh the policies supporting strict adherence to the neighborhood schools concept."2 Although the neighborhood plan per
se is not held unconstitutional, the decree that the Board consider the
feasibility of alternate measures suggests that strong reasons must
be given before the benefits of an integrated education are denied
to the Negro.33
The track system was held unconstitutional as it, too, represents
an unjustifiable arbitrary classification. Although the court accepts
ability grouping in general as reasonably relating to the govern28

Id.
"Id.
"351 U.S. 12 (1956) (fees required for appeal).
383 U.S. 663 (1960) (poverty and poll tax).
Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 509-10 (D.D.C. 1967).
"Id.
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mental function of public education, it maintains that such grouping84
must be founded on something other than the standardized tests
presently administered. These tests, the evidence shows, group
according to environmental and psychological factors, not on the
basis of. innate ability. The results therefore are catastrophic to
the Negro child who is grouped in the lower tracks with rigid curricula and little chance of freeing himself from the false self-prophecy of intellectual inferiority. The system is also condemned for
its failure to include and implement a compensatory educational
program that would provide more flexibility and more movement
upward in the tracks.
Undoubtedly, the specific constitutional issues raised by the
decision are important, but a significant legal problem exists on a
more abstract level. The uncertainties 0 accompanying any balancing of constitutional rights on the basis of empirical data and
the complexities of implementing a decree, once interference in the
educational system is found to be necessary, obviously do not create
stability or certainty in the legal process. The court is intervening
in an area in which it has an acknowledged lack of expertise,8" and
its involvement causes one to ask certain elementary but important
questions. Relating to the track systems, there is a real question
of what type of ability grouping is justifiable, and how accurate
tests must be before they constitute legitimate bases for grouping.
If no satisfactory tests are developed, will the disadvantaged child
be forced to compete in the classroom with the middle class white
(though this is practically impossible) because no satisfactory
tests (in the court's view) are devised? If bussing is the solution
to correct the unconstitutional inequalities, then what practical
considerations are involved? What weight is to be given to costs,
"See P. SEXTON, EDUCATION AND INCOME (1961), for the rationale
supporting this position.
" "There can, of course, be no mathematical formula to determine at
what point the unequal educational opportunity inherent in racial imbalance
...rises to constitutional dimensions." Wright, supra note 13, at 303.
Fiss agrees that "no matter how conscientious the court that decides the
question, an irreducible amount of uncertainty will remain." Fiss, supra
note 14, at 596.
"0"It is regrettable, of course, in deciding this court must act in an area
so alien to its expertise. It would be far better indeed for these great social
and political problems to be resolved in the political arena by other branches
of government." Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 517 (D.D.C. 1967).
See Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part II: The General
Northern Problem, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 157, 182-86 (1963).
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time 9pent in transit, or ineffective or detrimental results from the
integrated experience? What considerations will guide the court
if the "area-wide" school system is found to be constitutionally
necessary, and how will the many side issues such as educational
financing be resolved?
Practical Effects
Despite the prevalence of constitutional and legal problems in
this area, the conclusions of the court are extremely important
in terms of the actual impact of the decision on the D.C. school
system. The decision will invariably have these initial consequences
in Washington: (1) an increase in the number of white students
migrating to the suburbs or to private schools, thereby increasing
the total percentage of Negroes well over the ninety per-cent-plus
figure that presently exists, and (2) the withdrawal from the system of many white teachers who are eligible for retirement benefits,
especially if the court finds reassignment necessary. The court
ruling has already forced Superintendent Hansen to resign his
37
position.
Regarding the actual decree in light of subsequent developments,
the decision might have been unnecessary. Within a week of the
decision Negroes gained a majority on the School Board for the
first time in its history,"8 and would certainly have implemented
most of the measures the court decreed. Moreover, as Carl Hansen pointedly noted in an interview 9 subsequent to the decision, the
track system was to be abolished; a proposal for the discontinuance
of the optional zones was already being considered; and the free
bussing for children in overcrowded schools had been initiated
prior to the issuance of the opinion. Finally, the Passow Report,40
" See The Washington Post and Times Herald, July 4, 1967, at A 1,
col. 8. This resignation resulted specifically from the Board's refusal to
appeal the decision which repudiated Hansen's policies and, to some degree, his integrity as an individual. The fact that he would probably resign
in the face of an adverse decision, despite the three year renewal of his

contract in March, 1967, was well known by those who participated in the
suit.
"8With a new majority the Negroes elected the first Negro President of
the Board of Education. See The Washington Post and Times Herald,
July 2, 1967, A 1, col. 1.
U.S. NEws AND WORLD REPORT, July 24, 1967, p. 42.
"The report on the D.C. school system made by Dr. Henry A. Passow
of the Columbia Teachers College, cost 250,000 dollars and involved over
180 consultants and specialists. For a brief summary of the findings, see

The Washington Post and Times Herald, Sept. 7, 1967, A 1, col. 6.
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preliminary findings of which were available to the Board soon
after the issuance of the opinion, contained extensive recommendations for the D.C. System, which included many of the court's
ideas. It was based on exhaustive educational research and had
been commissioned by the Board.
It would seem from these factors that the decision was to serve
a dual purpose: (a) to repudiate the attitude implicit in the practices and policies of the school authorities and (b) to provide a new
legal and moral basis for change. The public reaction41 to the decision in Washington reinforces this view, for an atmosphere was created which made positive action by the School Board not only
politically feasible but inherently necessary.
National Impact
Judge Wright was not interested, however, solely in the decision's catalytic effect on the D.C. educational power structure. The
length of the text and its exhaustive detail emphasize that the
impact of the decision was intended to be nationwide. Judge
Wright obviously expected the case to be appealed ultimately to the
Supreme Court, which required that the decision have a solid foundation in fact and in law. Moreover, as a Federal District judge,
Judge Wright had been closely connected with the desegregation
of public schools in Louisiana and the admission of Negroes to
Tulane University. 42

His judicial experience thus eminently quali-

fied him to make the first official, authoritative statement by a
member of the federal judiciary on the relationship of the equal
educational opportunity principle to the problem of de facto segregation in urban education.
It can also be surmised that Judge Wright was writing to and
for the legal profession. In his decision, he establishes a model for
legal change in the de facto area by constructing a framework in
which the lawyer knows what type of evidence must be presented,
and the judge is given a method by which specific constitutional
issues can be resolved. Concurrently, his decision was intended
to be a catalyst for change on the national level, to spur action in
"' "The significance of the Wright decision . . . is that it gives the
school system a mandate for change." Jacoby, Mandate for Change, The
Washington Post and Times Herald, July 22, 1967, A 1, col. 4. The plaintiff,
Julius Hobsen, stated that the Passow Report "would have wound up in
the dust bin like the Strayer Report [the last study of the D.C. schools in
1949] if it weren't for the court decision." Id.
42 See NEWSWEEK, July 3, 1967, at 49.
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legislative bodies and school systems which have long bypassed this
43
problem.
The primary area in which this opinion will have national impact
is the present-day civil rights movement. There is a split among
civil rights leaders evidenced in their attitudes toward attempts to
improve the educational resources in predominantly Negro schools.
Some groups oppose a major commitment to ghetto schools. Other
elements, primarily associated with the "Black Power" movement,
have favored the improvement of educational resources in the ghetto
schools.4 4 The difference in attitude is explained by the former's
assumption that the only possible avenue to equal education opportunity for the Negro child is through integrated classrooms. Such
a view is implicit in Hobsen v. Hansen, and evidenced by the data45
which is judicially noted to support the court's conclusions. 46
The dilemma in which the court finds itself is that in Washington, and in other urban areas, integration is impossible, at least in
the near future. Although the court is aware that racial imbalance
cannot be solved in the D.C. schools (and this is what the separatebut-equal theory is all about), its attempt to deal with it is undermined by the acceptance of a principle which unequivocably rejects
the segregated school. Hobsen v. Hansen advocates a self-defeating policy by focusing its attention on integration as the sole means
enabling the Negro to attain the ultimate goal of educational equality. This is especially important since there is some indication that
quality education can be had in the all-Negro school. The Passow
Repor 7 emphasized that quality education was possible, if and
when adequate resources were allocated to the predominately Negro
3
" New York, California, Maryland and New Jersey were the first, and
still remain, the principal states to take legislative action to correct imbalance. See 7 RACE REL. L. REP. 269 (1962); 7 RACE REL. L. REP. 738
(1962); 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 738 (1963); 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 1226
(1963).
"See Rousselot, supra note 14, at 715.
"See 1 U.S. ComiussioN ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1967)
(published in 2 vols.) [hereinafter cited as

U.S.C.R.C. REPORT]; U.S.
TIONAL OPPORTUNITY
REPORT].

OFFICE OF EDUCATION,

EQUALITY OF EDUCA-

(Coleman ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as

COLEMAN

"'Alsop, No More Nonsense About Ghetto Education, THE NEW REJune 22, 1967, at 20, characterizes this attitude of the liberals:
[G]hetto children can never be rescued, can never be educated,
unless they are subject to the benign classroom influence of middle class children.
"See supra note 40; The Washington Post and Times Herald, Sept. 7,
1967, A 1.

PUBLIC,
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D.C. schools. The "More Effective Schools"4 8 program, initiated
in Harlem in 1964-1965 is the latest of several new programs initiated for the ghetto schools. Its tests results indicate that Negro
children can achieve at the same grade level with his middle class
white counterpart even if taught in a segregated school."'
Though these special programs have not been as successful as
their advocates might hoper 0 the realities of the situation alone dictate a more flexible approach by the court's than is found in Hobsen v. Hansen. If the white community does not accept the necessity of integration, and there is no indication that it is so predisposed at present,5 1 then it may effectively block any implementation of corrective measures by moving further into the suburbs
or by sending its children to private schools. And bussing is by its
very nature confined to certain time and space limits.
This conflict between constitutional necessity and social reality
will often leave the courts with no alternative but to revive such
theories as the separate-but-equal principle. But again the basic
dilemma reappears if the court has already committed itself to the
view that a segregated education is inherently unequal for the
Negro and that no amount of compensatory education can effectively overcome this disadvantage.
The court reaches its position that the integrated school is the
primary solution to this problem by citing the latest sociological
and psychological findings in this area, and by emphasizing the
inherent destructiveness of a segregated society. 2 In the former, it
implicitly relies on the Coleman Report 3 and the United States
Civil Rights Commission Report54 which includes the very latest
research in this area.
8See Alsop, supra note 46, at 21.
"9See Maslow, De Facto Puiblic Segregation,6 VILL. L. REv. 353, 374-75
(1962); also Nancy Hoyt St. John, The Effect of Segregation on the Aspirationsof Negro Youth, 36 HARV. L. REV. 284, 286 (1965). For a discussion of the different measures that can be used to educate the disadvantaged
child, see Ornstein, Program Revision For Culturally Disadvantaged Cildren, 35 J. oF NEGRo ED. 117 (1965).
" See Swartz, Pettigrew and Smith, Fake Panaceas For Ghetto Education: A Reply to Joseph Alsop, THE NE W REPUBLIC, Sept. 23, 1967, at 16.

See Alsop, supra note 46, at 19, for statistics on this rapid migration.
Judge Wright quotes Fiss in the opinion: "Segregation perpetuates
the barriers between the races; stereotypes, misunderstandings, hatred and
the inability to communicate are all intensified." Hobsen v. Hansen, 269
F. Supp. 401, 504-05 (D.D.C. 1967).
See supra note 45.
84
Id.
'

82
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The Coleman Report did not attempt to separate all other factors such as cultural deprivation or social class in determining the
effects of racial imbalance. Its basic findings, however, did show
that the equality of educational opportunity was lowered when
culturally disadvantaged children were placed together in public
schools. Also, it concluded that pupil achievement is more closely
correlated to the aspirations and educational experience of the other
students in the school than to the quality of the facilities, teachers,
or curriculums. 5 The U.S.C.R.C. Report, however, re-analyzed
the data in the Coleman Report and declared that there was a direct
correlation between racial imbalance and Negro achievement:
"There is

.

. a relationship between the racial composition of

schools and the achievement and attitudes of most Negro students,
which exists when all other factors are taken into account." 50
Despite this conclusion of the U.S.C.R.C. Report, the most significant finding in either report was that a Negro child's achievement is highly correlated with his belief that he can control his
own destiny. 57 Coleman himself feels that "the one factor more
highly related to achievement than anything else was the child's
concept of whether his environment was responsive in any way to
him."'5 8

Floyd McKissick, National Director of CoXE explains

this view:
One wonders if that thing 'middle class' is not really a way
of saying that the middle class child is helpless and vulnerable,
that he knows his parents can and will go to bat for him, that
he carries that attitude around with him, that his teachers
perceive him differently, and that he is treated differently. 59
It should be noted that the Coleman Report and the U.S.R.C. Report suggest that it is the poor in general, rather than the Negro
in particular, who respond to good and bad schools.60
Hobsen v. Hansen foresees the danger in such a separatist view,
and it appreciates the need for an integrated society as an ultimate
5

COLEMAN REPORT

22

=' U.S.C.R.C. REPORT 204.
= See Jencks, The Racial Gap, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 1, 1966, at 22.
This article contains an excellent summary of the findings of the Colenan

Report.

NEWsWEEK, Sept. 25, 1967, at

75.

McKissick, Is Integration Necessaryf THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 3,
1966, at 35.
" See U.S.C.R.C. REPORT 79.
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goal. But is not the court irresponsible in telling the Negro community that an integrated education is indispensable to a quality
education for their children when it has neither the power nor the
resources to create this necessary prerequisite. If it is accepted
that the educational needs for the Negro are immediate and pressing, then the court should not create impediments to the resolution
of these needs. Integration is only one of the means to an end,
which is equality for all. Since there may be another means
which are capable of producing this equality in education, the liberal community, and the expression of its views in the courts, must
not limit the attention of "Negroes to the sole issue of integration,
so that they cannot conceive of any other road toward equality." 0 1
CONCLUSION

Hobsen v. Hansen is presently being appealed in the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Regardless of
whether the decision reaches the Supreme Court of the United
States, its impact has already been felt nationwide.0 " In the process
of dissemination, the actual content of the decision and its implications have often been inaccurately reported. This discussion was
intended to give a more accurate analysis of the decision, concentrating not only on the narrow legal and constitutional issues involved, but on the intended and actual impact of the decision.
In the examination of the case several basic problems in the
court's reasoning have been discussed. First, there is a latent ambiguity in the decision, resulting from the court's vacillation between an economic and racial analysis of the issues, although the
racial element ultimately dominates the court's thinking.
Another problem raised is the role of the court in the educational
process. Where should the line be drawn when judges decide issues
normally delegated to the sphere of professional educators, to local
school authorities, to the local community? Conversely, how may
school authorities pursue legitimate educational concepts even if
integration is not a primary factor in their formulation?
The third and major area of concern is the court's view that
"'Oscar Handlin, Is Integration the Answer?, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
March 1964, at 49. Handlin continues: "[T]herefore, integration is not an
end but a means toward an end. Equality of education, housing, employment, and politics is the goal, and genuine progress in that direction will
push the problem of de facto segregation in the background, as it has for
other groups." Id.
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integration is the only feasible means to obtain equal educational
opportunity. This doctrine collides head-on with the social impossibility at present of achieving this goal. Whether other courts
will be flexible enough to explore alternative solutions, instead of
following the precedent of Hobsen v. Hansen, with its inherent
rigidity, might have an important bearing on the ultimate means
employed to solve the educational crisis in the urban schools.
There has been no attempt to formulate answers to the issues
raised in the case, except to suggest that the courts not narrow
their inquiry to the integration question alone. While few educators would deny that integration should be an important goal of any
educational system, if techniques and programs are developed
which prove to be effective within the different locales, the court
should reconsider before condemning them as discriminatory, merely because integration is not an end result.
NEILL

G.

McBRYDE

Constitutional Law-Governmental Regulation of Surface
Mining Activities
Surface mining in the United States has affected 3.2 million
acres of land. Of this total, 2.0 million acres need varying degrees of treatment to alleviate a range of environmental damage
both on-site and off-site. About 20,000 active operations are disturbing the land at a rate estimated in excess of 150,000 acres
annually. Data submitted by the surface mining industries indicate that, in 1964, the amount of land partially or completely
reclaimed was equivalent to only 31 percent of the area disturbed in that year. Surface mining activities are expected to
expand rapidly in coming years. By 1980, it is expected that
more than 5 million acres will have been affected by surface
mining.
Some damage from surface mining is inevitable even with the
best mining and land restoration methods. But much can be done
to prevent damage and to reclaim mined lands.'
I. INTRODUCTION

In an operation having the magnitude of surface mining in the
United States, the relationship existing between this activity and
the general public and the degree of control to be exercised in the
'STRIP AND SURFACE MINE STUDY POLICY COMM., U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, SURFACE MINING AND OUR ENVIRONMENT 104 (1967).
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public's interest are of paramount importance. The rapidly increasing population, the expansion of suburban areas, and the
recognized need for area-wide control of land uses are on a collision course with the desirability of exploiting our natural resources, particularly the numerous mineral resources found in
North Carolina. This problem is exemplified by current surface
mining practices and the probability that they will be increasingly
utilized within the state.
Surface mining may be subdivided into the general categories
of strip mining and quarrying.2 While these two methods differ
technically, the legal problems involved in their regulation are
similar. Strip mining is accomplished from the surface of the
earth and is generally performed by stripping off the earth, known
as overburden, which lies over the mineral, and then by removing
the mineral uncovered beneath the overburden. Open-pit is synonymous with quarry, and quarrying involves a large opening in the
earth from which rock, sand or ores are taken. The term "quarry"
is not properly applicable to the comparatively slight excavation
made primarily for construction. Both strip mining and quarrying
entail the removal of a large volume of surface "waste" material
with a resulting piling of this material at a nearby location and an
excavated opening or openings which accumulate water if not refilled with the waste or other substance. Both operations are characterized by noise, dust, and extensive use of mechanical equipment.
That a person's property shall not be taken except by due process
of law and that he is entitled to equal protection of the laws are
guarantees afforded by the United States Constitution 8 and the
North Carolina Constitution.' Into this area of historical rights
2 Governmental
controls over commercial mining practices extend to
surface evacuation of ore and minerals and of sand and gravel, by the
"open pit" and "strip mining" methods; to subsurface extraction of ore and
materials; to air and stream pollution; to the processing plants where crushing, washing and mineral-gangue separation is accomplished; and to disposition of the gangue (non-commercial minerals and rock separated from
the desired mineral). The scope of this comment will be limited to controls
exerted over surface evacuations. Unless otherwise noted, no distinction
will be stressed between excavations of ore and of sand and gravel. While
regulations of strip mining methods are emphasized, some material deals
with open pit methods, and it is believed that the problems encountered and
the extent of permissible regulations of the two methods, relative to the
excavation process, are essentially the same.
'U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
'N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 17.
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stalks the police power as an inherent right of governmental units
to provide for the public health, welfare, safety and morals of their
citizenry. 5 This power, while incapable of an exact definition or
limitation, 6 is relied on "to prohibit or regulate certain acts or functions of the populace as may be deemed to be inimical to the comfort, safety, health and welfare of society." 7 Utilization of this
power is the basis by which state and local government units will
be in a position to cope with developing problems, relatively new to
North Carolina but previously encountered in other states, attenddant to surface mining activities.
There is no legal right to exploit natural resources wherever
they may be found." This principle, in conjunction with the police
power, furnishes the foundation for a governmental unit's endeavors to regulate mining activities. Development of controls over
surface excavation practices has followed a familiar pattern of
judicial and legislative reaction to the changing social and economical conditions created by an increasing population and urbanization.
This envolvement has progressed from earlier prohibitory legislation, closely scrutinized by the courts as an invasion of property
rights, to the more recent utilization of zoning plans and direct
regulations that are recognized as requisites for protecting the public interest. Both procedures are generally viewed as proper applications of the police power, subject to an ever present requirement
of reasonableness. While the courts stand ready to oversee the
reasonableness of legislation and to protect constitutionally granted
rights, control of such mining activities is basically one for legislative concern.'
Regulation of surface activities may be classified into direct
regulations enacted by the state legislative bodies and having statewide effect, and local regulations enacted by the states' political
subdivisions pursuant to the authority delegated by the states. The
local regulations may be by direct control of particular conduct
'See, e.g., Lees v. Bay Area Air Pollution Control Dist., 238 Cal. App.

2d 850, 856, 48 Cal. Rptr. 295, 299 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
'Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
"Davis v. Barrett, 253 Iowa 1178, 1180, 115 N.W. 2d 839, 841 (1962)

(emphasis added).

"E.g., Township of Bloomfield v. Beardslee, 349 Mich. 296, 84 N.W.2d
537 (1957).
' Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Neace, 337 S.W.2d 725, 728 (Ky. 1960),
where the court stated: "Short of that which is proved to be arbitrary, wanton, or malicious, the control of commercial mining practices is strictly a
matter of legislative regulation."
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where the activity is prohibited or the manner of conducting the
activity is regulated, or through zoning legislation involving comprehensive regulation of land uses by districts and regulation of
certain permitted conduct within the district. Both the direct and
zoning controls may have the practical effect of prohibiting a desired usage.
II. EARLY VIEWS
Early attempts to regulate surface activity were local legislations of a direct nature. The earliest were in the form of outright
prohibitions directed at undesirable activities such as pig sties and
livery stables. If found to be a nuisance per se, the activity could
be regulated; but, if not, it was an unconstitutional taking of property in violation of the fourteenth amendment. This approach was
relaxed in Reinman v. City of Little Rock' where the United States
Supreme Court upheld the state's finding that a livery stable was a
nuisance in fact and in law, provided the state did not act arbitrarily or unjustly discriminatorily, and that a municipal ordinance forbidding the conduct of a livery stable within a designated area could
not be enjoined. Early legislation prohibiting surface mining was
viewed in respect to the public safety but was generally held to be
an unconstitutional taking of property" and to be a restriction that
could not be imposed upon a legitimate business without compensation.' 2 This approach was predicated on use of the police power
being justified only if the operation of a quarry or mine would
result in injury to the person or property of another. 13 Illustrative
of this is Ex parte Kelso 4 where a municipal ordinance prohibited
the operation of rock quarries within designated limits of San
U.S. 171 (1915).
See Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d
515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962).
The California Supreme Court discussed the earlier California cases and
distinguished them in view of the more recent developments in comprehensive zoning.
12 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) ; Pacific States
Supply Co. v. City of San Francisco, 171 F. 727 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1909);
Commonwealth ex rel. Keator v. Clearview Coal Co., 256 Pa. 328, 100 A.
820 (1917); Stone v. Kendall, 268 S.W. 759 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
18
Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1226 (1966).
14 147 Cal. 609, 82 P. 241 (1905).
While the court invalidated the ordinance as prohibiting quarrying, they did recognize the state's power to regu10237

"

late the manner in which the quarrying operation was conducted, on the

basis that uncontrolled quarrying may be performed in such a manner to
occasion injury.
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Francisco, irrespective of whether a quarry might cause injury to
others. Holding the ordinance to be an improper use of the police
power, the court emphasized that the use to which a person could
put his property could not be interfered with or limited except to
the extent that such use would definitely result in legal injury.
While outright prohibitions were generally unfavorably accepted, a regulation of the manner of conducting an activity was
likely to be sustained if the court found the regulation to be reasonable, even if the practical effect of the regulation amounted to a
prohibition. This judicial approach is exemplified by the landmark
case, Hadacheck v. Sebastian.1 5 A Los Angeles ordinance made
it unlawful to establish or operate a brickyard or brickkiln within
designated areas. The petitioner owned a tract of land located
within the designated area and containing a valuable deposit of
clay used in the manufacture of bricks. He contended that, if
required to manufacture his bricks at a location other than on the
tract containing the clay deposit, the operation could not be economically conducted. The Supreme Court upheld the ordinance as
a valid regulation of the manner in which the overall brickmaking
process could be conducted. Recognizing that such a control could
result in prohibiting the petitioner from mining his clay and that
it would be an extension of the Reinman case, since the mining
operation could not be conducted elsewhere, the Court insisted that
the ordinance was only a regulation within the designated locality
over the manufacture of the clay into bricks. It distinguished the
Kelso case by viewing the ordinance as a control over the offensive
effects of a commercial operation rather than as a deprivation of
the mineral deposit.

III. TRANSITION STAGE
That a governmental unit could prohibit the uses of property
without compensation, and without justifying it as being a common
law nuisance or creating a risk of imminent injuries, was recognized for the first time by the United States Supreme Court in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.1" A municipality's comprehensive zoning plan for regulating and restricting the location
of commercial and residential structures, the lot area to be built
upon, and the size and height of buildings was held to be a valid
15239

18272

U.S. 394 (1915).

U.S. 365 (1926).
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exercise of the police power. In justifying the advent of such
restrictions, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sutherland,
pointed to the increase and concentration of population as creating
new problems requiring regulations that earlier would have been
rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. This was accomplished, not
by varying the meaning of constitutional guaranties, but by adjusting the scope of their application to meet the changing conditions within the field of their operation. The Court further
emphasized that such ordinances, and all similar laws and regulations, must find their justification in some aspect of the police power,
as it is asserted for the general public welfare, and that the line
separating the legitimate from the illegitimate assumption of power
is not capable of precise delimitation but varies with circumstances
and conditions. The role of the judiciary in the zoning process
was reiterated by the Court's statement: "If the validity of the
legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable,
the legislative judgment must be allowed to control."' 7 Of particular interest is the Court's acceptance that, in comprehensive regulations, some "innocent" activities may suffer the same fate as
offensive activities, but the inclusion of a reasonable margin reaching innocent activities will not invalidate the controls.
The Euclid case stands as a milestone in the acceptance of a
new. innovation which places permissible limitations on individual
rights. This raises a question as to why the courts differentiate
between direct prohibitions and zoning controls that may, and
often do, have the effect of a prohibition. While a direct prohibition is an outright regulation of a single or related group of
activities, a prohibition fostered by zoning is an essential part of
an overall comprehensive plan of uses within a designated district.
The preferential treatment afforded zoning regulations by the courts
seems to have its basis in the fact that a particular prohibition is
only one cog in the comprehensive scheme, rather than a "one-shot"
effort directed at an undesirable activity and uncoordinated with
other controls that have been enacted or may be enacted in the future by the governmental subdivisions.:'
1' 272 U.S. at 388, citing from Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 294
(1924). Accord, Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P.
381 (1925).
See City of Elizabeth City v. Aydlett, 201 N.C. 602, 161 S.E. 78 (1931)
where the court upheld a zoning regulation prohibiting the construction of
a filling station after previously invalidating an ordinance directly prohibiting such construction.

19671

SURFACE MINING ACTIVITIES

Judicial acceptance of zoning legislation, rather than direct
prohibitory legislation, as a constitutional regulation of property
uses even though the particular use could not be conducted at another location, is illustrated in Blancett v. Montgomery. 9 A municipal
ordinance prohibited the drilling of oil wells within the corporate
limits, and a general zoning ordinance classified the proposed drilling
sites as residential. The trial court held the prohibitory ordinance
to be invalid as unreasonable, arbitrary and discriminatory but did
not make a finding as to the validity of the zoning ordinance. The
Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's results; and
assuming, but without deciding, that the prohibitory ordinance was
invalid, the court held the general zoning ordinance to be a valid
exercise of the police power and not to be a taking of property
without due process nor an abridgment of equal protection rights.'
IV.

REGULATION THROUGH ZONING

As a general proposition, the principles applied in the zoning
of other industries and buildings are also applicable to the regulation of surface mining.-'
The legislation must have a real or
substantial relation to the police power goals,22 and its effect on
the landowner should be considered3 Since the Euclid case, a
gradual accumulation of case law on zoning controls over surface
mining activities has provided insights into the requisites for judicial acceptance of these regulations. While the courts' principal
concerns are that the legislation be reasonable and not discriminatory and that the legislative bodies have discretion to act within
these limits, the cases also reveal an influence derived from various
aspects of zoning's relation to aesthetic considerations, non-conforming uses, and special use permits.
19398

S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1966).

The court stated: "As a general proposition a valid exercise of the

police power resulting in expense or loss of property is not a taking of
property without due process of law or without just compensation, nor does
it abridge the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States." 398 S.W.2d at 881, citing 6 E. McQulLLIN,

MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS

§§ 24.05-.06, (3d

ed. 1949).

E.g.,

Marblehead Land Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 47 F.2d 528 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 284 U.S. 634 (1931).
21 Cf. United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958);

Town of Seekonk v. John J. McHale & Sons, Inc., 325 Mass. 271, 90 N.E.2d
325 (1950).
58 A[. Jun. Zoning § 97 (1948). See, e.g., Kane v. Kreiter, 25 Ohio
Op. 2d 295, 195 N.E.2d 829 (C.P. Tuscarawas County 1963).
."See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
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A.

Prohibitionof a Use
A well documented opinion of the power to prohibit a use is
Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles.24 An
ordinance established a comprehensive zoning plan for Los Angeles,
restricting the plaintiff's property to agricultural and residential
uses, but with provisions for a supplemental use district. A request
for the supplemental use was denied. The trial court, after finding
that dust from the proposed rock, sand and gravel quarrying would
carry to nearby residences and sanitariums, denied injunctive relief
to the plaintiff. Since the property was suitable only for gravel pit
operations, the ordinance not only prohibited a desired use but also
prevented any economical use of the property. Applying a test of
limiting the legislative action only if it is unreasonable, arbitrary or
discriminatory, the California Supreme Court found that reasonable
minds could differ,2 5 in which case the court would not substitute
its judgment for that of the legislative body, and that the ordinance
was a valid exercise of the police power. Earlier California cases
had indicated legislative authorities could not constitutionally prohibit the extraction of natural resources when they were the primary
or preponderant value of the property. In rejecting this view, the
court pointed to an extended line of cases upholding zoning ordinances that prohibited the removal of natural resources and refusing
to distinguish between the prohibition of their removal and the
prohibition of other uses. 6 As a basis for this approach, the court
traced the history of prohibitory legislation from the period before
comprehensive zoning, through its acceptance in Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co.,2 7 and into its more recent applications."8

Attacks on zoning controls are often predicated on financial loss
to the owner. This is particularly applicable to removal of natural
products as a result of their immobility and the impossibility of
conducting the industry at another locality. Although a comparison of values before and after the regulation is relevant, it is not
2' 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371
U.S. 36 (1962). See 50 Calif. L. Rev. 896 (1962).
2"Disagreement between the city planning commission and the city
council relative to granting the plaintiff's application for a supplemental use
is indicative of how reasonable minds may differ.
28 See cases cited 57 Cal. 2d at 529, 370 P.2d at 351, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 647.
27272 U.S. 365 (1926).
"8 E.g., West Bros. Brick Co. v. City of Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 192
S.E. 881, appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 658 (1937).
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conclusive in determining the validity of controls.2 9 A typical approach is that an exercise of the police power, either through zoning
or direct prohibition that precludes what may be a more profitable
use of the property, does not violate a person's constitutional rights
if the exercise of the power is otherwise valid."0
In Consolidated the court did not apply a test relating to the
effect on the landowner, but relied on the "fairly debatable" effect
quarrying had on contiguous property and the overriding principle
of protecting the general public. Support for the position that the
prohibition was not an unconstitutional taking without compensation was found in Marblehead Land Co. v. City of Los Angeles3 l
where the federal court upheld a comprehensive zoning ordinance
prohibiting extraction of oil from lands in a residential zone. Additional support for this position is City of Trussville v. Porter3 '
involving a municipal ordinance zoning an area for "General Industry."
The Porter opinion extended judicial acceptance of
"legislative" action by upholding the delegation of authority to a
building inspector to permit or deny quarrying based on his opinion
of whether it would create objectionable conditions affecting a
considerable portion of the city. The court upheld the inspector's
denial of a permit and refused to enjoin what it found to be a valid
ordinance even though it deprived people of a right to earn an
income. This approach is traceable to the United States Supreme
Court's statement relating to the police power in Hadacheck v.
Sebastian:
It is to be remembered that we are dealing with one of the
most essential powers of the government,-one that is the least
"See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
" E.g., Village of Spillertown v. Prewitt, 21 Ill. 2d 228, 171 N.E.2d 582
(1961); La Salle Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 60 I1. App. 2d 39, 208
N.E.2d 430 (1965). But see East Fairfield Coal Co. v. Booth, 166 Ohio St.
379, 143 N.E.2d 309 (1957). While not discussing the removal of natural
products, the North Carolina Supreme Court held in City of Elizabeth City
v. Aydlett, 201 N.C. 602, 161 S.E. 78 (1931) that financial loss is not the
test of the reasonableness of a zoning ordinance.
"47 F.2d 528 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 634 (1931); accord,
Blancett v. Montgomery, 398 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1966).
" 279 Ala. 467, 187 So. 2d 224 (1966); accord, Southern Rock Prod.
Co. v. Self, 279 Ala. 488, 492, 187 So. 2d 244, 246 (1966) where the court
stated: "Unquestionably a municipality has authority to pass zoning ordinances which regulate the use of private property and the authority to promulgate ordinances prohibiting the removal or crushing of rock from lands
lying in certain areas or under certain conditions."
239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915) (citations omitted).
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limitable. It may, indeed, seem harsh in its exercise, usually
is on some individual but the imperative necessity for its existence precludes any limitation upon it when not exerted arbitrarily. A vested interest cannot be asserted against it because
of conditions once obtaining . . . To so hold would preclude
development and fix a city forever in its primitive conditions.
There must be progress, and if in its march private interests
are in the way, they must yield to the good of the community.
Consideration of the prohibition's effect on the property owner
and the necessity for more than a passing acceptance of the legislative determination that such a prohibition is needed find support
in Kane v. Kreiter3 where a township ordinance zoned an area as
agricultural, thereby preventing the strip mining of coal. Recognizing that the classification of uses must be reasonable, the court
further required that pre-existing vested rights be considered and
protected. It noted that the plaintiff's land was steep, hilly, rundown and unsuited for farming and held the deprivation to be a
taking without due process in violation of the United States and
Ohio Constitutions. A frequent view is that incidental damage
resulting from zoning, such as a dimunition of land values, does
not violate due process unless the restriction practically or substantially renders the land useless for all reasonable purposes."
Efforts to establish a control as an exercise of eminent domain,
rather than of police power, as a basis for invalidating a zoning
regulation have been unsuccessful once the ordinance was found to
bear a reasonable relationship to the general public welfare. As observed in Beverly Oil Co. v. City of Los Angeles,"0 the very essence
of the police power, as differentiated from the power of eminent
domain, is that the deprivation of individual rights and property
cannot prevent its operation if its exercise is proper and the method
of exercise is reasonably within the meaning of due process.
Whether the mining operation will constitute a common law
" 25 Ohio Op. 2d 295, 195 N.E.2d 829 (C.P. Tuscarawas County 1963).
See Midland Elec. Coal Corp. v. Knox County, 1 Ill. 2d 200, 115 N.E.2d
275 (1953); East Fairfield Coal Co. v. Booth, 166 Ohio St. 379, 143 N.E. 2d
309 (1957). The East Fairfield court stated: "[W]e must consider the protective effect of the constitutional guaranties upon the owner of the land in
question; whether the power exists to forbid the use must not be considered
abstractly, but in connection with all the circumstances and locality of the
land itself and its surroundings." 166 Ohio St. at 382, 143 N.E.2d at 311.
"Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Bubler
v. Racine
County, 33 Wis. 2d 137, 146 N.W.2d 403 (1966).
ae 40 Cal. 2d 552, 254 P.2d 865 (1953).
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nuisance is not controlling in determining the validity of a zoning
ordinance, but the law of nuisances may be consulted for the helpful
assistance of its analogies in ascertaining the reasonableness of the
controls."7 A modification of this approach is advanced in Kane v.
Kreiter s where, in addition to considering the reasonableness of the
prohibition, the court stated that the desired control would be valid
only if it prohibited what would become an actual nuisance.
Aesthetic considerations are generally held to be insufficient,
when unsupported by other factors, to sustain the zoning power
although there is authority indicating the law in this area is not
settled and that a solely aesthetic approach may have a definite relation to the public welfare. 9 Aesthetics are usually an auxiliary
consideration, with the validity of controls on mineral extraction
supported by other considerations. 40 The North Carolina Supreme
Court has taken the position that aesthetic factors alone are insufficient to support use of the police power.4"
While needing support from other factors, aesthetics have
played an influential role in decisions upholding zoning controls
of mining activities. The court in Town of Burlington v. Dunn
seemed to be swayed by aesthetic considerations of possible consequences in upholding a zoning ordinance preventing the removal of
top soil from land within the town. They discussed the disagreeable dust and noise that would result from machinery removing
the soil but considered, as more important, that a "desert" area
would remain after removal of the top soil and that such an unsightly waste in a residential area would permanently depress the
value of surrounding property. An interesting approach was taken
by the court in Midland Electric Coal Corp. v. Knox County,43 invalidating a zoning prohibition on strip mining of coal, where they
"Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); cf.
Township
of Bloomfield v. Beardslee, 349 Mich. 296, 84 N.W.2d 537 (1957).
8 25 Ohio Op. 2d 295, 195 N.E.2d 829 (C.P. Tuscarawas County 1963).
" 58 Am!. JUR. Zoning § 30 (1948). In Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d
263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967), the court overruled prior
New York cases and held that aesthetic objectives alone will support a
zoning ordinance although the exercise of the police power should not extend to every artistic conformity or nonconformity.
"°See Merced Dredging Co. v. Merced County, 67 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.
Cal. 1946).
'"State v. Brown, 250 N.C. 54, 108 S.E.2d 74 (1959).
This case did
not involve regulation of surface mining activities.
"2318 Mass. 216, 61 N.E.2d 243, cert. denied, 326 U.S. 739 (1945);
accord, Billerica v. Quinn, 320 Mass. 687, 71 N.E.2d 235 (1947).
" 1 Ill. 2d 200, 115 N.E.2d 275 (1953).
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distinguished the Dunn case by a casual remark that coal is not as
plentiful as top soil.
Nonconforming uses may generally be continued irrespective
of subsequently enacted prohibitions. In controls over mining and
quarrying this is sometimes extended to permit continuance of the
nonconforming use over the entire property in question and not
restricted solely to the portion which was mined or quarried prior
to adoption of the prohibition.44 Contrary to this position are the
decisions which have found that the continued operations "vary"
from the prior uses and therefore are not within the nonconforming
uses doctrine. In De Felice v. Zoning Board of Appeals45 a change
in the mechanical process for washing and screening sand prior to
its removal from the sand pit was sufficient to prevent the altered
process from being an existing use within the zoning classification.
The Dunn court also refused to consider the removal of top soil
as an existing use when the prior use was a gravel pit from which
the top soil had been removed.
B. Regulation of a Use
Use of the zoning power to regulate, rather than to prohibit,
surface mining activity has taken the format of applying a zoning
classification to an area but permitting the extraction as a special use
if a special permit is obtained. "Special use" is defined as a method
of land use control where the zoning ordinance retains the usual
residential, commercial and industrial zones, and in addition
establishes special uses that are permitted if approved by a zoning
board or governing legislative body."
The purpose of a special
use is to provide the board with a procedure for the alleviation of
land usage restrictions which result in limitations bearing no reasonable relation to the objectives of the police power.47 The government's ability to regulate specific onsite activities and to require
other conditions to be fulfilled is treated in a subsequent discussion
of state acts.
The general rule of reasonableness applies to the regulation and
to the action of the agency issuing the special use permits. In La
"Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1226 (1966).
" 130 Conn. 156, 32 A.2d 635 (1943) ; see Wilbur v. Newton, 302 Mass.
38, 18Kotrich
N.E.2d v.365
(1938).
County
of Du Page, 19 Ill. 2d 181, 166 N.E.2d 601 (1960).
City of Warwick v. Del Bonis Sand & Gravel Co., 209 A.2d 227 (R.I.

1965).
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Salle National Bank v. County of Cook 48 an ordinance zoning an
area for heavy industry also provided for quarrying as a special
use upon issuance of a permit by the county commissioners. The
commissioners refused to issue a special permit for the quarrying
of limestone. The court considered evidence of lower property
values, pollution of wells, harmful effects due to the general noise,
and the dirt and attractive nuisance qualities and held the commissioner's refusal to be reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious." Decrease in value of the zoned deposits was also considered
to be an insufficient basis for invalidating the ordinance. However,
refusal to issue a special permit was held to be an unenforceable
regulation of quarrying in City of Warwick v. Del Bonis Sand &
Gravel Co.5" where sand and gravel were being removed prior to
the enactment of a zoning ordinance requiring a permit for continuation of the operation.
Powers delegable to a board in the issuance of a special permit
were etended in Houdaille ConstructionMaterials, Inc. v. Board of
Adjustment5" where the court upheld the board's imposition of certain performance standards that were in addition to the standards
required by the zoning ordinance. Although the company could
meet the standards of the ordinance, the court further required it
to meet the board's additional standards that were considered to be
reasonable.
Dangers of infringement of equal protection rights are prevalent in the issuance or denial of special permits. Provisions for
permitting a special use are likely to authorize inadvertent or arbitrary treatment of a specific operation that is not afforded other
similar ones; and they are likely to authorize any given operation
having essentially identical effects as non-permitted operations.
Considering these discriminatory aspects, the court in Town of
Caledonia v. Racine Limestone Co.52 held that requiring a permit
" 60 Ill. App. 2d 39, 208 N.E.2d 430 (1965). The court also gave six
guidelines for determining whether a zoning ordinance is valid or is invalid as a taking without compensation.
" Accord, Raimondo v. Board of Appeals, 331 Mass. 228, 118 N.E.2d 67
(1954).
( 0209 A.2d 227 (R.I. 1965).
" 92 N.J. Super. 293, 223 A.2d 210 (App. Div. 1966).
"2266 Wis. 475, 63 N.W.2d 697 (1954). Accord, Northern Ill. Coal
Corp. v. Medill, 397 Ill. 98, 72 N.E.2d 844 (1947) where the ordinance was
held to discriminate against strip miners unless it regulated everyone and
every industry that endangered the public health or conservation in a manner similar to strip mining.
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to operate a stone quarry in areas zoned as agricultural, but not requiring one for similar quarries in industrial zones or for other
mining operations in agricultural zones, was an unreasonable classification and not germane to the police power objectives. The court
emphasized that any ordinance which limits or restricts the right
of a person to engage in a legitimate business must apply equally
to all persons engaged in a like business where the circumstances
and conditions are similar.
Zoning ordinances providing for a variance from the zoned
classification are subject to rules similar to those pertaining to
special uses. Discretionary refusal of a board to grant a permissive
variance for sand and gravel removal in an agricultural-residential
district was held in Calcagno v. Town Board 3 not to be a taking
of property without compensation when the court found the evidence insufficient to establish that the property met the criteria for
a variance within the ordinance.
V.

DIRECT PROHIBITIONS AND REGULATIONS (NON-ZONING)

Direct prohibitions and regulations, as distinguished from zoning legislation, have been upheld as a valid exercise of the police
power where the restrictions exemplify a substantial and definite
purpose to serve the public and the means adopted bear a reasonable
relationship to the accomplishment of this purpose. Such controls
are generally predicated on protection of the public safety. General
prohibitions having no apparent basis for their action, particularly
when left to the unrestrained control of a governing authority, are
usually held to be invalid.54
The requisite relationship to the public health and safety is demonstrated in Village of Spillertown v. Prewitt5 5 where a municipal
ordinance prohibited strip mining of coal within the city. The
ordinance declared the stripping method to be dangerous and hazardous to the person and property of the citizens and was predicated
on the operation's proximity to houses where small children played
and on the tendency of prior excavations to fill with water. Holding the operation to be an obvious danger to the public safety,
the court refused to invalidate the ordinance as a taking of property
without compensation or as violating due process. It found the
" 265 App. Div. 687, 41 N.Y.S.2d 140 (App. Div. 1943).
"'Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1226 (1966). See particularly § 13

21 Ill. 2d 228, 171 N.E.2d 582 (1961).

and §§ 15-18.
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ordiiance: to be reasonable and the preclusion of the most -profitable
use of, the property not to violate the owner's constitutional rights.",
The emphasis -placed on protection of the public safety is apparent upon considering that the Prewitt court, which took a liberal
view when the public safety was obviously endangered, was the
same court that earlier, in Midland Electric Coal Corp. v. Knox
County,57 had adopted a strict approach and invalidated a zoning
ordinance prohibiting strip mining upon a failure to find a substantial relationship between the prohibition and the preservation of the
public health and safety. The Midland operation was considered
to have no detrimental effect on neighboring persons or properties,
and the land was suitable for reclamation as agricultural.
Principal opposition to a mining prohibition is found in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon" which held an attempt to prohibit coal
mining within a city to be an unconstitutional taking without compensation. The value of Pennsylvania Coal as precedent for this
position is weakened by the United States Supreme Court's subsequent recognition of comprehensive zoning and its necessarily prohibitory effect on commercial activities.5
Validity of direct legislation as a proper use of the police power
received substantial support in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead.60
A city had grown around a sand and gravel quarrying operation and
a 20-acre lake created by the excavations. A prior ordinance requiring a wire fence around the land and specific berm and slope
requirements was complied with by the operator, but an attempt to
prohibit the quarrying through zoning legislation failed when the
operation was found to be a prior nonconforming use. An ordinance directed at regulation of the quarrying provided that no excavation could be made below two feet above the maximum ground
water level, prior excavations below the water level must be refilled, and a permit must be obtained. The United States Supreme
"See Schreiber v. Town of Cheektowaga, 195 Misc. 748, 91 N.Y.S.2d
403 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
1 Ill. 2d 200, 115 N.E.2d 275 (1953).
260 U.S. 393 (1922). Accord, Ex parte Kelso, 147 Cal. 609, 82 P.
241 (1905) ; see note 12 supra and accompanying text.

"'See, e.g., Burlington v. Dunn, 318 Mass. 216, 61 N.E.2d 243 (1945),

for a discussion of the effect of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926) on the earlier view taken by the Supreme Court in the
Pennsylvania Coal case.
00369 U.S. 590 (1962).
Accord, Farmington River Co. v. Town Plan
& Zoning Comm'n, 25 Conn. Supp. 125, 197 A.2d 653 (Super. Ct. 1963).
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Court upheld the city's attempt to enjoin the operation in violation
of the ordinance despite the fact that it deprived the property of its
most beneficial use and, in essence, amounted to a prohibition of
the beneficial use to which the property had previously been devoted.
Conceding that no set formula exists for determining where regulation ends and "taking" begins, the Court considered a comparison of values before and after the regulation to be relevant but
by no means conclusive, and relied on their previously established
rule that depriving property of its most beneficial use does not
render an ordinance unconstitutional. 61 Instrumental in the Court's
decision was the legislative intent that the ordinance serve as a
safety measure, and it was held to be a reasonable exercise of the
city's police power.
Regulatory- legislation may be considered a taking without compensation if it interferes with operations which do not injure others
in their person or property 2 or if the granting of permission to
engage in the lawful activity regulated by the legislation is left to
the unrestricted discretion of an administrative agency, 3 thereby
not insuring a reasonable relationship to the public safety and
welfare.
VI.

STATE REGULATIONS

Fortified by judicial acceptance of prohibitory and regulatory
controls, by both zoning and direct legislation, as valid exercises
of the police power, the more recent trend indicates an increasing
role by the states through direct regulation of surface mining. This
state role is in addition to the continuing local regulatory schemes.
Early state controls were essentially limited to mine safety requirements, but these are being replaced or supplemented by statewide regulations and an Interstate Compact which concentrate on
rehabilitation of the disturbed land and protection of neighboring
properties. A principal development is the interest of the federal
government in this area. Identical bills are pending in the House
of Representatives and the Senate. 4 These bills would authorize
the establishment of an office within the Department of the Interior
"1Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
" Ex parte Davison, 321 Mo. 370, 13 S.W.2d 40 (1928).
'"Merced Dredging Co. v. Merced County, 67 F. Supp. 598 (S.D. Cal.
1946) ; Morton v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. App. 2d 577, 269 P.2d 81 (1954).
(1967); H.R. 4719, 90th Cong., 1st
8 S. 217, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
Sess. (1967).
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for administration of their provisions and are directed to the "reclamation, acquisition, and conservation of lands and water adversely
affected by coal mining operations. '65 They would require an operator to obtain a permit, post a bond, preplan reclamation procedures,
and report his progress. Provisions are also included for rendering financial and technical assistance to state and local agencies.
Coverage of the bills extends to previously mined coal lands as
well as to land to be affected by future strip mining of coal.
Regulations at the state and federal levels will assume legal and
practical difficulties of a more significant magnitude than have been
encountered at the local levels. The most outstanding of these
problems is affording equal protection to all affected operators. Inherent in a more widespread control are the difficulties of treating
all similar operations in an identical manner or of justifying any
preferential treatment directed at a particular class as a reasonable
classification. State regulations also face the problem of not being
correlated within an overall comprehensive scheme of usage regulations, and therefore encounter the judicial objections experienced
by local direct prohibitions. The administration of a statewide
enactment raises practical questions as to the requisite administrative structure and the ever present dilemma of what authority may
and should be delegated to various subordinate echelons. Offsetting
these adverse aspects is the potential in a state structure for better
trained and more competent professional personnel and for research and development facilities.
At least nine states6" have adopted statewide enactments designed to eliminate, or contain within acceptable bounds, the undesirable effects attendant with surface excavations and to reclaim
the affected land. Characteristics common to all or to a majority
of these legislative schemes include: (1) an application for a permit must be filed; (2) the operator is required to post a performance
bond to insure compliance with the law; (3) the operator must sub5 d.
'0
"ILL.

ANN. STAT. §§ 180.1-.13 (Supp. 1966); IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 461501 to -1528 (Supp. 1967); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 350.010-.990 (Supp. 1966);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, §§ 657-674 (Supp. 1967); OHIO CODE ANN.
§§1513.01-.19 (Supp. 1966); PA. STAT. ANN. chap. 4, §§ 681.1-.22 and chap.
6, §§ 1396.1-.21 (1966); TENN. CODE ANN. chap. 15 (Supp. 1967); VA.
CODE ANN. chap. 15, §§ 45.1-162 to -179 (1967); W. VA. CODE §§ 22-2A-1
to -14 (1966). The federal government and forty-six states regulate surface mining on government owned or controlled lands, but this discussion
will be limited to governmental controls exerted on privately owned lands.
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mit with his application a description of lands to be mined, and
periodic reports on the progress of the operation; (4) the disturbed
area must be reclaimed within specified time limits; (5) the disturbed land must be graded to varying degrees; (6) performance
bonds are held until the state concludes that the reclamation has met
the requirements of the law; (7) failure to complete reclamation
results in forfeiture of the bond and, in some cases, prohibits the
issuance of new permits to the operator involved; and (8) criminal
penalties are prescribed for operating without a permit or license.
Three of the state laws regulate the surface mining of all minerals,67 one state law applies to all minerals except limestone, marble
and dimension stone,68 one state law applies to clay and coal,00 and
the remaining four apply only to coal."
Judicial testing of these state enactments is found in three leading cases decided during the period 1947-49. Of particular interest
in all three is the courts' concern with equal protection of the rights
of the operators and property owners. The Illinois act"' regulating
strip mining of coal was challenged by seventeen coal companies in
a successful attempt to enjoin its enforcement." The state pleaded
its police power as the basis for the act; but the court, in examining
the provisions, held that preservation of the public health was not
the object and purpose of the regulation. This was predicated on
the act's requirement that the land be restored to its original configuration, which would include the restoration of a mosquito breeding pond if one had originally existed, and that the final open cut
could be left unfilled if there was insufficient material available for
refilling, thereby leaving one open excavation for the accumulation
of water. The court indicated it would find a reasonable relation
to protecting the public health if the act required the elimination of
all ponds and other sources for the accumulation of water. A conservation argument as justification for the requirement that the land
be restored to a condition suitable for row crops, rather than reclaimed by reforesting or reseeding of the unleveled ridges as
" Illinois; Indiana; West Virginia.
Tennessee.
0 Kentucky.
7 Maryland; Ohio; Pennsylvania; Virginia.
The Illinois act, as well as those of Pennsylvania and Maryland, contained provisions essentially identical to the common characteristics discussed in the preceding textual paragraph. Selected provisions of these acts
are reiterated only as they are pertinent to the courts' considerations.
"Z
Northern Ill. Coal Corp. v. Medill, 397 Ill. 98, 72 N.E.2d 844 (1947).
68
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previously conducted by the individual operators, was rejected as
a confiscation on the basis that the state cannot compel a private
owner, at his own expense, to convert his land to what the state
considers a better usage. The court further stipulated that, even
assuming the act to be a valid protection of the public health, it
was fatally defective as discriminatory against coal strip mining.
A regulation preventing the creation of water-filled excavations
and requiring contouring suitable for cultivation was held to be
an unconstitutional discrimination against coal operators unless it
applied equally to all operations leaving such excavations or land
unsuitable for cultivation. The court reiterated that it is the method
of mining employed, not the nature of the product removed, that
produces the undesirable result, and the object of the legislation
must be to prevent the use of that method. The Illinois law was
subsequently amended to eliminate these objectionable features
and to encompass the surface mining of all minerals within the State.
The Pennsylvania act regulated bituminous coal strip mining
operations.

In an action to enjoin enforcement of the act, 73 the

court upheld the legislature's authority to create a classification
for regulation and would not subject this classification (bituminous coal miners) to judicial revision unless it was grounded on
artificial or irrelevant distinctions rather than real distinctions.
Sufficient evidence of real distinctions between bituminous coal
operations and other mining operations was found, and the act
was upheld as a constitutional exercise of the police power. One
justice dissented on the basis of a violation of equal protection
under the fourteenth amendment upon finding no material differences between persons subject to the act and persons similarly
situated but not subject to it. The dissent failed to find sufficient
distinctions to justify legislative regulation of bitunimous coal
operations while not regulating all persons engaged in open pit or
strip mining. 74 Coverage of the law has now been expanded to include anthracite and bituminous coal operations. A challenge to
the registration fee as an unconstitutional tax, resulting from the
non-uniformity of its application, was countered by treating it
as a license fee for the privilege of mining; therefore it was not
subject to the requirement of uniformity of taxation.
" Dufour v. Maize, 357 Pa. 309, 56 A.2d 675 (1948).
" The non-regulated operations included limestone, shale, flint, clay,
ganister, iron ore, and cannel coal.
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The Maryland act regulating coal operations was the object of
a suit for a decree to declare it unconstitutional and for injunctive
relief to restrain its enforcement. 5 This legislation was found to
have a real and substantial relation to the police power with a purpose of preserving the public health and safety, but was held to be
unconstitutional in violation of equal protection rights due to the
exclusion of one county from its coverage. An increase in the
cost of mining was considered to be immaterial. In answer to a
challenge on denial of equal protection through the act's non-coverage of limestone and slate quarries, the court, citing from Jeffrey
Manufacturing Co. v. Blagg70 upheld the state's power to classify
the subjects of legislation. Such classification was held to be
within the equal protection clause provided it is not arbitrary or
unreasonable. The dangers from limestone and slate quarrying
were found to be considerably less than the dangers from strip
mining of coal, therefore it was reasonable to exclude them from
the act's coverage. The court further upheld the delegation of
authority to the Director of the Bureau of Mines, an administrative
official, to set the required bond between statutory limits of 5000
dollars to 20,000 dollars and to decide the degree of refilling that
would be required.

VII.

NORTH CAROLINA

Twentieth century developments in North Carolina have
brought this state to the threshold where impending governmental
control of surface mining activities has become a paramount public
concern, particularly in selected areas of the state. Entrance of
state and local legislative influence into this area has been minimal,
but recent activities and legislation indicate a transitional period
has been initiated.
A framework within which the state and local governments may
operate is available. The North Carolina Constitution provides:
The General Assembly shall not pass any local, private, or
special act or resolution relating to health, sanitation, and the
abatement of nuisances; . . . regulating labor, trade, mining, or
manufacturing. . . . Any local, private or special act or reso-

lution passed in violation of the provisions of this section shall
" Maryland Coal & Realty Co. v. Bureau of Mines, 193 Md. 627, 69
(1949).
A.2d 471 U.S.
571 (1915).

11-235
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be void. The General Assembly shall have power to pass general laws regulating matters set out in this section.?
Through this provision the General Assembly is authorized to enact
statewide legislation within its police power but still subject to the
guarantees of due process and equal protection afforded the individual and his property. 78 There are presently no general regulations of surface mining activities of the nature discussed in this
article, although the Interstate Mining Compact commits the state
to establishment of a program for the conservation and use of mined
lands.
Entrance of North Carolina in 1967 as a member of the Interstate Mining Compact79 is a milestone in the state's recognition of
the pressing problems facing its mining activities. The Compact
represents the realization by its member states of the adverse and
undesirable effects of mining on public and private interests, of
the need for regulation, conservation and restoration, and of the
state's position of responsibility in protecting the interests of all
affected parties. Each member state is committed to formulating
and establishing an effective program for the use and conservation
of productive mineral lands through the establishment of standards,
enactment of laws, and continuation of currently effective schemes.
This program must be directed to the protection of the public and
individual landowners; to the conduct of mining in a manner designed to reduce adverse effects on the economic, residential, recreational or aesthetic value and utility of land and water; to the requirement for restoration and rehabilitation of mined lands; and
to the abatement and control of land, water and air pollution. The
Interstate Mining Commission has the function to study operations
and techniques, make recommendations, gather and disseminate
information, and cooperate with the federal government and any
public or private entities having interest within the purview of the
Compact.
CoNsT. art. II, § 29 (emphasis added).
U.S. CoNsT. amend XIV, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 17.
Ch. 946, [1967] N.C. Sess. Laws. The Compact is sponsored by the
Council of State Governments and became effective upon enactment by four
states. It provides for a Commission to be composed of a representative
(the Governor or an alternate) from each member state and for an advisory
body in each member state. The North Carolina advisory body will be an
eleven-member "Mining Council" composed of state administrative officials,
members of the General Assembly, representatives of mining industries,
and representatives of nongovernmental conservation interests.
"N.C.
18
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North Carolina's commitment to a program designed to accomplish these purposes places the burden on the state to enact
general laws or to delegate adequate authority to state agencies
or local governments. Accomplishment of this through general
laws creates the difficulties of statewide legislation over the entire
surface mining industry or, as a minimum, over one particular
industry, e.g. gravel quarry operations. The wide range of topography, cultivation and population density existing across the
breadth of the state poses significant problems for any control that
would be appropriate and acceptable under the various situations.
Large variations of interests must be co-ordinated in the establishment of such controls. The need for regulation is also not as
prevalent in certain areas of the state as in other areas where metropolitan centers are developing or where adverse mining practices
have developed or will probably develop. North Carolina does
not have a single extractive industry of essentially statewide import,
as is found in several of the coal mining states, which warrants statewide regulation of the industry. These factors indicate that local
controls would be more effective with incentive and assistance furnished by the state. To ensure the local governments' ability to
enact adequate regulations, they should be delegated both zoning
and direct regulatory powers.
Local governments have only the regulatory powers delegated
by the General Assembly.
The power for both counties and
municipal corporations to effectuate zoning controls has been delegated. "For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals or
the general welfare," the boards of county commissioners and the
legislative boards of incorporated towns are empowered to regulate
and restrict "the location and use of buildings, structures, and land
'
for trade, industry, residence or other purposes, except farming."81
The statutes also enable the local bodies to provide for a board of adjustment to determine and vary the application of enacted regulations in harmony with their general purpose and intent and in
accordance with rules contained within the regulations. The 1967
General Assembly amended both statutes to permit the local legislative bodies or boards of adjustment to issue special use permits
or conditional use permits in accordance with procedures contained

:'See
v. Hedgpeth, 226 N.C. 405, 38 S.E.2d 164 (1946).
'1N.C.Kass
GEx. STAT. §§ 153-266.10, 160-172 (Supp. 1967).
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in the regulations and to impose reasonable and appropriate conditions and safeguards on the permits. 2
Powers of direct prohibition and regulation are furnished to
municipal corporations "to define, prohibit, abate, or suppress all
things detrimental to the health, morals, comfort, safety, convenience, and welfare of the people, and all nuisances and causes
thereof. 8 3 The county commissioners were delegated power "to
prevent and abate nuisances, whether on public or private property;
. . . to define, prohibit, abate, or suppress all things detrimental
to the health, morals, comfort, safety, convenience and welfare of
the people . . . ; and to make and enforce any other types of
local police, sanitary, and other regulations . . ."I" Due to the

exclusion of forty-four counties from the coverage of this statute,
the North Carolina Supreme Court held it to be a local act and
therefore void under article II, section 29 of the Constitution.8 5 As
a consequence of this ruling, any controls to be exerted by the county
commissioners under the present enabling laws must be under their
zoning authority.
Success of local governments in enacting zoning or direct controls will be aided by the position of the North Carolina Supreme
Court that when an ordinance is enacted within the grant of power
to the local body, there is a presumption that it is reasonable.8 6
An example of the county commissioners' utilization of their
zoning power is furnished by the recently enacted amendments to
the Chapel Hill Township Zoning Ordinance.87 The ordinance
previously permitted extractive uses in residential and industrial
districts upon conformance with minimum restrictions, approval
of a rehabilitation plan, and issuance of a permit by the County
Planning Board.
As amended, the ordinance creates a Rural Industrial District
(RID) providing for extractive uses, and a Rural Processing
District (RPD) providing for extractive use processing. Extractive
82

Ch. 1208, [1967] N.C. Sess. Laws.

8"N.C.GEN. STAT.
8 4N.C. GEN. STAT.

§ 160-200(6) (1964).

§ 153-9(55) (Supp. 1965).

High Point Surplus Co. v. Pleasants, 264 N.C. 650, 142 S.E.2d 697
(1965). This statute was not amended by the 1967 General Assembly.
" See Gene's, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 259 N.C. 118, 129 S.E.2d 889
(1963).
"'Orange County, N.C., Chapel Hill Township Zoning Ordinance § 8
(1967).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

uses are defined to include mining, quarrying, stripping, and other
removal of natural resources for non-farming purposes and are
permitted only in RID and RPD districts. Normal sand, gravel
and quarrying removal and processing operations are permitted in
the RID districts, but for other extractive uses only the removal
operation is permitted in RID districts. Both situations are subject
to special provisions.
An annualpermit must be obtained for all extractive uses. Sand,
gravel and quarrying operations may be under a Limited Extractive
Use Permit issued by the County Board of Adjustment and subject to provisions similar to those existing prior to the amendment.
All other operations must be under an Extractive Use Permit issued
after a public hearing by the County Commissioners and on a
recommendation by the County Planning Board. The Extractive
Use Permit can be obtained only after an operations plan and program is submitted and approved, an operations bond is filed, a rehabilitation plan and program is submitted and approved, and a rehabilitation bond is filed. A fee of 150 dollars is charged for the
application. Existing extractive uses must comply with the provisions of the ordinance. The operation plan must include a detailed topographic map showing estimated ultimate maximum depth
and surface extent of the operation; provisions for a buffer strip
of at least 200 feet; and provisions for testing and control to
maintain pre-existing air, surface water, and ground water qualities. Strict noise and vibration limits are imposed. The rehabilitation plan must include a topographic map and an aerial photograph of the proposed excavation site and detailed plans for returning the site to the condition shown on the map and photograph.
Rehabilitation includes regrading, replacement of the topsoil, refertilization, and vegetation replacement. Failure to comply with
the plans, as approved, will result in forfeiture of the bonds and
revocation of the permit.
The stated objectives of the Chapel Hill Township ordinance
are to further the general welfare of all residents by safeguarding
property values and to provide for residential, commercial and
industrial growth in Orange County. The unique intermingling
of industrial technology and research facilities with the advanced
educational facilities in the area makes these objectives particularly
The avowed legislative
applicable and, apparently, necessary.
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intent to further this growth and to protect property interests, with
the interrelated aesthetic considerations of an "historical" surrounding, should provide an ample basis of reasonableness for the classification and regulation of land uses.
Certain difficulties may be encountered in the application of
the ordinance. The provision for topographic rehabilitation to the
original configuration presents the same objection that the court
found in the Illinois act88 relative to requiring the reconstruction
of a mosquito breeding pond, if one had previously existed. By
requiring approval of the rehabilitation plan and providing for its
modification by the County Commissioners, the ordinance is not
forever fixed to this objective of the plan; it provides sufficient
flexibility for a court to distinguish the Illinois difficulty. Testing
for dust and noise qualities on all property lines and adherence to
stringent standards in suppressing them appear to present problems
of first impression relative to surface removal operations. There is
a possibility that compliance with these requirements will make
an operation economically unattractive, therefore the ordinance
would have the effect of prohibiting a desired usage. This objection is countered by the majority approach of not invalidating a
zoning control that prohibits a use, if it is otherwise within the
police power."9 To the credit of this ordinance is its adoption
prior to the influx of any sizeable new mining operation and its
notification to any potential operator of the requisite quality standards for activities in the regulated districts.
The Chapel Hill Township Zoning Ordinance facilitates a
comparison with the previously discussed benefits and detriments
resulting from statewide regulations. An attempt to impose the
above discussed quality control standards throughout the state would
raise serious questions of equal protection for an operation in Guilford County as opposed to a similar operation in Brunswick County.
It is hardly conceivable that the same noise level values could be
reasonably imposed in both areas. A satisfactory and mutually
beneficial compromise would be the use of local regulations, adopted
and enforced at the city and county level, with state agencies and
their professional staffs providing advisory, research and testing
assistance. An additional consideration, and one of primary con8 Northern Ill. Coal Corp. v. Medill, 397 Ill. 98, 72 N.E.2d 844 (1947).
'o See note 26 supra.
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cern to many political and industrial factions, is that regulations at
the local level should tend to deter "big brother," be it the state or
federal government, from imposing its own influence and solutions
on the local scene.
WLLIAM H. THOMPSON
Constitutional Law-Legislative Election of a Governor
When the "one man, one vote" principle first arose in a case
concerning the county unit system in Georgia,' the question asked
was how far it would be extended. The answer came quickly in
two historic decisions. The Court ordered that congressional districts be approximately equal in population,' and that both houses
of state legislatures be apportioned on the basis of population.'
Yet these decisions raised more questions concerning what limitations the Court would put on the "one man, one vote" maxim.
These questions were partially answered in Fortson v. Morris,4
where the Court, with a vigorous dissent, did put a limitation on
the applicability of the "one man, one vote" concept,5 refusing to
use it to prevent the legislative election of a governor in which the
winning candidate might have been (and, in fact, eventually was)
the loser at the polls.
The case arose out of the 1966 race for Governor of Georgia.
Democrat segregationist Lester Maddox contested with conserva'Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) : "The conception of political

equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg
Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can
mean only one thing-one person, one vote."
'Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
'Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
'385 U.S. 231 (1966).
'Since Fortson v. Morris the Supreme Court has limited further the
application of "one man, one vote." In Sailors v. Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S.
105 (1967), aff'g 254 F. Supp. 17 (W.D. Mich. 1966), the Court held that
"one man, one vote" was not applicable to the selection of a county school
board because the choice was not by an elective process, no election being
required because the offices were nonlegislative. In Dusch v. Davis, 387
U.S. 112 (1967), rev'g 361 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1966), the Court refused to
apply "one man, one vote" to the at-large election of a city council, where
there was a requirement that the members reside in certain boroughs. The
Court, however, did not reach the merits of applying "one man, one vote"
to local governments in these cases, or in Moody v. Flowers and Supeivisors
of Suffolk County v. Bianchi, 387 U.S. 97 (1967), dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.
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tive Republican Howard "Bo" Callaway. Mainly as a protest move,
a write-in campaign was launched for Ellis Arnall, a former governor, and a man of more liberal persuasions. The votes received by
Arnall were enough to prevent either Callaway or Maddox from
obtaining a majority.' This result invoked a section of the Georgia
Constitution' which provides that if no candidate receives a majority the General Assembly shall choose among the two candidates
receiving the highest number of votes, regardless of which one had
a plurality.
The right of the Georgia legislature to make this choice was
challenged in federal district court. In Morris v. Fortson8 the legislature was enjoined from selecting the governor, the court relying
heavily on Gray v. Sanders' and reasoning as follows:
This [allowing the legislature to choose a candidate who did not
receive a plurality] would give greater weight to the votes of
those citizens who voted for this candidate and necessarily dilute
the votes of those citizens who cast their ballots for the candidate
receiving the greater number of votes. The will of the greater
number may be ignored. In addition each legislator would stand
as a unit in selecting the Governor, and his vote would necessarily eliminate the will of his constituents who voted for the
other candidate. 10
The Court in Fortson v. Morris reversed, by a 5-4 decision, the
district court's holding, saying tersely: "There is no provision of
the United States Constitution or any of its amendments which either
expressly or impliedly dictates the method a State must use to select
' Howard H. Callaway-449,894 or 47.07%; Lester G. Maddox--448,044
or 46.88%; Ellis G. Arnall-57,832 or 6.05%.
GA. CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 4:
The members of each branch of the General Assembly shall convene in
the Representative Hall, and the President of the Senate and Speaker
of the House of Representatives shall open and publish the returns in
the presence and under the direction of the General Assembly; and the
person having the majority of the whole number of votes, shall be declared duly elected Governor of this State; but, if no person shall have
such majority, then from the two persons having the highest number
of votes, who shall be in life, and shall not decline an election at the
time appointed for the General Assembly to elect, the General Assembly
shall immediately elect a Governor viva voce; and in all cases of election of a Governor by the General Assembly, a majority of the memhers present shall be necessary for a choice.
8262 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ga. 1966).

8372 U.S. 368 (1963).
10262

F. Supp. 93, 95 (N.D. Ga. 1966).
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its governor."'" The dissent, composed of the "liberal" faction of
the Court,' 2 rested their rationale upon two major points: (1) A
malapportioned legislature, such as the Georgia legislature, 18 should
not be permitted to choose a governor; (2) In any case, a legislative
choice of governor, after the popular will has made a choice, 14 is in
violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,
11385 U.S. at 234.
12

The Chief Justice, and Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Fortas. But
Justice Black, normally a "liberal," joined with the "conservatives"-Justices
Clark, Harlan, Stewart, and White-and wrote the majority opinion.
" See Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
1 In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Fortas, joined by the Chief
Justice and Justice Douglas (but not Justice Brennan), went even further,
casting doubt on whether a legislature could elect its governor in any circumstance:
Moreover, the Court today announces in an offhand manner, as a side
effect of today's decision, without adequate argument or consideration,
that a State may today, as some States did long ago, provide that its
Governor shall be selected by its legislature in total disregard of the
voters. I do not believe that the issue is so easy. 385 U.S. at 246-47.
Justice Fortas does not say precisely on what basis such a system would be
unconstitutional, whether due process, equal protection, or guarantee of a
republican form of government (long recognized by the Court as being a
political matter). In Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957),
Chief Justice Warren stated: "Moreover, this Court has held that the concept of separation of powers embodied in the United States Constitution is
not mandatory in state governments. . .

."

(see also Dreyer v. Illinois, 187

U.S. 71, 83-84 (1902)). If, therefore, it would be permissible for a state
not to have an independent and separate executive, it is difficult to see how
the manner in which a state chooses a governor becomes a constitutional
issue, unless it violates some explicit constitutional mandate (e.g. not permitting Negroes to vote for governor). Furthermore, even though all states
now elect their governor by popular vote (at least initially), Fortas's dictum
is more than an academic nicety. How would such a viewpoint affect the
generally successful and progressive city manager forms of urban government (in which the city's top executive is not chosen by the people), if, for
instance, New York City, which has a larger budget than New York State,
chose to adopt such a system? Would not whatever rights Justice Fortas
thinks would be denied the people of New York State, if not permitted to
choose their governor, be equally denied to the eight million residents of
New York City if not permitted to choose their de facto mayor?
Justice Fortas also develops a rather clumsy analogy by discussing a
hypothetical situation where the governor selects the legislature, which he
assumes, no one would deny is unconstitutional. But consider the language
in Willis v. Blue, 263 F. Supp. 965, 969 (N.D. Ga. 1967), citing the principle case: "There is no federal requirement intended to compel a state to
elect any of its officers or agents through the popular vote of the people. So
long as the method does not constitute an inreasonabledelegation of power,
it is sufficient." Few would deny that permitting a governor to select a
legislature would be an "unreasonable delegation," i.e. that it would thwart
the very purpose of a democracy-rule by the people or their representatives.
The converse, however, does not follow. It would seem hard to call legislative election of a governor an "unreasonable delegation" that would raise
government as a citadel above the control of the popular will.
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especially as interpreted in Gray v. Sanders.15
be considered in turn.

These points shall

Election by a Malapportioned Legislature
In Toombs v. Fortson' the district court, following the lead
of the United States Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr,17 ruled that
Georgia's legislature was malapportioned because neither house was
apportioned according to population. The Georgia legislature responded by adopting a new apportionment plan. In the meantime,
however, the Supreme Court had handed down its decision in
Reynolds v. Sims, ordering that both houses of state legislatures
must be apportioned on a population basis. Following Reynolds,
the district court in the second Toombs v. Fortson decision ' held
that a population deviation of as much as fifteen per cent between
legislative districts would not satisfy constitutional requirements.
However the district court gave the legislature until May, 1968 to
come up with a new plan, and gave it de facto status until that time.'"
This decision was affirmed without comment by the Supreme Court.2 0
In accordance with this, the majority in Fortson v. Morris dismissed the challenge to an election by Georgia's malapportioned
legislature: "[W] e held [in Tombs v. Fortson21 ] that with certain
exceptions, 22 not here material, the Georgia Assembly could continue to function until May 1, 1968. Consequently the Georgia
Assembly is not disqualified to elect a Governor as required by
Article V of the State's Constitution. ' 23 The dissent, however,
viewed it in a different light. Referring to the language of the
majority just quoted above, the dissent, per Justice Fortas, said:
This is indeed a weak reed for so monumental a conclusion....
We have declined to deprive a malapportioned legislature of
its de facto status as a legislature. .
U.S. 368 (1963).
F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962).

.

. [But] [i]f this Court

15372
16205

17369 U.S.
186 65
(1962).
F. Supp.
(N.D. Ga. 1965).

18241

10 Previously the district court had enjoined the legislature from proposing a new constitution, but this order was vacated and remanded by the
Supreme Court, because, in the light of new facts, the issue had become
moot. Fortson v. Toombs, 379 U.S. 621 (1965). However, the prohibition
against proposing a new constitution while so malapportioned remains, by
implication,
in effect. See also note 26 infra.
10384 U.S. 210 (1966).
21 Id.
22 Proposing a new constitution.
23 385 U.S. at 235.
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had foreseen that events would place the Georgia Legislature in
a position to override the vote of a plurality of the voters and to
select as Governor of the State the loser at the polls, I expect
that it would have included this power as one of the 'exceptions,'
forbidden to this Legislature which, this Court has held, functions
only by judicial sufferance despite its constitutional infirmity. To
a reader of Gray v. Sanders, Fortson v. Toombs, and Toombs
v. Fortson, it must seem inconceivable that the Court would
permit this malapportioned legislature to select Georgia's Governor in these circumstances. Indeed, the irony of the matter is
that a three judge federal court held that the Georgia legislature
was so malapportioned that it could not properly submit to the
voters a new Constitution, adopted by both houses of the Georgia legislature, which would have abolished the provisions for
legislative selection of a Governor 24 and have substituted a runoff or special election. .

.

. But now the Court holds that this

same, unreformed legislature is not so malapportioned that it
cannot itself select the Governor by direct action 1 I confess total
25
inability to understand how the two rulings can be reconciled.
What the Court might have said if it had foreseen the results of
the 1966 Georgia gubernatorial election and what it actually did
say are two different things. The basic issues, then, dividing the
majority and dissent are these: (1) Should the Court add other
exceptions to the granted de facto status of a malapportioned legislature when unforeseen contingencies arise? (2) Is a legislative
election of a governor an act of the same quality or importance as
the adoption of a new constitution? The answers to both the
questions are basically subjective policy decisions. It should be
noted that the reason malapportioned legislatures are given temporary de facto status is functional. Leaving a state without a legislature would grossly disrupt the political, economic and social well
being of its people. In the Court's view, a malapportioned legislature is better than no legislature at all. It might well be said that
a malapportioned legislature is better than an ineffective one. The
possibility that every legislative act might be voided by a judicial
afterthought would put the legislators in a straight jacket. What
would happen, for instance, if the Georgia legislature, while functioning under "judicial sufferance," attempted a major revision of
the penal code? Would it not be just as "inconceivable" that a
malapportioned legislature should be allowed to affect such a change
"'See note 35 infra.
2r 385 U.S. at 245-46.
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as to elect a governor? There is one possible distinction. The
Court gave the Georgia legislature de facto status to "enact such
legislation as shall properly come before it." Electing a governor
is not legislation. Nonetheless, the Court specifically excepted from
legislative power one thing only-proposing a new constitution.
The truth of the matter is that the possibility of the Georgia legislature electing a governor never crossed the Court's mind. If it
had, it is idle speculation to guess whether it would have been made
an exception. A court may perhaps properly limit the power of a
malapportioned legislature,2 6 but such limitations should be prospective. Invalidating legislative acts or enjoining legislative power
on an ad hoc2 basis will result in uncertainty and instability, and
put the Court in an undesirable political role which would confirm
all the fears that Mr. Justice Harlan originally voiced in Baker v.
Carr.28
Legislative Election and Equal Protection
There are three basic methods by which governors have been
elected: (1) legislature alone; (2) popular vote alone; and (3) a
combination of the popular vote and legislative action. Although
many states, including Georgia before 1824, left the election to the
legislature, no state employs such a method today. Only nine states
leave the election entirely to the popular will,"9 while forty-one
others have some form of legislative involvement. Thirty-eight 0
"' This issue is by no means clear. It was raised in Fortson v. Toombs,

379 U.S. 621 (See note 19 supra), but the Court did not reach the merits

because of mootness. Justice Harlan's separate opinion implied that he, at
least, did not favor limiting the power of a legislature once it has been allowed
to function.
"' And what would be the standard for ad hoc invalidation? The nature
of the power to be exercised or the importance of the power? If it is the
importance, is it the theoretical importance or the actual importance? In
Fortson v. Morris the actual effect of legislative malapportionment on the
result of the legislative election is nugatory. Under any scheme of apportionment the Georgia legislature would still have elected Lester Maddox as

governor. Thus the dissent, while arguing for an additional limitation on
the power of the Georgia legislature as though some great injustice were
about to occur, based their rationale not on political realities but on theo-

retical abstractions. Whether such an approach in this particular context is
wise or unwise is debatable. True, in general courts should ignore strictly
political considerations. But when courts have entered such highly political
areas as legislative apportionment, such considerations begin to become unavoidable.
28369 U.S. 186 (1962).
' See 385 U.S. at 235 & n. 3.

so Id.
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of these provide for legislative election when there is a tie vote.
Two other states, Mississippi and Vermont, have provisions similar
to that of Georgia. 32
Previous to 1824, the Georgia General Assembly chose the governor, the House selecting three candidates and the Senate choosing
one of the three by majority vote. 3 On November 6, 1824 the
Georgia Senate, by a 47-9 vote, called for a constitutional amendment setting up the present election system. Six days later the
House approved the plan by a 90-10 vote.3 4 Five times since then
the same system has been incorporated into new constitutions, the
latest being in 1945." 5 Thus, this method of choosing a governor
had been a part of the Georgia Constitution for 142 years before it
was challenged in this case.3 6
The principal difference between the majority and dissent centered around the question of the continuity of the electoral process.
Under the majority's interpretation, election of the governor by the

"' One method, at least, of settling a tie vote has generally been held constitutional-namely, drawing straws. See Webster v. Gilmore, 91 Ill. 324
(1878) ; Johnston v. State ex rel. Sefton, 128 Ind. 16, 27 N.E. 422 (1891);
Keeler v. Robertson, 27 Mich. 116 (1873). But deciding by lot must be provided for by statute or constitutional provision. See State ex rel. King v.
Solomon, 82 Neb. 200, 117 N.W. 348 (1908). Compare with Fortson v.
Morris the words of the Indiana Supreme Court: "We can not concur with
counsel, that where an election is held and results in a tie vote for opposing
candidates, the General Assembly may not provide for determining the right
to office otherwise than by making provision for another election." 128 Ind.
16, 18, 27 N.E. 422 (1890).
32 Miss. CoNsT. art. V, § 141; VT. CoNsT. ch. II, § 39.
GA. CoNsT. art. II, § 2 (1789). Note the nomination process provided
for in this system. The 1824 Amendment, in a sense, gave the nomination
process to the people, unless the people could muster a majority for one
candidate, in which case they would elect.
" The lopsided vote, however, is not indicative of a grandiose plan by the
General Assembly to extend the franchise. The same House that voted 90-10
for this amendment, turned down a bill providing for the popular election of
presidential electors by a 45-55 margin.
" A proposed new constitution, however, would change this method of
choosing a governor. It has been delayed because of malapportionment problems. See Toombs v. Fortson, 384 U.S. 210 (1966), aff'g 241 F. Supp. 65
(N.D. Ga. 1965); Fortson v. Toombs, 379 U.S. 621 (1965).
" It is interesting to note the similarity between this method of choosing
a governor and the federal method of choosing a president. If a presidential
candidate does not receive a majority of the electoral college vote (which
usually means he would fail to receive a majority of the popular vote), the
election reverts to the House of Representatives, which, with each state
having one vote, chooses among the top three candidates. U.S. CoNsr.
amend XII. While the Court has not been impressed by federal analogies,
the question of whether they should be regarded as completely inapposite is
discussed in note 63 infra.
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legislature is an alternative procedure which commences upon the
failure of the people to elect by majority vote. In other words, the
right granted to the people under the 1824 amendment to elect their
governor is limited to the general election, and when that election
The dissent, however,
is over, the right simultaneously ceases.3
rejected this "alternate procedure" view by stating succinctly: "The
election, commencing with the primary, will indeed not be finally
completed until the winner has taken the oath of office." 8 The dissent argued that once the people are permitted to make a choice,
their voice can not be silenced until an eventual winner is selected.
The people's right continues beyond the general election and can not
be overruled by any "alternate procedure." Thus, the dissent reasoned, to allow the legislature to disregard the plurality of the voters
is ipso facto a violation of the equal protection clause.39
7 385 U.S. at 233-34:
It [the Georgia Constitution] set up two ways to select the Governor.
The first, and preferred one, was election by a majority of the people;
the second, and alternative one, was selection by the State Assembly
if any one candidate failed to receive a majority of the popular vote.
Under the second method, in the legislative election the votes of the
people were not to be disregarded but the State Assembly was to consider them as, in effect, nominating votes and to limit itself to choosing
between the two persons on whom the people had bestowed the highest
number of votes.... A method which would be valid if initially employed is equally valid when employed as an alternative.

38Id. at 238.

" The rejection of the "continuity" theory by the majority was decisive
in settling a third minor challenge to the legislative election-the pledge of
the Democratic legislators. Each Democratic candidate in Georgia took the
following pledge: "I further pledge myself to support at the General Election
of November 8, 1966, all candidates nominated by the Democratic Party of
the State of Georgia." This pledge was advanced as evidence that the Democratic legislators would not be free to choose between the two candidates.
The majority quickly dismissed this contention by saying: "That election is
over, and with it, terminated any promises by the Democratic legislators to
support the Democratic nominee." 385 U.S. at 236. The dissent took a
different view: "We would be less than naive to believe that the momentum
of that oath has now been dissipated and that the predominantly Democratic
legislature has now become neutral." Id. at 241-42. Yet as regards the
pledge, it is not so important what the Court thought about "continuity" as
what the legislators though about it. The only issue is whether or not the
legislators felt bound by the pledge. Empirical data, while of course not
available to the Court at the time of the decision, answers the question. The
Democrats have a 229-30 edge in the Georgia legislature. Yet Maddox, the
Democrat, won over Callaway by only a 182-66 margin. Therefore aporoximately thirty-six Democrats did not feel themselves bound by the pledge.
Barrinz gross dishonor or apostasy on the part of the Democrats who voted
for Callaway, it is apparent that the pledge did not have the continuity the
dissent suggested (even if all the Democrats had remained loyal to Maddox,
it would be merely post hoc ergo propter hoc reasoning to assume that the
pledge was the motivating force).
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There is evidence both in the language of the Georgia Constitution," and other extrinsic facts to support both the majority and
the dissent in their disagreement over continuity. A case in point
is Thompson v. Talmadge.41 In that 1947 case, the candidate for
governor elected by a majority of the voters had died before taking
office. The Georgia Constitution provides that when the legislature
is making a choice, they shall choose between the two top candidates
"who shall be in life."'42 The General Assembly, interpreting the
"in life" phrase to extend beyond election day, proceeded to choose
between the top two defeated candidates (both of whom were writeins receiving less than 1000 votes). The majority in Thompson
overruled the action of the General Assembly, saying that "in life"
refers only to the situation where the General Assembly is making a
choice because no candidate received a majority. "By the terms of
the Constitution, full and complete power to elect a Governor is
reserved to the people, but if the voters fail to elect because they do
not cast a majority of their votes for one person, then and then only
is the power given to the legislature to elect a Governor." 4 The
Georgia Supreme Court thus treated the failure of the people to
give a candidate a majority of the votes as a constitutional divesting
of their electoral rights, and an eo instante vesting of the same right
in the General Assembly. Such an interpretation does not lend itself
44
to a continuity rationale.
40 See note 7 supra.
41201 Ga. 867, 41 S.E.2d 883 (1947).
42 See note 7 supra.

201 Ga. 867, 880, 41 S.E.2d 883, 895 (emphasis added).

"Even more striking in regard to the dissent's view in Fortsonv. Morris
is the language, in Thompson, of dissenting Chief Justice Jenkins (who dissented upon the interpretation of the phrase "in life," rather than on the
more general principles enunciated by the majority) :
It is well to observe at the outset that the paragraph of the Constitution
giving the General Assembly the right and duty to elect a Governor
when the election by the people has thus failed, whether wise or unwise,
antiquated or not, is not mere cast-up driftwood littering the shore
line of today ... Much has been said about changed conditions since
the language of the quoted paragraph of the Constitution was embedded
within our organic law in the year 1824. It is true many things have
come to pass since then, but what has all this to do with the language
of the Constitution requiring the General Assembly to elect a Governor
under a named contingency? Language has not changed. Dictionaries were in vogue then just as they are now. The language under
discussion has five times been carried forward and five times solemnly
embedded within our organic law. The last time [1945] that this was
done was but as yesterday, after the horses and buggies were mostly
put away. There in clear cold print it stands, and there it should re-
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It is noteworthy that the Georgia court painstakingly insisted
that the power of the legislature to elect a governor arose only upon
a definite condition precedent-the failure of the people to muster
a majority for one candidate. The power did not arise merely because in hindsight the people in fact made no choice (since the candidate they had selected had died). It is also relevant, in lieu of the

"in life" clause, that the framers of the 1824 amendment intended to
give the legislature, once it was vested with the power by the necessary condition precedent, a real choice (i.e., inter alia, live candidates) and not merely a pro forma duty.
Notwithstanding all this, the Thompson case illustrates the lurking dangers and inequities in such a system, dangers that may well
have been on the dissenting justices' minds in Fortson v. Morris.
If the Georgia court had interpreted the "in life" phrase differently,
the General Assembly would have been allowed to choose between
two candidates who received less than 1000 votes. No one could
deny that such a situation would completely discard any remnant
of a popular system of electing a governor, and thwart the spirit
of the 1824 amendment.4 5 Furthermore the General Assembly does
not have a free choice, but is restricted to choosing from the top
two living candidates. Thus the alternate procedure is not totally
independent of the original popular procedure. One has to employ
legal fictions to change the votes from electoral votes to nominating
votes when no candidate receives a majority, something which is
main until the power that wrote it in shall write it out....

[The

power of] the General Assembly to elect a Governor under the contingency stated ...

is as plain now as it was in 1824.

201 Ga. 867, 902-04, 41 S.E.2d 883, 907-08. But compare the declaration
"there it should remain until the power that wrote it in shall write it out" in
the above quotation with the language in Lucas v. General Assembly, 377
U.S. 713, 736-37 (1964): "A citizen's constitutional right can hardly be
infringed simply because a majority of the people choose that it be."
" But again consider the language of dissenting Chief Justice Jenkins in
Thompson:
Laws and constitutions in a government of law as distinguished from
an autocracy are not decreed and administered to fit some special occasion after it has happened; but being fashioned in advance to meet all
future contingencies, they are more like ready made garments, and for
this very reason do not always by specific, as distinguished from general, language fit unusual future contingencies as perfectly as we can
afterwards see that they might possibly been made to do. But there
are few indeed in all this land who would exchange their liberty under
a government of law for any other system where rights and liberties,
if any, are doled out as a matter of grace from some malevolent or
even benevolent autocrat.
201 Ga. at 900, 41 S.E.2d at 900-01.
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quite casually done by Justice Black. Yet a voter might vote differently if his vote were a nominating vote. 6 It is overstating an
otherwise supportable position to claim that no aspects of continuity
exist between the original popular vote and the final choice of the
legislature.
But whatever continuity is present, it is weak and partial in
character. It thus seems that there is a rational basis for both the
continuity theory of the dissent and the alternate procedure theory
of the majority. Faced with such a situation, the Court acted rightly
in not declaring a law unconstitutional when there was a rational
4
basis for upholding its constitutionality. 7
Because of the majority and the dissent's differences over "alternate procedure" and "continuity," the two rendered conflicting interpretations of Gray v. Sanders.48 In Gray, the Supreme Court
held that Georgia's county unit system used in primaries for statewide office, including governor, was unconstitutional, the Court
for the first time unfolding its "one man, one vote" concept.4" Under the county unit system, the eight largest counties would have
three votes, the thirty next largest two votes, and the rest one vote.
These votes would be cast in a block, as in the federal electoral college, for the candidate that carried the county. 0 The smaller counties had a disproportionate share of the vote. 5' The Court had held
that such a system violated the equal protection clause, remarking:
Once the geographical unit from which a representative is to be
chosen is designated, all who participate in this election are to
"'Take, for instance, a hypothetical election between candidates A, B,
and C. Voter V is in favor of A, and would vote for him in a normal election. Let us further assume that in a normal election A would in all probability receive a plurality. However, V dislikes candidate B even more than
he favors A. If the legislature were to choose between the tvo candidates
receiving the most nominating votes, and there was only a 50-50 chance that
the legislature would choose A, V (assured that A will be one of the nominees) might well cast his nominating vote for C, in order that B, whom he
dislikes, will lose to C, and thus not be one of the nominees. Thus while V
would vote for A in a regular election, he would vote for C in a nomination.
"7Cf.: U. S. v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Metropolitan
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 584 (1934).
"372 U.S. 368 (1963).
"See note 1 supra.
"To win, however, a candidate needed both the county unit vote and the
popular vote. If different candidates won the county unit vote and the popular vote, those two candidates would have a run-off; in the run-off the county
unit vote would prevail.
1 Fulton County, for instance, with 556,326 residents, had only three
times the voting strength of Echols County, with 1,878 residents.
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have a equal vote ....
The idea that every voter is equal to
every other voter in his State, when he casts his ballot in favor
of one of52several competing candidates, underlies many of our
decisions.
The Court also struck down the district court's holding"3 that such
disparity was acceptable if it did not deviate more than the federal
electoral college, 4 holding that such comparisons with the federal
system were inapposite. 55
The majority in Fortson v. Morris, relying on the "alternate
procedure" theory, dismissed any applicability of Gray by holding
that it was "only a voting case" and adding: "Not a word in the
[Gray] Court's opinion indicated that it was intended to compel
a State to elect its governors or any other state officers or agents
through elections of the people rather than through selections by
appointment or elections by the State Assembly." 6 The dissent,
however, viewing the legislative election as a part of the popular
vote process, could see no difference between the "evils" abolished
in Gray, and the "evils" of a legislative election.57
Yet despite the clear logical framework,"5 it is quite likely that
" 372 U.S. 368, 379-80.
"203 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
"' The relative voting strength between Alaska and New York, the smallest
and largest states respectively in the electoral college, is approximately five
to one. Each state has an electoral vote equal to its representation in Congress. Since each state has two senators and at least one representative, regardless of population, inbalance results.
See note 63 infra.
'

385 U.S. at 233.
at 240-41:

11 Id.

If the legislature is used to determine the outcome of a general election,
the votes cast in that election would be weighted, contrary to the principles of 'one person, one vote.' All the vices we found inherent in
the county unit system in Gray v. Sanders are inherent when the choice
is left to the legislature. A legislator when voting for governor has
only a single vote. Even if he followed the majority vote of his constituency, he would necessarily disregard the votes of those who voted
for the other candidate, whether their votes almost carried the day
or were way in the minority. He would not be under a mandate to
follow the majority or plurality votes in his constituency, but might
cast his single vote on the side of the minority in his district. Even
if he voted for the candidate receiving a plurality of votes cast in his
district and even if each Senator and Representative followed the same
course, a candidate who received a minority of the popular vote might
receive a clear majority of the votes cast in the legislature.
H owever, for a different approach to the problem consider Jones v.
Fortson, 223 Ga. 7, 152 S.E.2d 847 (1967) concerning the same fact situation as Fortson v. Morris. A Georgia statute (GA. CODE ANN. § 34-15114
(Supp. 1966)) provides that where no candidate "receives a majority of the
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more general considerations influenced this decision, causing Justice
Black, for instance, to change sides abruptly. The Court may have
simply felt that enough is enough.5" Indeed, somewhere the line
will have to be drawn. A too literal interpretation of the concept
that it is a violation of equal protection to have one man's vote count
more than another's, and that no vote can either be diluted or aggrandized, could lead to absurdities. For example, when one candidate defeats another, the vote of the 49 per cent or less minority is
disregarded-diluted to zero. The only effective way to avoid this
dilution would be a system of proportional representation, a system
that would present both political (e.g. the destruction of the twoparty system) and constitutional problems.6 0 As Justice Stewart
commented, dissenting in Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly :"1
"It is just because electoral systems are intended to serve functions
other than satisfying mathematical theories, however, that the system of proportional representation has not been widely adopted."
And how would the practice of demanding extraordinary majorities
on certain occasions be reconciled with a "no dilution" rule?2 Indeed, the whole system of representative government could be theovotes cast, a runoff primary or election shall be held between the two candidates receiving the highest number of votes. . . ." The plaintiffs in this
case, decided after Fortson v. Morris, argued that this statute should govern
and take the election out of the hands of the General Assembly. The majority of the Georgia Court rejected this argument saying simply that when
the constitution and a statute are in conflict, the constitution governs. The
dissenting opinion in Jones, however, interpreted the constitutional provision
as merely an escape clause to be invoked only if no provisions for handling
runoffs had been established by statute. (This dissenting opinion was written
by Chief Justice Duckworth, who also wrote the majority opinion in Thompson v. Talmadge). Such an interpretation was not discussed by the dissent
in the Fortson v. Morris case at the Supreme Court level, but was suggested
in the original opinion of the district court, Morris v. Fortson, 262 F. Supp.
93, 95 & n.2 (N.D. Ga. 1966).
5 See note 5 supra.
'0 See People ex tel. Devine v. Elkins, 59 Cal. App. 396, 211 P. 34 (1922);
Wattles v. Upjohn, 211 Mich. 514, 179 N.W. 335 (1920); Opinion to the
Governor, 62 R.I. 316, 6 A.2d 147 (1939). But as regards federal constitutional problems, consider the language in Bianchi v. Griffing, 238 F. Supp.
997, 1004 (E.D.N.Y. 1965): "It is not for the courts to prescribe the type
of representative government that is best suited to the needs of the voters....
The task of the courts is to determine whether particular methods transgress
the Constitution."
377 U.S. 713, 750 & n.12 (1964).
62 In Georgia, for instance, two-thirds of the voters must agree in order
to adopt a constitutional amendment. Thus, two votes must be cast "yes" for
every "no" vote. The "no" voters then would have twice the voting power
of the "yes" voters.
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retically challenged.

The dissent in Fortson v. Morris criticizes

the legislative election because a legislator is free to ignore the plurality or even the majority choice of the voters in his district. But
a legislator has always been free to ignore the desires of his constituents. The dissent would hardly suggest that we reduce all
government to the level of a New England town meeting. At some
point function must supersede arithmetical abstractions."
Conclusion
A proposed new constitution for Georgia would end such legislative elections64 as the one that gave rise to the problems in Fortson
v. Morris. Although such provisions would remain in Mississippi
and Vermont, it is not likely that such a case will rise again. But
Fortson v. Morris is not without practical significance. It demonstrates a recognition by at least a majority of the Court that the "one
man, one vote" lodestar, while perhaps useful in certain situations,
has its limitations. It is not clear precisely how far the ambit of
its usefulness extends; but the Court in Fortson v. Morris has at
" It would be appropriate to reflect upon the Court's distaste for electoral
comparisons with the federal system. As said by the Court in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 378:
We think the analogies to the electoral college, to districting and redistricting, and to other phases of the problems of representation in
state or federal legislatures or conventions are inapposite. The inclusion of the electoral college in the Constitution, as the result of
specific historical concerns, validated the collegiate principle despite
its inherent numerical inequality, but implied nothing about the use of
analogous system by a State in a statewide election. No such specific accommodation of the latter was ever undertaken, and therefore
no validation of its numerical inequality ensued.
Besides the "inequalities" of the electoral college and equal representations
of senators which the Court mentions, one can find many other violations of
"one man, one vote" in the Federal Constitution, such as counting nonvoting slaves as three-fifths of a person, giving each state at least one representative in the House regardless of population, and if and when the presidential election is thrown into the House, giving each state delegation one
vote irrespective of its size. While it may be unwise to run strict and inflexible comparisons between the federal and state system, it is going a
bit too far to declare it completely inapposite. The Constitution was not
written in a political vacuum. The delegates to the Convention in Philadelphia gathered their political wisdom and experience from state governments. The multitude of violations of the "one man, one vote" maxim in
the Federal Constitution is evidence that the Founders worried little, if at
all, about any "one man, one vote" postulate. Nor can it be said that the
writers of the fourteenth amendment had any different attitude. To ignore
totally any comparison between the federal and state systems is to disregard
history, distort reality, and to foster some strange conclusions.
"

See note 35 supra.
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least recognized that such an ambit exists, and that the "one man,
one vote" principle should not venture outside of it lest the theoretical tail end up wagging the functional dog.
RICHARD

J.

BRYAN

Constitutional Law-Miranda v. Arizona and the
Fourth Amendment
An interesting new dimension of Miranda v. Arizona' was presented in two recent cases, State v. Forney2 and State v. McCarty.8
The defendants in these cases argued for application of Miranda's
requirements4 concerning confessions to those rights guaranteed by
the fourth amendment.5 Despite the judiciary's contemporary tendency to emphasize the necessity of protecting the individual's constitutional rights, neither court would apply the Miranda test because Miranda dealt specifically with only the fifth and sixth amendments.
In Forney the defendant willingly went to the police station to
answer questions after being apprehended in his car as a suspect
for burglary. When the defendant was asked by an officer at the
station if the officer could look in his car, the defendant agreed.
Later, in testimony, the defendant described the situation: "Ah Well,
they asked me if I was-they could search my car, and I said, 'Yeah,
go ahead.' I couldn't stop them." 6 As a result of the search, a bag
'384
436 915
(1966).
2150 U.S.
N.W.2d
(Neb.1967).
'427

P.2d 616 (Ore. 1967).

As for procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully
effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of
silence . . . the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent,
that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him,
and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained
or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights,
provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
384 U.S. at 444.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Co1sT. amend. IV. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 385 U.S. 523.
(1967).
150 N.W.2d 915, 917 (Neb. 1967).
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and loaded revolver were found and these articles were held to be
admissible evidence by the Supreme Court of Nebraska.'
In McCarty the defendant and a companion were apprehended
as suspects for robbery. After being taken to the police station,
the defendant signed a written consent to a search of the living
quarters over the tavern where he had been apprehended. This
search yielded evidence which was significant in the defendant's
conviction of robbery.'
The defendants in Forney and McCarty were asked to waive
their constitutional rights under the fourth amendment. Explanation of their rights was not offered nor was counsel suggested or
offered to help them. For all practical purposes, the defendants
waived rights of which they were not clearly aware; and the abandonment of these rights resulted in evidence detrimental to their
cases. It is in this context that the defendants argued that a valid
consent-search should be subject to the same or similar requirements
established in Mirandafor confessions.9
In both McCarty and Forney the defendants' arguments were
rejected by the state supreme courts for substantially the same reasons. The court in McCarty said:
Miranda deals only with the compulsory self-incrimination
barred by the Fifth Amendment, not with the unreasonable
search and seizure proscribed by the Fourth Amendment. There
is an obvious distinction between the purposes to be served by
these two historic sections of the Bill of Rights. The Fifth
Amendment prohibits the odious practice of compelling a man
to convict himself; the Fourth guards the sanctity of his home
and possessions as those terms have been judicially interpreted.
An indispensable element of compulsory self-incrimination is
some degree of compulsion. The essential component of an
search and seizure is some sort of unreasonableunreasonable
0
ness.1
An attempt to separate completely the purposes of the fourth and
fifth amendments is also found in Forney when the court states that
7

1d. at 916-18.

8427 P.2d 616, 619 (Ore. 1967).

9 Unquestionably, when a person is lawfully arrested, the police
have the right, without a search warrant, to make a contemporaneous
search of the persons of the accused for weapons or for the fruits of
or implements used to commit the crime.
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964).
427 P.2d 616, 619-20 (Ore. 1967).
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Miranda in that jurisdiction will pertain "only to the issue tried
therein, and will not be extended by analogy to cover the Fourth
Amendment .... "I'
Whatever may have been the limited intention of the framers
of the fourth and fifth amendments, case history illustrates that the
scope of the two amendments has been undeniably expanded.1 2 The
Supreme Court has emphasized that "the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other,"13 that they are "supplementing
phases of the same constitutional purpose-to maintain inviolate
large areas of personal privacy,"14 and that the "values protected by
the Fourth Amendment thus substantially overlap those the Fifth
Amendment helps to protect." 5 Any other view which attempts to
separate the two amendments in regard to limited and outdated objectives seems wholly anachronistic and tends to destroy the vitality
of the Constitution.
The court in McCarty emphasized that the key word in the fifth
amendment is "compulsion" while the crucial word in the fourth is
"unreasonableness." The court, however, apparently overlooked the
Supreme Court's holding in Boyd v. United States that the two
amendments "throw great light on each other."'" In that case the
Court recognized that the search and seizure of evidence within an
accused's possession might well violate the self-incrimination clause
of the fifth amendment. If the possibility of self-incrimination is
11150 N.W.2d 915, 917 (Neb. 1967). The court added:
The trial court sustained the motion to suppress on the theory
that in order for a consent to be voluntary it was necessary that the
defendant be first advised that he need not submit to a search, and that
if he does consent, the fruits of the search may be used as evidence
against him. To reach this result the trial court held that Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, which involved the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, by analogy was applicable to search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Id. at 917.
2 See Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Antendment
to the United States Constitution, 55 JonNs HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES
IN HxSTORICA.

AND

POLITICAL SrUDIES 211, 261-88

(1937).

See also

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Murphy Waterfront Comm'n,
378 U.S. 52 (1964); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Quinn v. United
States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924);
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
1" Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
"' Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 489-90 (1944).
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
16

116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886).
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present, said the Court, then the search itself is unreasonable."
Thus, compulsion and unreasonableness can rarely, if ever, be

separated.
As can be seen from Boyd and other cited cases, the fourth and
Both
fifth amendments protect inter-related zones of privacy."
Forney and McCarty appear to be relying on an insecure basis in
maintaining that the fourth amendment applies only to the security
of one's possessions and does not overlap the area of privacy guaranteed by the fifth. Not only is the fifth amendment incorporated into
the fourth by the provision that people are to be "secure in their
persons," but the protection offered by the fourth is also incorporated into the fifth. 9 A consent-search necessarily includes a
degree of communication or testimony. One who consents to a
search is, for all practical purposes, saying either "Yes, I am guilty"
The only remaining alternative is that
or "No, I am not guilty."2
the individual's consent is the product of hope or fear, both of which
have been held to be invalid consents under the two amendments.2 '
Thus, it seems unsatisfactory to deny application of the Miranda
test for the reason that the fourth and fifth amendments have separate purposes. 22 Indeed, the two amendments have been insepa"See 1967 DuxE L.J. 366.
8 See the dissenting opinion of Douglas, J. in Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 778-79 (1966), where he says:
The Fifth Amendment marks 'a zone of privacy' which the Government may not force a person to surrender . .

.

. Likewise the

Fourth Amendment recognizes that right when it guarantees the
right of the people to be secure "in their persons."
where the Court
10 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 459-60 (1966)
says that "the privilege [against self-incrimination] was elevated to constitutional status and has always been 'as broad as the mischief against which
to guard.'" See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
it seeks
2 See 67 CoLtJm. L. REv. 130, 135 n.29 (1967).
Also see Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966) in which the Court says that "no distinction may be drawn between inculpatory statements and statements alleged
to be merely 'exculpatory.'"
21
There is no doubt but that the defendant was influenced by his
situation, and, when all the surrounding circumstances are considered
in their true relations, not only is the claim that the consent was
voluntary overthrown, but the impression is irresistibly produced that
it must necessarily have been the result of either hope or fear, or both
operating on the mind.
United States v. Baldocci, 42 F.2d 567, 568 (9th Cir. 1930). See also
Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955) and Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10 (1948).
'See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921):
The effect of the decisions cited [Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886), Weeks v. United States, 245 U.S. 618 (1914), and Silver-
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rably woven together both by their own language and by the
Supreme Court's interpretations. To separate them is to enter upon
an absurdity not unlike trying to separate the concept of freedom
into life without liberty, or liberty without the pursuit of happiness.
Regardless of their views toward the fourth and fifth amendments, the courts in Forney and McCarty expressed one more reason why they would not apply Miranda to the fourth amendment.
In the words of the Nebraska Supreme Court, "So far as I have
been able to determine, the United States Supreme Court has not
applied the Miranda test to searches and seizures. Until it does so,
if it ever does, we should not further shackle law enforcement."23
This belief is reiterated in McCarty.24 The courts' reasoning, however, flies in the face of Miranda itself. Searching for precedent to
justify a decision cannot by any means insure justice. In Miranda,
the Supreme Court emphasized the fact that "our contemplation
cannot be only of what has been but of what may be,"' 2' and it
encouraged courts to find new solutions to guarantee justice. 20
thorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) concerning
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments] is: that such rights are declared
to be indispensable to the "full enjoyment of personal security, personal liberty, and private property;" that they are to be regarded as
of the very essence of constitutional liberty; and that the guaranty
of them is as important and is imperative as are the guaranties of the
other fundamental rights of the individual citizen,-the right, to trial
by jury, to the writ of habeas corpus and to due process of law. It
has been repeatedly decided that these Amendments should receive a
liberal construction, so as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon or
'gradual depreciation' of the rights secured by them, by imperceptible
practice of courts or by well-intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous
executive officers.
2" State v. Forney, 150 N.W.2d
915, 917-18 (Neb. 1967). But see

Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 62-63 (1967) where the Court said:

In any event we cannot forgive the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment in the name of law enforcement. This is no formality
that we require today but a fundamental rule that has long been
recognized as basic to the privacy of every home in America. While
'the requirements of the Fourth Amendment are not inflexible, or
obtusely unyielding to the legitimate needs of law enforcement,' . . .
it is not asking too much that officers be required to comply with the
basic command of the Fourth Amendment before the innermost secrets of one's home or office are invaded.
2'427 P.2d 616, 619 (Ore. 1967).
25384 U.S. 436, 443 (1966). The Supreme Court went on to say:
Under any other rule a constitution would indeed be as easy of
application as it would be deficient in efficacy and power. Its general
principles would have little value and be converted by precedent into
impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in words might be
loss in reality.
26
Our decision in no way creates a constitutional straightjacket
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Moreover, although the two state courts were reluctant to apply
the Miranda test to searches and seizures, a lower federal court did
not hesitate to apply requirements similar to those of the Miranda
test to guarantee the rights secured by the fourth amendment. In
United States v. Blalock,217 three F.B.I. agents encountered the defendant in a hotel lobby. The defendant, who was suspected of
robbing a bank, was frisked by the agents after they had identified
themselves. Although they had no warrant, they accompanied the
defendant to his room. The defendant denied any knowledge of
the crime, but the entire party entered his room. When asked if
he would consent to a search of his room, the defendant replied that
he would not object. As a result of this consent-search, money from
the robbery was found and used as evidence at the defendant's trial.2"
In a well-reasoned opinion citing numerous other decisions, the
district court said that "rights given by the Constitution are too
fundamental and too precious for waiver lightly to be found." 9 An
effective waiver is present "only where there is 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.'-3'
The district court maintained that where the government relies on
consent to validate a warrantless search, the consent must not only
be voluntary but also intelligent 3 ' or knowing. 2 It, therefore, held
that a defendant who is not warned of his fourth amendment rights
cannot be said to have abandoned them. 3 In conclusion, the district
court emphasized that the requirements for waiver are the same for
both the fourth and fifth amendments:
which will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have
this effect. We encourage Congress and the States to continue their
laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the
rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our
criminal laws.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
27 255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
28 Id. at 268-269.
. Id. at 269. See also Pennsylvania ex rel. Whiting v. Cavell, 244 F.
Supp. 560, 567 (M.D. Pa. 1965).
"United States v. Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268, 269 (E.D. Pa. 1966). See
also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
31 Obviously, the requirement of an 'intelligent' consent implies that
the subject of the search must have been aware of his rights, for an
intelligent consent can only embrace the waiver of a 'known right.'
255 F. Supp. 268, 269 (E.D. Pa. 1966). See United States ex ret. Mancini
v. Rundle, 337 F.2d 268 (3d Cir. 1964); Walker v. Peppersack, 316 F.2d
119 (4th Cir. 1963) ; Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1960).
2 United States v. Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268, 269 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
" See also United States v. Nikrasch, 367 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1966).
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The agents here properly warned defendant of his right to
counsel and his right to remain silent, but they did not warn him
of his right to refuse a warrantless search. The Fourth Amendment requires no less knowing a waiver than do the Fifth and
Sixth. The requirement of knowledge in each serves the same
purpose, i.e., to prevent the possibility that the ignorant may
surrender their rights more readily than the shrewd . . . . To
require law enforcement agents to advise the subjects of investigation of their right to insist on a search warrant would impose
no great burden, nor would it unduly or unnecessarily impede
criminal investigation. 4
Not only is the reasoning behind the decisions questionable in
Forney and McCarty, but justice itself demands that a Mirandatype test or an objective standard be applied to guarantee the rights
secured by the fourth amendment. A warning-similar to the one
imposed by Miranda-has been suggested by a student for dealing
with warrantless searches:
You have a right to refuse to allow me to search your home,
and if you decide to refuse, I will respect your refusal. If you
do decide to let me search, you won't be able to change your
mind later on, and during the search I'll be able to look in
places and take things which I couldn't even if I could get a
search warrant. You have a right to a lawyer before you decide,
and if you can't afford a lawyer we will get you one and you
won't have to pay for him. There are many different laws which
are designed to protect you from my searching, but they are
too complicated for me to explain or for you to understand, so
if you think you would like to take advantage of this very important information, you will need a lawyer to help you before
you tell me I can search. 35
This type of warning serves several important purposes. In the
first place, it informs the individual of his rights. The ignorant
and the well-informed are brought to a less unequal position, especially when one knows he may have an attorney present.8" Authorities are less able to exploit the deprived or ill-equipped. Moreover,
the warning impresses the consequences of his decision upon the
individual and makes him more reluctant to abandon his constitu255 F. Supp. 268, 269-70 (E.D. Pa. 1966).

"67 COLUm. L. REv. 130, 158 (1967).

Providing equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful
alike is an age-old problem. People have never ceased to hope and
strive to move closer to that goal.
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16 (1956). See also Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963).

19671

EXPANSION OF,STATE ACTION

tional rights. Such an objective standard is held in high regard by
the Supreme Court, as indicated by Miranda.3 7 Finally, because of
the warning's content and its likely effect upon the individual, the
warning requirement would encourage authorities to seek the judicially preferred search warrant. 8 The skeptical practice of conducting a warrantless search in reliance upon the individual's uninformed consent would grow increasingly rare.
It seems fair to say that if courts adopt the Forney-McCarty
position, justice will suffer because fourth amendment rights will
be protected by subjective good faith alone. And, as the Supreme
Court said in Beck v. Ohio:
If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections
of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would
be "secure in their persons, 8houses,
papers, and effects," only
9
in the discretion of the police.
D. S. DUNKLE
Constitutional Law-Racial Discrimination-Expansion of
State Action
Since the Civil Rights Cases' the Supreme Court has held that
the fourteenth amendment prohibits "state action" and not purely
private action. Subsequent decisions have greatly expanded the
reach of "state action." Indeed the expansion has been so great
that commentators have suggested that the search for "state action"
is a "misleading search,"' 2 that some sort of state action can always
be found, and that the Supreme Court should be using a different
mode of analysis.'
' 384 U.S. 436, 468-69 (1966).
""See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1956); Chapman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257
(1960) ; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) ; Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452
(1932).
30379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964).
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
'See Horwitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S.CAL. L. REv. 208 (1957).
'St. Antoine, Color Blindness But Not Myopia: A New Look at State
Action and "Private"Racial Discrimination,59 MicE. L. RaV. 993 (1961) ;
Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. IEv. 3 (1961) ; Williams,
Twilight of State Action, 41 TEx. L. REv. 347 (1963). Williams suggests

that the test should be whether the private group has so moved into the
area of public concern that the public's interest in eliminating the particular
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Still, in cases involving the application of the proscriptions of
the fourteenth amendment to private organizations, the courts continue to look for connections between the private organization and
the state. But they have replaced the semantic rigidity of "state
action" with a formula which better explains actual case results. To
hold a private organization to the standards which the fourteenth
amendment sets for the state, the plaintiff must be able to establish
that the state has become "involved" in the discriminatory acts of
the private organization to a "significant extent."6'
In practice,
if the plaintiff can show significant state involvement in a private
organization which serves a public function and can also show discrimination by that private organization, he has established his
case.' He need not show that the state induced or encouraged the
discrimination.
The leading case applying this analysis is Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority.7 In Burton the Supreme Court decided that a
private restaurant located in a publicly owned and operated parking
lot could not refuse service to a person because of his race. The
action of the restaurant could not be considered, the Court said,
"so 'purely private' as to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment." ' In the face of criticism that its decision would subject a vast number of private organizations to the sweep of the
fourteenth amendment, the Court issued a disclaimer:
discrimination must outweigh the personal right to discriminate. Id. at
389-90.
'Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 CoLum. L. REv. 1083, 1101-07
(1960) ; Shanks, "State Actioin' and the Girard Estate Case, 105 U. PA. L.
Rav. 213, 227 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Shanks]. "Under some circumstances state contact, control and encouragement may be so intimately
fused with the activities of private groups ... in the performance of a
public function that it seems fair to call the activity 'state action' . . . ." Id.

Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
See, e.g., Smith v. Hampton Training School, 360 F.2d 577 (4th Cir.
1966); Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental Soc'y 355 F.2d 118 (4th Cir.
1966); Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 339 F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1964);
Smith v. Holiday Inns, 336 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1964), vnodifying 220 F.
Supp. 1 (M.D. Tenn. 1963); Simkins v. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d
959 (4th Cir. 1963). But see, e.g., Mitchell v. Boys Club of Metropolitan
Police, 157 F. Supp. 101 (D.D.C. 1957).
'365 U.S. 715 (1961).
8
Id.at 725. Burton extended earlier case law which had subjected
the private lessee of government property to the fourteenth amendment's
ban on racial discrimination when the purpose of the lease was to provide a service to the public on state property. Burton ignored the distinction. 75 HARV. L. Rav. 144 (1961). See, e.g., Derrington v. Plummer,
240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957); Jones v.
Marva Theatres, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 49 (D. Md. 1960).
6
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* [T]he conclusions drawn from the facts and circumstances

of this record are by no means declared as universal truths by
means of which every state leasing agreement is to be tested.
Owing to the very largeness of government a multiple of relationships might appear to some to fall within the Amendment's embrace, but that .. .can be determined only in the
framework of the peculiar facts or circumstances present. Therefore respondents' prophecy of nigh universal application of a
constitutional precept so peculiarly dependent for its invocation
upon appropriate facts fails to take into account "Differences
in circumstances [which] beget appropriate differences in law
"9

The purpose of this note is to examine the application of the
concept of state action in the recent case of Ethridge v. Rhodes;"O

to show that Ethridge differs from other state action cases (particularly the progeny of Burton) ; and to consider possible implications
of this difference.
In Ethridge a federal district court applied the fourteenth
amendment to another of the multiple relationships between "private" organizations and government. William Ethridge was not
admitted to a Columbus, Ohio, local of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers because he was a Negro. When he
went directly to construction contractors, he was told that they hired
only through the union."1 In this situation a number of circumstances combined to give Ethridge the opportunity for a novel
flank attack on union discrimination.' 2 The State of Ohio was
" 365 U.S. at 725-26. The Court listed the following factors to support its
finding that the public Parking Authority had become involved in the discrimination of the privately owned restaurant to a significant extent. The building
in which the restaurant was located was publicly owned; as an entity the
building was performing an essential governmental function of providing
parking space; the restaurant was physically an integral part of the public
building; and the revenue obtained by leasing the space the restaurant occupied was essential to the state's plan to operate the project as a financially
self-sustaining unit. 365 U.S. at 723-24.
111 268 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
Id. at 85.
2
The legal attack was not entirely novel. See Todd v. joint Apprentice1963),
ship Comm. of Steel Workers, 223 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ill.
vacated as moot, 332 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1964). In Todd the federal government was building a courthouse. The sub-contractor in question obtained his labor only from the Steel Workers. The two Negro plaintiffs
were accepted by the sub-contractor for work on the project but, in spite of
the vigorous efforts of the federal officer in charge of insuring equal employment opportunity, the union refused to indenture the plaintiffs. The
district court found the necessary connection between the government and
the private organization simply in the "continued erection of the Federal
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about to build a new medical school building at Ohio State University. The contractors who were about to be awarded the state
building contracts would obtain their labor exclusively from unions.
Like the electrical workers, most of the unions discriminated against
Negroes. The result was summed up by the court:
Since the contractors will hire only through unions and a majority of craft unions do not have Negro members and will not
refer non-member Negroes, the contractors will hire only non
Negroes in a majority of the crafts needed to work on this
project.,3
The court found that the plaintiffs had stated a cause of action
under section 1983 of Title 42, United States Code.' 4 Finding that
the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable injury, the court enjoined
officers of the state from entering into contracts for the construction
of the Medical Basic Sciences Building with
any persons who are bound by agreement, or otherwise, to
secure their labor force exclusively or primarily from any organization or source that does not supply or refer laborers and
craftsmen without regard to race, color or membership in a
labor union.:5
Courthouse." By continuing to build the courthouse the federal government was "unwillingly fostering and becoming an integral part of" the

union's discrimination. 223 F. Supp. at 20. The court was able to find a
sort of "state action" by the federal government by analogy to Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). The court also found government action
in two other aspects of the fact situation less relevant here. For an unsuccessful attack on union discrimination applying the analogy to Bolling,
see Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 262 F.2d 359 (6th
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959).
268 F. Supp. at 87.
1, Section

1983 provides that:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceedings for redress.
1268 F. Supp. at 89. Plaintiffs had several possible remedies. (1) 42
U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1964) prohibits discrimination in programs which receive federal financial assistance. The primary remedy available is the
power of the federal department in question to cut off the federal grant,
loan, or contract. But under § 2000(d)-(3) the act provides that no
action shall be taken by any department or agency with respect to any
employment practice except where the primary objective of the federal
financial assistance is to provide employment.
(2) 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-(1) to -(15) (1964) and OHio Rav. CODr
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The court found that "[d]efendants' failure to assure qualified
minority workers equal access to job opportunities on public construction projects by acquiescing in the discriminatory practices of
contractors and craft unions clearly falls within the proscription
of the Fourteenth Amendment ..... 16 According to the court,
the fourteenth amendment's ban on racial discrimination does not
apply to the acts of private persons such as union officials. But
here the state was about to become a "joint participant" in racial
discrimination by "placing itself in a position of interdependence"17 with the discriminating unions and contractors. "[W]here
a state . . .undertakes to perform essential governmental functions, . . . with the aid of private persons, it cannot avoid the re-

sponsibilities imposed on it by the Fourteenth Amendment by merely
ch. 4112 (Anderson 1965) both contained provisions which the defendants
claimed would be adequate to secure plaintiffs' admission to the unions
in question with back pay. The court dealt with this argument in a cryptic
sentence: it was apparent that the threatened injury was not fully reparable
through the use of these proceedings. Furthermore, the court found that
the remedies proposed were not adequate because they did not take a single
step toward mending the psychological damage done to the party discriminated against. 268 F. Supp. at 88-89. The court dealt with the
problem of a remedy as if the question was simply one of whether the remedy at law was adequate. At least as far as the Ohio statute is concerned
a prior question would seem to be whether Section 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964)
is available xegardless of the existence of a state remedy. This approach to
the question was not taken by the court. The question is beyond the scope
of this note. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); McNeese v. Board
of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
" 268 F. Supp. at 88. The decree in Ethridge enjoined the State of Ohio
from dealing with contractors who obtained their labor exclusively from
unions which discriminated. It did not take the direct approach of ordering
the union to admit the plaintiff. One reason for not doing so is clear. Since
the contract had not been signed, the union had not yet become a joint participant with the government. Thus, the fourteenth amendment did not
yet apply. From the state action aspect of the problem, there seems to be
no basis in logic or authority for drawing the line at enjoining the state
from dealing with discriminatory private organizations. Since the restrictions of the fourteenth amendment apply to acts of the state's private partners, the plaintiff (once the project had begun) could sue directly for admission to the union if he were discriminated against. In the case of Todd
v. Joint Apprenticeship Comm. of Steelworkers, 223 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ill.
1963), vacated as moot, 332 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1964), the court ordered just
such relief. In other state action cases, the plaintiff has obtained relief
directly against the private organization. Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Smith v. Holiday Inns, 336 F.2d 630 (6th
Cir. 1964); Simkins v. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963).
Such an approach might raise problems for the plaintiff beyond the state
action question. See e.g., Note, Alternative Remedies for Denial of Union
Membership: Applicability of Constitutional Relief, 50 CoRIELL L.Q. 75
(1964).
" 268 F. Supp. at 87.
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ignoring or failing to perform them."'18 To support these propositions the court cited the Burton case.
As the opinion in Ethridge implies, there are important similarities between Ethridge and Burton and the cases which have fol9
lowed Burton."
Both the State of Ohio and the Wilmington Parking Authority found themselves in a position of "interdependence"
with private discriminators. The Court's suggestion in Burton that
the Parking Authority had a positive duty to see that its lessee did
not discriminate2 ° indicates a parallel duty on the part of state
officials in Ethridge to prevent their contractors from discriminating. In neither case did the state control the private organization. 2
Furthermore, the possibility of limiting Burton to leases of state
property has been ignored. The federal cases which have followed
Burton have not limited it to its peculiar facts or even to lease
agreements. Instead they seem to interpret Burton as meaning that
certain governmental contacts with private organizations serving
Id.
See, e.g., cases cited note 10 supra; Wimbish v. Pinellas County 342
F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1965); Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320
(5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 911 (1962).
20365 U.S. at 725. The Court in Burton said:
[T]he Authority could have affirmatively required Eagle to discharge
the responsibilities under the Fourteenth Amendment imposed upon
the private enterprise as a consequence of state participation. But
no State may effectively abdicate its responsibilities by either ignoring
them or by merely failing to discharge them whatever the motive
'8

may be ....

By its inaction, the Authority, and through it the

State, has not only made itself a party to the refusal of service, but
has elected to place its power, property and prestige behind the
admitted discrimination. The State has so far insinuated itself into
a position of interdependence with Eagle that it must be recognized
as a joint participant in the challenged activity, which, on that
account, cannot be considered to have been so "purely private"
as to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
On the state's duty of control, see Comment, State Action and Private
Choice, 50 CORNFLL L.Q. 473, 498 (1965).
1 Some authorities suggest that government "control" of the private
organization is required before the fourteenth amendment can be applied.
E.g., Mitchell v. Boys Club of Metropolitan Police, 157 F. Supp. 101 (D.D.C.
1957). "Governmental control is the decisive factor in the determination
of whether a corporation is public or private and governmental control of
the club corporation does not exist." Id. at 108. In most recent state action
cases of this sort, unusual state controls or regulations of the private organizations have been present. But the controls have not been so extensive
as to justify the assertion that the state "controlled" the private organization. See, e.g., Simkins v. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir.
1963); Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 911 (1962).
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a public function are sufficient to subject the private organization
to the proscriptions of the fourteenth amendment. In Simkins v.
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital,22 for example, the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the state and federal government had become so involved in the activities of an otherwise
private hospital that it could not discriminate on the basis of race
in granting staff privileges. The court found that the necessary
degree of state involvement was present as a result of the hospital's
participation in the Hill-Burton program.23 Just as the Court in
Burton found Eagle Coffee Shoppe an integral part of a public
building devoted to a public service, the court in Simkins found the
hospital an integral part of a joint state-federal program to effect
a proper allocation of available hospital resources.24
Despite the similarities, there are also important practical differences between Ethridge and earlier state action cases. The differences exist both in the sort of service the private organization provided and in the state contact considered sufficient to apply the
proscriptions of the fourteenth amendment. It is difficult to provide any generalized explanation of the sorts of state contacts which
will subject a private organization to the standard the fourteenth
amendment sets for the state. Indeed, the Supreme Court has implied that it may be "an impossible task."'25 While no precise formula exists, the cases do seem to fit into broad groups. Although
the classification is far from exhaustive, four such groups of cases
should be mentioned: (1) those in which the private organization
is performing an "exclusive" state function,26 (2) those in which
it is performing a function sufficiently like that of the state to sub-- 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963). Similarly in Smith v. Holiday Inns,
336 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1964), nodifying 220 F. Supp. 1 (M.D. Tenn. 1963),
the Sixth Circuit found that a motel located in a redevelopment area could
not deny service to Negroes. The fact that the Holiday Inn owned the land
did not serve to distinguish the case from Burton. The court pointed to
public design, public financing, and continuing public controls to justify
its decision.
"The Hill-Burton Act, 60 Stat. 1041 (1946), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 291e(f) (1964), provides for federally assisted hospital construction.
Funds to assist the hospital's building program were paid by the United
States to the State of North Carolina and in turn by North Carolina to the
hospitals. 323 F.2d at 963.
" 323 F.2d at 967.
2r
365 U.S. at 722.
"0 See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649 (1944).
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ject it to the same standard;27 (3) those in which the private organization provides a direct service to the public at large on state
property dedicated to public service ;28 (4) those in which the private organization receives unusual state aid, state powers, or is sub29
ject to unusual state control.
The situation in Ethridge does not fit easily into any of these
categories. Constructing buildings is not an exclusive governmental function, such as holding a primary election. Nor is it a
function much like that of the state, such as running a public park.
Nor is it a case of a public service enterprise conducted on public
property. Payment to the contractor is not a sort of state aid
ordinarily thought sufficient to apply the fourteenth amendment.
Of the four categories, the situation in Ethridge looks least like the
first; building buildings is clearly not an exclusive governmental
function.
With the exception of the first, each of these groups of cases
seem to have one common element. In each the fourteenth amendment was applied to private organizations which had significant
state contacts and which provided services directly to the general
public. In Simkins, for example, the hospital received unusual
state aid and control, and it served the public directly. In contrast,
the contractors in Ethridge were not providing a direct public service. By constructing a medical school building they were supplying
an entity which stood between them and the general public-that is,
the State of Ohio. In terms of public service their position is
analogous to that of a dairy which supplies milk to a public school
cafeteria.
Thus, Ethridge differs from the other progeny of Burton in
27 The category is just beginning to develop. See Evans v. Newton, 382
U.S. 396 (1966); Guillory v. Adm'rs of Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855

(E.D. La. 1962) (dictum), vacated 207 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. La. 1963),

aff'd per curiam, 305 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962).
See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715
(1961); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 791 (1954),

vacating and remanding 202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953), aff'g 102 F. Supp.
525 (W.D. Ky. 1951); Jones v. Marva Theatres, 180 F. Supp. 49 (D. Md.

1960).
But cf. Wimbish v. Pinellas County, 342 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1965).
2 9 See, e.g.,
Smith v. Holiday Inns, 336 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1964),

modifying 220 F. Supp. 1 (M.D. Tenn. 1963); Griffin v. Bd. of Supervisors,

339 F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1964); Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir.

1964); Simkins v. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963);

Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,

371 U.S. 911 (1962); Kerr v. Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.
1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945).
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that it applied the fourteenth amendment to an organization which
was supplying the state, rather than to a state "controlled" or assisted organization serving the public.3" The case also represents
the emergence of a new sort of state contact sufficient to apply the
fourteenth amendment's commands to a private organization. The
holding in Ethridge seems to be that, in at least some situations, a
contract with the state is a sufficient state contact. Of course,
cases involving leases of public property have applied the fourteenth
amendment to those in contractual relations with the state. But in
those cases the state contact was thought to be based more on the
nature of the property than on the simple fact of a contractual
agreement."1 These distinctions seem to indicate that Ethridge
has moved the law nearer to the doctrine that states and their extensions are constitutionally prevented from having economic relations with private businesses that discriminate.
The rationale of Ethridge seems to be that when the state and
a private organization enter a contractual relation, public officials
have a duty and a responsibility to see that public funds do not indirectly foster private discrimination. If so, the case represents
an application of the fourteenth amendment to a new layer of stateprivate relations. Thus, a public school could be enjoined from buying milk from a dairy which discriminates; state pencils, furniture,
copying machines, and a myriad of other items would have to come
from equal-opportunity employers. Furthermore, one passage in
the court's opinion indicates that the impact might be even more
widespread:
In a venture, such as this one, where the state as a governmental
entity becomes a joint participant with private persons, the
"O
Of course, some of the progeny of Burton have involved contacts
other than state assistance or regulations. See, e.g., Hawkins v. North
Carolina Dental Soc'y, 355 F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1966).
11The Court made its decision in Burton assuming that the surplus
property distinction of Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957), would be significant. 365 U.S.
at 723. The court in Derringtonthought that when there was "no purpose
of discrimination," no "joinder in the enterprise" and "no reservation of

control" the state could lease property not needed for state purposes to

private persons. If all of these conditions were met the lessee's conduct
would be purely private. Id. at 925. If a mere contractual relation is
enough to hold the lessee to the standard of the fourteenth amendment, the
surplus property distinction "assumed" in Burton would be irrelevant.
A number of commentators have assumed that the nature of the property
rather than the mere fact of a contract was the crucial factor in the lease
cases. 75 HARv. L. Rnv. 144 (1961); Shanks 221.
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restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment apply not only to the
actions of the state but also to the acts of its private partners32
the contractors ....
Arguably, since the state could not deal with a private organization
which discriminates, neither could its private partners such as the
contractor. His nails, bricks, pipes, and other supplies would all
have to come from equal-opportunity employers. The impact of
such a decision would be ubiquitous; logically the proscriptions of
the fourteenth amendment could be applied to the state's entire chain
of supply.
Another practical problem raised by Ethridge should be briefly
noted. If the sanctions of the fourteenth amendment were directly
applied to private economic organizations in contractual relations
with the state, this would raise the question of how the private organization could disengage itself and regain its purely private
status. Since the tie with the state would be economic, severing the
tie would probably be sufficient.8" Avoiding the reach of the fourteenth amendment might be easy enough for an organization not
presently bound by some state contract. But a private organization
which had a long-term state contract and which was determined to
practice racial discrimination might have difficulty. It could find
itself trapped between the rock of equal opportunity and the whirlpool of breach of contract.
It is difficult to find a rationale for Ethridge which will both
achieve a desirable result and contain any logical limitation. One
is faced with the spectre of the rationale of the case cruising on its
own logical power through the net of economic "interdependence"
into situations in which the state's contribution to, and responsibility for, discrimination is very small indeed. Two possible limitations should be mentioned.
First it is possible that Ethridge can be given a narrower reading than that suggested here. There is language in the decision
which suggests some limitation. At one point in its opinion, the
court refers to the situation as one where the state was undertaking
to perform essential governmental functions with the aid of private
persons."
But any limitation to those performing essential gov268 F. Supp. at 88.
Cf. Tonkins v. City of Greensboro, 276 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1960).
268 F. Supp. at 87.
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ernmental functions seems to be more apparent than real. Even
with such a qualification the decision would seem to reach all those
in contractual relations with the state. It is difficult to see why
the contractor who supplies the state with a hospital building is performing an "essential governmental function," while the company
which supplies the hospital beds is not. Without one, the other is
useless.
While the "essential governmental functions" test seems to provide no effective limitation, one commentator has suggested a test
which might. The question would be whether the state is the
"effective source" of the discrimination.3 5
In determining whether the state is the effective source of the
discrimination, the relationship with the state is all that is important. It is irrelevant that the private party is also responsible
for the discrimination; only by showing that the state is not
responsible may constitutional restraints be avoided. 36
Of course there are various degrees of state contribution to discrimination. Application of the test to a situation of the Ethridge
type seems to require a practical inquiry into the extent of the
state's contribution to and, hence, responsibility for, discrimination. In Ethridge, by its decision to build a medical school building, the state created all the construction jobs on the project. Without the state's economic participation these jobs simply would not
exist. It is hard to imagine a situation in which a state, by simply
awarding a contract to a private discriminator, could do more to
contribute to discrimination. When the state is only a very small
buyer among a great many (for example, in the purchase of toothpaste for state institutions) the state's contribution to discrimination is less.
Ethridge is in keeping with the current judicial trend toward
the expansion of "state action." It reached a desirable result: jobs
created by government funds alone should be open to qualified applicants without regard to race. Ethridge clearly differs from
earlier state action cases in that it applied the fourteenth amendment
to a new layer of state-private relations. An earlier line of cases
had applied the fourteenth amendment to private organizations
receiving unusual state aid (and often subject to unusual regula8 Shanks 231.
3"
Id. at 232.
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tion). a7 Ethridge seems to extend this line of cases to (at least
some) payments made under state contracts. Together Ethridge
and the earlier line of cases seem to be consistent with a new principle. Substantial state payments to a discriminating private organization make the discriminatory acts of the private organization
"state action."381
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS

Defamation-Damages-Requirements for Collection of
Substantial Damages in Actionable Per Se Defamation

In R.H. Bouligny, Inc. v. United Steelworkers,' a defamation
action arising out of a labor organization campaign, the North
Carolina Supreme Court stated the following rule in regard to
damages recoverable for a defamatory statement adjudged actionable
per se :2
"See, e.g., Simkins v. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir.
1963).
" Compare Griffin v. Bd. of Supervisors, 339 F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1964)
with Simkins v. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963) and
Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
1270 N.C. 160, 154 S.E.2d 344 (1967). For the complete text of the
defendant's five further answers and defenses and the various motions, demurrers and rulings that gave rise to its appeal, see id. at 163-66, 154 S.E.2d
at 349-51. The basic issues raised concern questions of qualified privilege in
labor organization campaign communications, federal preemption of labor
defamation actions under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15
1964), and the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87
1964), state jurisdiction to award damages for labor dispute defamation
under the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution,
and whether plaintiff's damages allegations were sufficient to state a cause
of action. The court held in favor of the plaintiff on all questions but that
of privilege, ruling on that point that the defense of qualified privilege does
extend to defamatory statements made during labor organization campaigns.
2 Defamation considered sufficient to establish a cause of action without
proof of specific monetary loss, i.e., special damages, is referred to as actionable per se. Slander is generally not actionable per se unless it imputes
commission of a crime, a loathsome disease, unchastity to a woman, or
tends to affect the plaintiff in his trade or profession. W. PROSSER, LAW or
ToRTs 772 (3d ed. 1964). Under the common law, all libel was considered
actionable per se. However, confusion has arisen in this country over the
division of libel into two types-libel per se and libel per quod. In some
states, libel per se-or libel defamatory on its face-maintains its actionable
per se character, although libel per quod-that requiring the introduction
of extrinsic evidence to establish its defamatory nature-is not considered
actionable without proof of special damages. Prosser, More Libel Per
Quod, 79 HARv. L. Rnv. 1629 (1966) ; Eldridge, The Spurious Ride of Libel
Per Quod, 79 HARv. L. REv. 733 (1966). The North Carolina courts have
not escaped this confusion. See Kindley v. Privette, 241 N.C. 140, 84 S.E.2d
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[E]ven though the alleged statements were published by the defendant, were not privileged, were false and had a natural and
immediate tendency to impair the plaintiff's repuation in the
area of its customer or employee relations, the plaintiff can recover, under the law of this State, as compensatory damages,
only a nominal amount in absence of proof of both the fact and
the extent of damages actually suffered by it as a result of the
publications.3
Although the statement is dictum, it represents a change in defamation law. Most jurisdictions hold that general damages 4 are
presumed as a natural consequence of actionable per se defamation,
thus establishing a cause of action and insuring at least a verdict
for the plaintiff. 5 Further, the plaintiff who fails to plead or prove
some actual injury resulting from the defamation is not automatically limited to a nominal recovery; substantial damages may be
awarded based solely on the presumption. 6 North Carolina, at least
660 (1954) (all libel actionable per se). Contra, Flake v. Greensboro
News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938) (libel per quod requires proof
of special damages to be actionable). The conflicting language used in both
Flake and Kindley is quoted with apparent approval in Bouligny. R.H.
Bouligny, Inc., v. United Steelworkers, 270 N.C. 160, 168-69, 154 S.E.2d
344, 353 (1967). The libel per se-libel per quod confusion in this state
is not within the scope of this note. For a full discussion of this problem,
see Torts, Fourth Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 35 N.C.L.
REv. 177, 256 (1957); 33 N.C.L. R~v. 674 (1955).
'R.H. Bouligny, Inc. v. United Steelworkers, 270 N.C. 160, 170, 154
S.E.2d 344, 353-54 (1967) (emphasis added). Although discussed, the
question of proof required in order to collect more than nominal damages, a
cause of action having been established, was not directly submitted to the
court.
'The elements of general damages include injury to reputation, physical
pain and inconvenience, humiliation, embarrassment and mental suffering.
Payne v. Thomas, 176 N.C. 401, 97 S.E. 212 (1918); Osborne v. Leach,
135 N.C. 628, 47 S.E. 811 (1904).
Starks v. Comer, 190 Ala. 245, 67 So. 440 (1914) ; Stidham v. Wachtel,
41 Del. 327, 21 A.2d 282 (Super. Ct. 1941); Hermann v. Newark Morning
Ledger, 48 N.J. Super. 420, 138 A.2d 61 (Super. Ct. 1958); Badame v.
Lampke, 242 N.C. 755, 89 S.E.2d 466 (1955); Roth v. Greensboro News
Co., 217 N.C. 13, 6 S.E.2d 882 (1940); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212
N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938); James v. Powell, 154 Va. 96, 152 S.E. 539
(1930); Arnold v. National Union of Marine Cooks, 44 Wash.2d 183, 265
P.2d 1051 (1954), affd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 37 (1954); C. McCoRMincK,
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(hereinafter cited as McCoRMicK);

M. NEWELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL 810 (4th ed. 1924).
'Holden v. American News Co., 52 F. Supp. 24 (D.D.C. 1943); Starks
v. Comer, 190 Ala. 245, 67 So. 440 (1914); Barnett v. McClain, 153 Ark.
325, 240 S.W. 415 (1922); Stidham v. Wachtel, 41 Del. 327, 21 A.2d 282
(Super. Ct. 1941); Walsh v. Trenton Times, 124 N.J.L. 23, 10 A.2d 740
(Ct. Err. & App. 1940); Arnold v. National Union of Marine Cooks, 44
Wash.2d 183, 265 P.2d 1051 (1954); see Youssoupoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-
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prior to the 1962 opinion cited as authority for Bouligny,l has
been in accord with this rule." Since then, however, this presumption of damages appears to suffice only to establish a cause of action
in those situations where proof of special damages is not required.'
It no longer will support a recovery of more than a nominal amount.
One possible explanation for the language is that it is influenced
by the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision of Linn v. Plant Guard
Workers.'" In that case, it was held that the Labor Management
Relations Act does not preempt state jurisdiction in libel actions
arising out of labor organization campaigns." It was also held
that in order to recover the plaintiff must prove that the statements
were made with malice and caused some form of harm recognized
as compensable under state tort law.' 2 As interpreted by Bouligny,
this Linn proof requirement is necessary in order to establish a
cause of action."3 The Bouligny dictum under consideration, however, calls for proof of damages in order to collect more than a
Mayer Pictures, Ltd., 50 T.L.R. 581 (C.A. 1934); Tripp v. Thomas, 107
Eng. Rep. 792 (1824); McCoRMICx 423; M. NEWELL, supra note 10, at 821;
3 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 621, comment a (1938); RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 569, comment c at 91 (Tent. Draft No. 11,
1965). Some cases indicate that even if the presumption of damages is
controverted, plaintiff is still entitled to a substantial award. See Modisette
& Adams v. Lorenze, 163 La. 505, 112 So. 397 (1927); Hermann v. Newark
Morning Ledger, 48 N.J. Super. 420, 138 A.2d 61 (Super. Ct. 1958);
Youssoupoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Ltd. supra.
"Jones v. Hester, 262 N.C. 487, 137 S.E.2d 846 (1964) (per curiam). Refusing to hold a jury's award of nominal damages invalid, the court stated
that a verdict on publication of the libel "entitled the plaintiff to nominal
damages. Any further compensatory damages (other than nominal) could
be awarded only upon the basis of proof, by the greater weight of the
evidence." New trials have been awarded in other jurisdictions due to
inadequacy of the verdict. See, e.g., Kehoe v. New York Tribune, Inc., 229
App. Div. 220, 241 N.Y.S. 676 (1930).
8 Barringer v. Deal, 164 N.C. 246, 80 S.E. 161 (1913); see Roth v.
Greensboro News Co., 217 N.C. 13, 6 S.E.2d 882 (1939) (dictum); Flake
v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1937) (dictum);
Brandis & Trotter, Some Observations on Pleading Damages in North Carolina, 31 N.C.L. Rnv. 249, 272 & n.157 (1953).
'R.H. Bouligny. Inc., v. United Steelworkers, 270 N.C. 160, 169, 154
S.E.2d 344, 353 (1967).
10383

11
Id.
2

U.S. 53 (1966).

at 61.
' Id. at 64-65. The Linn decision required proof of malice and damages
in order to protect labor unions and smaller employers from "the propensity
of juries to award excessive damages for defamation," thereby attempting
to balance the state's interest in protecting its residents from malicious libel
with the "effective administration of national labor policy." Id.
13 R.H. Boulignv, Inc., v. United Steelworkers, 270 N.C. 160, 176, 154
S.E.2d 344, 358 (1967).
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nominal award, the cause of action already having been established.
Of course, this difference of emphasis between proof allowing judgment and proof allowing substantial recovery does not in itself mean
that Linn was not the motivation behind the Bouligny proof requirement. However, the Bouligny language itself is broad, and
it was arrived at by the North Carolina court without mention of
Linn. Indeed, the only case cited as authority for Bouligny in this
regard was an action involving two individuals. 4 All these factors
considered together point to the conclusion that the particular Bouligny paragraph in question is not controlled by the Linn case. Thus
it seems that the language is meant to apply to all libel and slander
suits in North Carolina that are deemed actionable without proof
of special damages.
Although Bouligny calls for proof of the fact and extent of harm
before substantial damages will be awarded, there are several possibilities as to the degree of proof that will satisfy this demand. It
may be argued that the proof of damages required by Bouligny can
be satisfied by the presumption of damages arising under the common law. This was the result in a New Jersey case, which held
that:
This requirement that the damages be 'proved' is not necessarily
inconsistent with an allowance of general damages by 'presumption.' Such a presumption arises by logical inference from the
patently defamatory character of a publication, assisted by the
reasoning of experience, and stands as an element of proof which,
until overcome by contrary proof, will support a verdict for general damages.' 5
Under such an interpretation, there would be no practical change
made by Bouligny.
14

Jones v. Hester, 262 N.C. 487, 137 S.E.2d 846 (1964).
Bock v. Plainfield Courrier-News, 45 N.J. Super. 302, 312, 132 A.2d
523, 528 (Super. Ct. 1957). The issue arose under the New Jersey Retraction Statute, which provides that if a non-malicious statement has been
retracted, the plaintiff "shall recover only his actual damage proved and
specifically alleged in the complaint." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 43-2 (1952).
Construction of the North Carolina Retraction Statute has never required
consideration of this point, the statute providing only that "plaintiff . . .
shall recover only actual damages. . . ." making no mention of the need
to prove those damages. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99-2 (1965). The phrase
"actual damages" has been defined as encompassing all but punitive damages,
i.e., special damages, physical pain and suffering, mental suffering and injury
to reputation. Pentuff v. Park, 194 N.C. 146, 138 S.E. 616 (1927); Osborn
v. Leach, 135 N.C. 628, 47 S.E. 811 (1904).
15
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General damages are said to be proved by introduction of evidence tending to show the probable impact of the defamation (as
opposed to direct proof of injury)." This, then, is another possible interpretation of the degree of proof of harm required by
Bouligny. Elements admissible as evidence usually include such
things as the severity of the language, plaintiff's social and financial
standing, the extent of publication of the defamation, and the defendant's influence as measured by his standing in the community.
Introduction of such evidence is always advisable in an effort to
increase the damages award.18 To require it would amount to a
shift from the realm of "ought to" in an effort to increase the damages award to the realm of "must" in order to qualify for a substantial damages verdict. It would have little practical effect, since
10
such evidence is most often introduced as a matter of course.
However, the general intangible nature of reputational injury 0 dictates that the absence of this evidence would not necessarily mean
that the plaintiff had gone unharmed.
When the North Carolina court required proof "of both the fact
and the extent of damages actually suffered," it could have been
imposing a requirement that the plaintiff prove special damages-a
specific dollars and cents loss-to collect more than nominal damages. This strict interpretation is arguable in light of the court's
21
holding that a meeting of the Linn proof of injury requirements
by the plaintiff would be sufficient "to permit recovery of nominal
damages." 2 This may mean, by inference, that a stricter proof
requirement than that imposed by Linn must be met in order to
" See MCCORMICK §

117.

"Id. There is conflicting authority over the admissibility of other factors, such as plaintiff's general good reputation (deemed presumed by many
courts), evidence of repetition by third persons, specific instances of the
effect of the defamation on individual recipients, and defendant's wealth
(allowed by most courts only on the issue of punitive damages). Id.; Note,
Direct Proof of General Damage by Defamation, 2 N.Y.L..REv. 305 (1924);
Comment, Developments in the Law of Defamation, 69 HARV. L. R-v. 875

(1956).

"8Brandis & Trotter, Some Observations on Pleading Damages in North

Carolina,
31 N.C.L. Ray. 249, 272 & n. 157 (1953).
MCCORMICK 423-24.
19

"0See note 36 infra and accompanying text.
"1As interpreted by the court in Bouligny, the Linn case requires proof
"that the publications 'injured the relations between the plaintiff and its

employees' or damaged 'the good name and reputation' of the plaintiff in the
eyes of the employees or prospective employees

....

"

R.H. Bouligny, Inc.,

v. United
Steelworkers, 270 N.C. 160, 178, 154 S.E.2d 344, 359 (1967).
22
1d.
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get more than nominal damages.28 Such a stricter requirement
would probably mean proof of pecuniary harm.24 The result would
be that compensation for often real but immeasurable harm (in
monetary terms) to reputation and feelings would become a rarity
in North Carolina defamation law.
The most likely interpretation of Bouligny's proof of damages
requirement, judging from the language on its face, is that the plaintiff must provide direct proof of both the fact and the extent of
injury before qualifying for substantial compensation. For example, the plaintiff must objectively prove that his relationship with
friends has been unfavorably influenced, and perhaps the degree
of this influence, or how many of his friendships have been so
affected. Because of this likelihood, attention should be directed
to whether this is a desirable requirement.
In favor of such a requirement is the possibility that it may inject a greater element of control and rationale into defamation
damages awards by juries2 5 It would facilitate the jury's understanding of the exact harm that their award should compensate and
would make easier the court's review of the jury's award. 6 This
same desirable goal could be approached, however, through dearer
explanation to the jury of the elements of presumed injury to reputation for which they are to award compensation. 27 The advantage
"On the other hand, the phrase "to permit recovery of nominal damages" may be intended to refer only to the establishment of a cause of action,
and not to be read as meaning plaintiff can recover only nominal damages
in the absence of further proof. At best, the language is unclear.
2This assumes, of course, that the degree of proof required by Linn is
interpreted by Bodlgny as being direct proof of claimed injury. This ap-

pears to be the case. See note 21 supra.
" Amounts of verdicts vary from nominal damages of a few cents to
a fortune in six figures, according to numberless factors, such as the
age, sex, wealth, and personal attractiveness of the parties, the skill
of the respective counsel, the pungency of the defaming words, and
the infinite variety of experiences, sympathies, and prejudices of the

jurymen.

McCoRMIcK, supra note 10, at 443.
"' The criteria used by the courts in determining the reasonableness of

a damages award is whether it appears to be the result of passion or preju-

dice. See, e.g., Yates v. Mullins, 233 Ky. 781, 26 S.W.2d 757 (1930).
"'Comment, Developments in the Law of Defamation, 69 HARv. L. Rv.
875 (1956). The harms resulting from injury to reputation would consist
of such things as pecuniary injury, physical injury, mental suffering, and

loss of association.

By focusing directly upon these specific harms to the individual rather
than on the injury to reputation which caused them, the arbitrary
nature of jury awards of general damages might be somewhat reduced
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of such a practice, in lieu of requiring proof of damages, is that it
permits compensation for defamatory harm not subject to direct
proof. Besides, there is no guarantee that different men would not
assign different values to those injuries that were directly proved.
Thus the uncertainties in amounts of awards would continue to be
a factor under the Bouligniy proof requirement.
Under the interpretation of Bouligny being considered here,
those unable to prove directly some harm resulting from defamation
still would have the benefit of a verdict in their favor. This fact
forces one to consider the vindicatory function of a verdict without
damages. Vindication, or restoration of reputation, is probably the
relief most desired by victims of defamation. Thus, a verdict without damages (or with only a nominal award) may satisfy the defamed28 while not burdening the defamer with potentially large
damages payments.2 9
The allowance of nominal damages performs a vindicatory func-

tion by enabling the plaintiff to brand the defamatory publication
as false.

The rule that permits satisfaction of the deep seated

need for vindication of honor is not a mere historic relic, but promotes the law's civilizing function of providing an acceptable
substitute for violence in the settlement of disputes. The judgement also partakes of the nature of relief in equity by subduing,
or at least minimizing, the spread of harm to reputation.8 0
and the courts might be provided with at least a general standard for
determining the outer limits of proper awards of damages.
Id. at 936.
8Of course, punitive damages may be assessed against a defendant in
some libel and slander cases. In North Carolina, such damages can be
awarded only if the defamation was perpetrated with actual malice (the
implied malice considered to accompany libel or slander per se will not
suffice), and the award must bear some reasonable relation to the circumstances. See, e.g., Cotton v. Fisheries Prods. Co., 181 N.C. 151, 106 S.E.
487 (1921). This note deals only with the compensatory damages aspect
of actionable per se defamation.
2" The "lie bill," a form of action apparently once used in some northern
Arkansas counties, provided a somewhat similar result. The slandered party
would file a "lie bill" against the defamer in a justice of the peace court.
If the plaintiff won his case, the verdict took the form of a declaratory
judgment in which the defendant was required to sign an admission that he
had lied about the plaintiff. See Leflar, Legal Remedies for Defamation,
6 ARK. L. Rav. 423 (1952).
" Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 660 (D.C. Cir.
1966). The language was used in rejecting a requirement of proof of special
damages to establish a cause of action for libel per quod. However, the
court indicated that (similar to Bomdigny) it would require proof of injury
before allowing more than a nominal award: "[A] plaintiff need not show
any pecuniary damage in order to establish the libel and recover nominal
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Closer scrutiny, however, reveals several practical considerations

which tend to limit the effectiveness of these vindicatory functions
of a nominal damages verdict. First, a nominal award may indicate to the general public that the plaintiff's damaged honor and
reputation have been assessed at a similar small value. 1 As put by
one English adjudicator, "[T]he damages awarded have to be regarded as the demonstrative mark of vindication.""2
Further, any idea that the spread of harm to reputation will be
minimized by a judgment must be considered in light of the speedor lack of it-with which verdicts are rendered. Crowded court
calendars and complex issues combine to make judicial vindication
painfully slow. 3 At the same time, harm to reputation and feelings
can result in no less time than it takes a newspaper to be published,
distributed and read by the public. Indeed, the harm has run its
full course and been long ingrained in both recipients and victim
before judgment is rendered.
Finally, before any judicial vindication can assert itself, the
judicial system must be available to the victim of defamation. One
must contend with the prohibitive expense of defamation litigation, 4
and any further limitation of the possibility of making the action
pay its own way-i.e., by requiring direct proof of injury before
substantial damages may be awarded-may effectively close the
court's doors to less wealthy plaintiffs.
The vindicatory value of a verdict without substantial damages
is thus open to question. Compensation for injury from defamation
is probably the primary value of an action for damages. A requirement of direct proof of injury before the victim can collect substandamages, or compensation for non-pecuniarydamage supported by the proof."
Id. at 659 (emphasis added).
" "The very nature of an action which prays for damages, in a society
where economic values dominate, implies failure in the action if substantial
damages be not awarded." Leflar, Legal Remedies for Defamation, 6 ARK.
L. REv. 423, 428 (1952). "Thus a libel impugning the virtue of the" village
banker's daughter that results in a verdict for six cents implies that her
repuation for chastity was worth only that much." Donelly, The Right of
Reply: An Alternative to an Action for Libel, 34 VA. L. Rxv. 867, 873
(1948).
" Dingle v. Associated Newspapers Ltd., [1960] 3 W.L.R. 229, 240
(H.L.), cited in Note, Problems of Assessing Damages for Defamation, 79
L.Q. REv. 63, 64 (1963).
" Comment, Vindication of the Reputation of a Public Official, 80 HARV.
L. REv. 1730, 1732 (1967).
" Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modern
Revised Translation, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 581, 604 (1964).
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tial damages limits the compensatory function of a defamation action
since direct proof of specific injury caused by defamation is often
difficult if not impossible.3
By the very nature of the harm resulting from defamatory publications, it is frequently not susceptible of objective proof. Libel
and slander work their evil in ways that are invidious and subtle.
The door of opportunity may be closed to the victim without his
knowledge, his business or professional career limited by the
operation of forces which he cannot identify but which, nonetheless, were set in motion by the defamatory statements. 30
In light of these considerations-an uncertain and perhaps unnecessary method of regulating jury determinations, the questionable
vindicatory value of a judicial verdict without damages, and the
inherent difficulty of the proof required-it seems more desirable
to permit the award of substantial compensation for defamatory
harm based on a presumption of damages. Maintenance of the full
scope of this presumption, coupled with more thorough instructions
to juries and a greater readiness to review their damages awards,
is a preferable alternative to the requirement of direct proof of damage to qualify for substantial award-which seems to be the most
probable effect of Bouligny. This alternative permits compensation
for unprovable but present harm, and also offers greater protection
from unreasonable damages awards.
Finally, it must be admitted that it remains basically unclear
exactly what the Bouligny dictum intends to require of a plaintiff
seeking compensation for damages resulting from actionable per se
defamation. This added uncertainty as to what he must do to gain
substantial compensation for defamatory harm should be clarified
at the court's earliest opportunity.
RICHARD W. ELLIS
Estate Tax-Deductions-Life Beneficiary with Power to
Invade Corpus of Charitable Remainder
The Internal Revenue code of 1954 provides that in the determination of the taxable estate the value of all transfers, bequest,
legacies, or devises of property to certain public, charitable, or
" Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 660 (D.C. Cir.

1966); RESTATEMiENT OF ToRTs § 621, comment a (1938).
"1 F. HARPER & F. JAmEs, THE LAW OF ToRTs 468 (1956).
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religious organizations is to be deducted from the value of the
gross estate.' By allowing the deduction congress hoped to shift
to the private sector charitable expenditures it would probably otherwise have to assume. The theory seems to be that the private sector can maintain the charitable programs more economically, efficiently, and with less political interference than either federal or
state government. Realizing the possibilities created for obtaining
funds, the charitable organizations have undertaken extensive
campaigns for contributions; and the response has been good since
there are tax advantages in charitable giving for both the wealthy
and those with more moderate means.2
A frequently used method of giving entails the establishment of
a trust directing the trustee to pay the income to a private lifetime
beneficiary with the remainder over to charity. The trustee is also
given the power to invade the corpus of the trust in favor of the
lifetime beneficiary. By using this method the testator hopes to
insure the comfort and happiness of the private beneficiary and at
the same time obtain a charitable deduction. In the absence of a
power to invade, the amount of the deduction can be easily determined." But where such a power exists a considerable amount
of controversy has developed over what circumstances should exist
before a deduction is allowed. The source of this controversy is
the uncertainty as to the value of the interest charity will ultimately
receive. The Treasury Department has taken the position that a
deduction is allowable; but, to insure that charity will take an
amount commensurate to the deduction allowed, the Treasury
requires that the value of the remainder interest be "presently
ascertainable and, hence severable from the private interest"4 and
that the possibility of an invasion be "so remote as to be negligible." 5 These requirements may seem to present few complexities
' NT. REv.

CODE of 1954, § 2055.

' See generally, Lowndes, Tax Advantages of Charitable Giving, 46 VA.

L. REv. 394 (1960); Merritt, .Tax Incentives for Charitable Giving, 36
TAxEs 646 (1958); Yohlin, Tax Blessings of Charitable Giving, 10 PRAc.
LAW 43 (May 1964); Young, Tax Effects of Gifts to Charity, 41 TAxEs

351 (1963).

' Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(A) (1958). This section allows a deduction for
the present value of the remainder interest created when property is placed
in a trust to pay the income to a private lifetime beneficiary and then to
pay the principal to charity. The remainder interest is valued according
to the rules stated in § 20.2032-7.
'Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(A) (1958).
'Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(B) (1958).
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but in their application the courts have been faced with three major
questions: In what order should the tests be applied? What does
"presently ascertainable" mean? And what is "so remote as to be
negligible?"
To obtain a deduction the burden is on the taxpayer to show
that the necessary requirements have been met.6 First, he must prove
that the power of invasion is limited by a "presently ascertainable"
standard. Without such a standard no deduction is allowed.7
If such a standard is found, he must then prove that the possibility
of an invasion is negligible; but where no standard exists the courts
refuse to consider this problem." In those cases where there is a
standard but the possibility of invasion is more than remote the
courts must decide what amount of the claimed deduction is to be
denied.
In Moffet v. Commissioner' the Fourth Circuit denied the entire
deduction when it found that the possibility of invasion was not "so
remote as to be negligible." In that case the testator established a
million and a half dollar trust from which yearly payments were to
be made to his widow for life. Charity was to receive the remainder. In denying the deduction the court was unimpressed by
the taxpayer's argument that a deduction should be allowed for
the present value of the charitable remainder computed after
subtracting from the original trust corpus an amount determined
by the multiplication of the expected annual invasion by the widow's
life expectancy. This decision was clearly repudiated by the Second Circuit in Schildkraut v. Commissioner.1" There, on substantially the same facts, a partial deduction was allowed. The court
held that the requirement that the possibility of invasion be negligible did not apply in this context. It felt that the proper test was
whether there is an interest that is "presently ascertainable" and
"assurance" that charity will ultimately receive it. In short, the
court took the position of the Treasury Department in Revenue
'Lincoln Rochester Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 424 (2d Cir.
1950); Commerce Trust Co. v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 643 (W.D. Mo.
1958).
'Ithaca
Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929).
8
Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595
(1949); Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 256 (1943);
Salisbury v. United States, 377 F.2d 700 (2nd Cir. 1967); Merrill Trust
Co. v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 474 (D. Me. 1958).
'269 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1959).
" 368 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1967).
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Ruling 54-285" that "if the facts indicate the probability of an invasion to a limited extent which is calculable in accordance with an
ascertainable standard, the deduction should be denied only to such
extent." From these two cases it is clear that there is a serious dispute as to whether a negligible possibility of invasion is a prerequisite for any deduction. In the light of this dispute it would be advisable for the testator to utilize some other tax saving method
where it appears that even a limited invasion is probable. The simplest solution would be an outright devise by the testator, after consultation with an attorney, to the widow and charity of interests
approximately equal in value to those they would have taken under
the trust.
There has been some criticism of the requirement that a
"presently ascertainable" standard must exist within the will before
a deduction is allowed. Those who criticize are in effect rejecting
the "two-step" analysis. In a dissent in Merchants National Bank
v. Commissioner 2 Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice
Jackson concurred, argued that in determining whether the standard was ascertainable the court should consider such outside factors as the frugality and conservatism of the trustee, the habits
of the beneficiary, and the nature of the investments. These
factors might make certain what on the face of the will appears
uncertain; thus, the likelihood of. invasion should be the determining factor. By using this test it is felt that the congressional
policy of favoring charity would be better served. In support
of this argument cases can be cited where the charitable deduction
was denied even though the facts showed that, as a matter of
common experience, the charitable beneficiary was as assured
of receiving the corpus intact as in other cases where an ascertainable standard was found and a deduction allowed.' 3 This inconsistency seems to be the basis for most objections to the present
"two-step" test.
In answer to these criticisms the Court has said that "[w]hat
common experience may regard as remote in the generality of cases
1954-2 Cum. BuLL. 302.
12320 U.S. 256 (1943).
18 Compare Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 256 (1943),
Gammons v. Hassett, 121 F.2d 229 (1st Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
673 (1941), and Merrill Trust Co. v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 474 (D.
Me. 1958), with Estate of Mary C. Wood, 39 T.C. 919 (1963) and Estate
of Leonard 0. Carlson, 21 T.C. 291 (1963).
11
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may nonetheless be beyond the realm of precise prediction in the
single instance."' 4 In sum, the Court was pointing to the additional
uncertainty created by the absence of a "presently ascertainable"
standard. Whether or not a standard exists would in itself be an
important factor in determining the likelihood of an invasion.
Without a limiting standard the courts can only speculate as to the
needs or desires of the lifetime beneficiary. Of course the courts
can look to the beneficiary's past station in life and draw some conclusions as to his frugality but in light of the general uncertainty
surrounding human affairs no adequate projection can be made.
In fact, without first establishing a standard it is difficult to see
how the likelihood of an invasion can be determined. Furthermore
it must be remembered that the tax is imposed on the transfer of
property or the act of the testator 5 and that when he creates a
trust giving charity a vested interest subject to divestment for the
benefit of the private beneficiary he is only secondarily concerned
with the charitable beneficiary. When this intent is considered in
conjunction with the broad power of invasion given the trustee it
does not seem unfair to deny the deduction.
What language constitutes an "ascertainable standard?" In
answer to this question the Court has said that the purposes for
which the corpus may be invaded must be subject to "reliable prediction"' 6 rather than "rough guesses" or "approximation"' 1 and
that there must be a standard "fixed in fact and capable of being
stated in definite terms of money."'- The first class of standards
held to be ascertainable are those where the trustee's power of invasion is limited to the amount necessary to insure that the lifetime
beneficiary will continue to live according to his or her accustomed
standard of living.' 9 Other language held to connote the objective
station in life standard includes "support, maintenance, welfare,
'2 2
21
and comfort,"20 "comfort and support," "comfort and welfare,
"' Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595,
599 (1949).
' Young Mens Christian Ass'n v. Davis, 264 U.S. 47 (1924).
" Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 256, 262 (1943).
lId.
at 261.
18 Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151, 154 (1929).
Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929); Lincoln
Rochester Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 181, F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1950);
Estate of Leonard 0. Carlson, 21 T.C. 291 (1953).
"0Estate of Mary C. Wood, 39 T.C. 919 (1963).
"Estate of Edwin E. Jack, 6 T.C. 241 (1946).
" Blodget v. Delaney, 201 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1953).
''Ithaca
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"care and maintenance," 3 and "comfortable maintenance and support."24 The objective standard has also been implied where the
invasion was limited to periods created by physical or economic
emergencies. 5
Where there is subjective language such as "use and benefit,"2 6
"comfortable support and maintenance and for any other reasonable
requirements, 2 7 "need or desire," 2 "support, maintenance, and
comfort, including luxuries," 29 and "welfare, comfort, and happiness,"3 the courts have been prone to say that the standard is
unascertainable. Expansive language directing the trustee to invade the corpus for the proper maintenance and support of the
beneficiary to the same generous extent that the testator, if living,
could do has caused an otherwise objective standard to fail for
subjectivity.3' Directions by the testator to the effect that the
trustee in exercising his discretion is to favor the private beneficiary
over the charity have also rendered the remainder nondeductible.32
"' Estate of Nellie H. Jennings, 10 T.C. 241 (1946).

*'Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. v. Eaton, 36 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1929).

Payment by the trustee was to be limited to cases of need "on account

of any sickness, accident, want, or other emergency," Commissioner v. Wells

Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 145 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1944); "in case
she should, by reason of accident, illness, or other unusual circumstances so
require," Commissioner v. Bank of America Trust & Savings Ass'n, 133
F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1943); "in case of illness or other emergency" affecting
the beneficiary or his family, Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. United
States, 265 F. Supp. 800 (D. Conn. 1967); and for any "emergency, illness,
or necessity," Estate of Oliver Lee, 28 T.C. 1259 (1957).
" Newton Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 175 (1st Cir. 1947).
"! State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 313 F.2d 29 (1st Cir.
1963).
" Gammons v. Hassett, 121 F.2d 229 (1st Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 673 (1941).
F. Supp. 307 (D. Mass. 1963).
°Vaccaro v. United States, 224F.2d
821 (10th Cir. 1962).
United States v. Powell, 307
Kline v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 849 (N.D. W.Va. 1962), aff'd
per curiamn, 313 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1963). Directions to the trustee to make
payments "for any other purpose which my trustee shall deem expedient,
necessary, or desirable for the benefit and use of my sister," Zentmayer v.
Commissioner, 336 F.2d 488 (3d Cir. 1964); "for any purpose which may
add to her (beneficiary's) comfort or convenience," Seubert v. Shaughnessy,
233 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1956) ; and "of such portion of the trust as my sister
may in writing request" with her judgement as to need being conclusive,
Merrill Trust Co. v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 474 (D. Me. 1958), have
rendered an otherwise objective standard subjective.
" Typical examples are directions that the trustee's first object to be
accomplished is to provide for the beneficiary in "such manner as she may
desire," Ilenslee v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595
(1949) ; that in the exercise of his discretion he is to be liberal to the life
time beneficiary, Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 256
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Furthermore the use of subjective or expansive language in conjunction with a limitation permitting invasion only in cases of
emergency have caused the standard to be unascertainable.8" It
seems though that in this latter situation the courts will more readily
imply an objective standard. 4
In the construction and interpretation of a will the primary purpose of the court is to ascertain the intention of the testator. 5 To
do this the courts must necessarily interpret the will in accordance
with the applicable state law since it is that law which ultimately
determines the extent of the trustee's power of invasion. 8 This
dependence upon state law in determining the existence of a standard creates what at first appears to be an inconsistency between
the courts' words and actions. The federal courts have consistently
refused to consider outside circumstances in order to make the standard ascertainable. 37 Yet we find that the state courts construe the
language used by the testator in the light of such outside circumstances as the condition of the testator's family, how he was circumstanced, his relationship to the beneficiary, the financial condition of the beneficiary (at least where it was known to the testator),
and even the motives which are reasonably supposed to influence
him.3" Thus, in a sense, extrinsic circumstances sometimes in(1943) ; that he is to give "sympathetic consideration to any request" made

by the beneficiary, Union Trust Co. v. Tomlinson, 355 F.2d 40 (5th Cir.
1966); and that his powers are to be liberally construed in favor of the
private beneficiary, Industrial Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 151 F.2d 592
(1st Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 788 (1946).
" In DeCastro v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 254, (2d Cir. 1946), cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 727 (1946), the court held that a provision allowing invasion if other income did not "amply" provide for the life beneficiary's needs
rendered the remainder nondeductible. A similar result was reached in
Estate of Helen H. Thompson, 27 P-H Tax Ct. Rep. & Mem. Dec. 1 58-100
(1958), where the trustee was directed to make payments "for the best
interest of the beneficiary during illness or emergency of any kind."
" Compare Salisbury v. United States, 378 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1967) and
Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. United States, 265 F. Supp. 800 (D.
Conn. 1967), with Newton Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 175 (1st
Cir. 1947).
" Salisbury v. United States, 378 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1967).
"Blodget v. Delany, 201 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1953).
" Seubert v. Shaughnessy, 233 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1956). The court indicated that extrinsic facts such as the financial condition of the life
beneficiary were irrelevant to the question of whether or not there was an
ascertainable standard.
" Rufty v. Brantly, 204 Ark. 32, 161 S.W.2d 11 (1942) ; Stern v. Stern,
410 Ill. 377, 102 N.E.2d 104 (1951); Herring v. Williams, 153 N.C. 231,
69 S.E. 140 (1910); It re Jackson's Estate, 377 Pa. 561, 12 A.2d 338
(1940); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 129 S.C. 321, 123 S.E. 854 (1924).
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directly enter into the determination of an "ascertainable standard." 9 Despite the apparent inconsistency there is a distinction
that can be drawn between these two practices. In the latter instance
the courts are using the outside factors to determine the testator's
intent expressed in the language of the will. In the former if the
court finds that the language is subjective it will not allow the deduction just because those same factors show that the likelihood of
invasion is remote.
What is "so remote as to be negligible?" Must the taxpayer
prove that it is impossible for charity not to take? This question
was answered in the negative by the court in Hamilton National
Bank v. United States.40 The court made it clear that a charitable
deduction will be allowed even though some uncertainty exists.
In defining "so remote as to be negligible" the court said "a negligible possibility is a possibility that would in the ordinary and reasonable affairs of men be disregarded in arriving at a present valuation
of a future remainder interest in a serious business transaction, with
no deduction in the value of the remainder interest being made by
reason of the existence of such a possibility."41 Whether such a
possibility exists is a question of fact. No general rules or conclusions can be reached as each case must necessarily be decided
on its own particular facts.
What facts are to be considered? The courts have stated that
only those facts existing at the testator's death are relevant.4 2 In
" Where there has been a state court decision which is neither collusive

nor inoperative, on the extent of the trustee's power of invasion, it seems
that the federal courts in applying the federal tax statute must make their
determination in accordance with the state court ruling. Henrickson v.
Baker-Boyer Nat'l Bank, 139 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1944). Professors Lowndes
and Kramer point out that where there is no state court decision on the
particular trust under consideration the federal courts generally construe and
apply the state law for themselves. C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, FEDERAL
ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES, 57 (2d ed. 1962). In construing the will the
federal courts must necessarily take into account all the factors which
are relevant in the particular state jurisdiction to the interpretation of a
will. To do otherwise would be unrealistic as no accurate interpretation
of the language used could be made. Furthermore, if the outside factors
were completely ignored a tax might often be imposed on interests which
by State Law were certain to go to charity.
40236 F. Supp. 1005 (E.D. Tenn. 1965), aff'd, 367 F.2d 554 (6th Cir.

1966).
"'236F. Supp. 1005, 1016 (E.D. Tenn. 1965), aff'd, 367 F.2d 554 (6th

Cir. 1966).
" Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929); Lincoln
Rochester Trust Co. v. McGowan, 217 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1954).
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Lincoln Rochester Trust Co. v. McGowan the court said that "actual
events occurring after the testator's death may never be substituted
for the estimate of probable events made as of the time of the
testator's death and based upon circumstances as they existed on that
date."4 3 For later events to be considered their admission must
"have sufficiently high probative value in establishing or clarifying
the circumstances as they existed at the time of the testator's
death."

'44

In Allen v. FirstNational Bank45 property was left by the testator to his wife for life and then to the children (including those
born posthumously) and descendants that survive her. In the event
there were no survivors the property was to go to designated charities. In allowing a deduction the court had to decide whether or
not it was proper to admit evidence of the fact that no child had
been born posthumously.

In admitting the evidence the court said

that it was merely evidence establishing the existence of a state of
facts which existed at the date of the testator's death. The evidence tended to establish that as of the date of death there would
not and could not be any child born of the marriage. Later events
held inadmissible included an actual invasion of the corpus after
the date of death and evidence of the later death of the private
beneficiary.4 7 The distinction is, as the above court pointed out,
that evidence of this nature has no connection at all with the facts
existing at the time of the testator's death.
The factors which seem to weigh most heavily with the courts
are the life expectancy of the beneficiary, the beneficiary's past standard of living, the income of the trust, and the independent means
of the beneficiary available for the payment of such expenses.4 8 In
their consideration of this last factor another important question
must be answered by the court: does the applicable state law require that the lifetime beneficiary substantially exhaust his own
"217 F.2d 287, 293 (2d Cir. 1954).
"Id.

"169 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1948).
Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 145 F.2d 132
(9th Cir. 1944). The court said that it was improper to be influenced by
such evidence.
"Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 559
(1949); Merrill Trust Co. v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 474 (D. Me.

1958).

"E state of Eunice M. Greene, 11 T.C. 205 (1948); Estate of John W.
Holmes, 5 T.C. 1289 (1945).

CHARITABLE DEDUCTIONS

1967]

private resources before an invasion can be made? In Christy v.
Commissioner49 a deduction was not allowed principally because
Pennsylvania had no such requirement. Had this case arisen in
another jurisdiction the deduction probably would have been
allowed."0 Some other factors considered by the courts include the
beneficiary's ability to work, the probability that he will continue
to work, the number of his dependants, the state of the beneficiary's
health, and the character of the trustee. 51
In reviewing the decisions of the courts in this area it is evident
that much confusion exists. But from these cases several general
propositions can be deduced. First, the power of invasion should
be limited to that amount necessary to maintain the beneficiary according to his prior station in life. Secondly, subjective or expansive language should not be used to limit the power of invasion as
it seems to be an invitation to a law suit. Furthermore most charitable interests have been held nondeductible where this language
was used. Thirdly, if tax considerations are the prime concern, a
provision to the effect that the beneficiary must exhaust his assets
before an invasion can be made should be included in the testator's
will if the applicable state law has no such requirement. Lastly,
the testator should not rely upon getting a partial deduction. If a
trust has been established and it later appears that a deduction will
be denied consideration should be given to disclaiming the power
52

of invasion.

JOHN M. MASSEY

'°8 T.C. 862 (1947).
"Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. United States, 265 F. Supp. 800
(D. Conn. 1967). In Connecticut the invasion of the corpus is conditioned
upon the exhaustion of the beneficiary's assets.
"'Estate of Mary C. Wood, 39 T.C. 919 (1963); Estate of Lucius H.

Elmer, 6 T.C. 944 (1946); Estate of Charles H. Wiggins, 3 T.C. 464

(1944); Union Nat'1 Bank v. Looker, 64-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
12,258 (N.D.
W.Va. 1964).
" INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 2055.
This section provides that included
in the amount deductible is the value of all the interest which passes to

charity as the result of an irrevocable disclaimer. For a deduction to be
taken the disclaimer must be filed in the probate court before the estate
tax return is filed.
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Insurance-Accidental Means v. Accidental Death or
Tweedledum v. Tweedledee*
The insured in Henderson v. Hartford Acc. & In4dern. Co.' was

a member of the local fire department who entered a burning dwelling in furtherance of his duties as a fireman. While inside the
house he inhaled heavy smoke which caused him to collapse. He
was revived, but he died after a few minutes from a cardiac arrest
brought on by the smoke inhalation. The group accident insurance
policy covering the fire department members provided that death
or injury must be "effected . . .through accidental means."2 On
the basis of this wording the North Carolina Supreme Court denied
recovery to the insured's beneficiary, distinguishing the terms "accidental means" and "accident." The insured's death, the court held,
occurred by "accident" and not by "accidental means."
The common definition of an "accident" is an unusual, unexpected and unintended event-an event which happens fortuitously and without design.' In light of the fact that the term
"accident" has acquired no special technical meaning in law and is
to be given its ordinary and common meaning,4 it would appear
that recovery would be had in the above case. The distinction
drawn by the North Carolina court to deny recovery, however, is
also drawn in many other jurisdictions. On the other hand, some
courts, while recognizing the technical distinction between the terms,
flatly refuse to drawn any legal distinction between them. The
* In the poem "On the Feuds between Handel and Bononcini," which
was written about two feuding schools of musical theory between which
there was no real difference, the English poet John Byron wrote this familiar
line:
"Strange all this difference should be
Twixt Tweedledum and Tweedledee."
This expression has a special relevance when discussing the terms "accidental means" and "accident" in insurance law.
'268
N.C. 129, 150 S.E.2d 17 (1966).
2
1d. at 130, 150 S.E.2d at 18 (emphasis added). The term "accidental
means" is common in accident policies and in double indemnity provisions of
life insurance policies. See Franklin, Accidental Death-As It Relates to
Health and Accident Policies and Double Indemnity Provisions of Life Policies, ABA INS., NEGL., & Comp. LAW SEcTION 91 (1965). The two types of
policies will be treated together here since the use of the term has the same
effect in both. For a brief history of how the term came into use see M.
CORNELIus, ACCIDENTAL MEANS

1-4 (1932).

'E.g., 29A Am. JuR. Insurance § 1164 (1960).
'2 G. RIcHrAIs, INSURANCE 725 (5th ed. 1952).
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resulting controversy is no small one.' It is helpful, for purposes
of analysis, to regard the courts and legal scholars as divided into
two distinct groups, but it is not always clear to which group some
courts belong.
The first group, of which North Carolina is a member, follows
the "strict approach" or "Georgia rule." 6 This group distinguishes
between the terms and is considered to be in the majority. Basically, the distinction is founded upon the idea that "means" is synonymous with "cause; ' that when the term "accidental means"
is used in a policy, the cause of the injury or death must be accidental. To these courts it is not sufficient that the result can be
classified as an accident. Under this theory an insured's injury
or death may be an "accident" and yet not caused by "accidental
means." The means are not considered accidental when the insured
does a voluntary and intentional act and is injured or killed, even
though the injury or death does not ordinarily follow such an act
and was not in any way intended or expected.
The North Carolina court's reasoning in the Henderson case
provides a clear example of the strict approach. There the insured
was voluntarily and intentionally fighting the fire. The court held
that the means were not accidental since the insured was voluntarily
performing an intentional act, even though the result (i.e. death)
was unusual, unexpected, and unforseen. s
If a slip or mishap occurs in the doing of a voluntary and intentional act, an element of unexpectedness is added and the means
become accidental.' Therefore the distinction or strict approach
becomes important only where the insured is injured or killed as
the result of an intentional act in which no slip or mishap occurred,
but where the result was totally unexpected and unintended as in
Henderson.

The second group of courts and legal scholars follows the
'See generally 29A AM.

JUR.,

mtpra note 3, at §§ 1164-67; 1A J. APPLE-

MAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 391-93
Insurance §§ 753-54, 938 (1946) ; 2 G. RIcHARDS,

W.

VANCE, INSURANCE

§§ 179-81 (3rd ed. 1961).

(rev. ed. 1965); 45 C.J.S.
supra note 4, at §§ 213-17;

° This "strict approach" stems from the case of United States Mut. Acc.
Ass'n v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100 (1889).
29A Al!. JuR., supra note 2, at § 1166.
8268 N.C. at 133, 150 S.E.2d at 20.
' Thus in Henderson the court ruled by implication that if a slip, mishap,
or mischance had occurred in the doing of the act, recovery would have
been allowed.
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"liberal approach" or "New York rule."1 0 Mr. Justice Cardozo,
dissenting in Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co.," paved the
way for this liberal rule by his apparently logical statement to the
effect that an accident is an accident throughout or it is no accident
at all. 2 To the followers of the liberal approach the terms "accidental means" and "accident" are regarded as being legally synonymous. To these courts the means are accidental when the result
is an accident. Therefore, when the result is unusual, unexpected,
and unintended, even though resulting from an intentional act in
which no slip or mishap occurs, the means are held to be accidental
and recovery is allowed.
Added to the controversy is confusion. Mr. Justice Cardozo
predicted in his celebrated dissent in Landress that "[tfhe attempted
distinction between accidental results and accidental means will
plunge this branch of the law into a Serbonian Bog.18 The confusion that has resulted has prompted one writer to the conclusion
that this "prophecy . . . is now close to fulfillment. This whole
"0Among the courts following the "liberal approach" are those of Arkansas, Travelers Ins. Co. v. Johnston, 204 Ark. 307, 162 S.W.2d 480 (19425;
Colorado, Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Hemenover, 100 Colo. 231, 67
P.2d 80 (1937); Florida, Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Nash, 97 So.2d 4 (Fla.
1957); Idaho, O'Neil v. New York Life Ins. Co., 65 Idaho 722, 152 P.2d
707 (1944); Illinois, Taylor v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 11 Ill.2d
227, 142 N.E.2d 5 (1957); Iowa, Comfort v. Continental Cas. Co., 239
Iowa 1206, 34 N.W. 2d 588 (1948); Louisiana, Schonberg v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 235 La. 462, 104 So.2d 171 (1958); Nebraska, Murphy v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 141 Neb. 41, 2 N.W.2d 576 (1942); New Mexico, Scott
v. New Empire Ins. Co., 75 N.M. 81, 400 P.2d 953 (1965); New York,
Burr v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 295 N.Y. 294, 67 N.E.2d
248 (1946); North Dakota, Jacobson v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc.
Ass'n, 69 N.D. 632, 289 N.W. 591 (1940); Oklahoma, Provident Life &
Acc. Ins. Co. v. Green, 172 Okla. 591, 46 P.2d 372 (1935); Pennsylvania,
Beckham v. Travelers Ins. Co., 424 Pa. 107, 225 A.2d 532 (1967); South
Carolina, Goethe v. New York Life Ins. Co., 183 S.C. 199, 190 S.E. 451
(1937); Utah, Browning v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 94 Utah 532,
72 P.2d 1060 (1937); and Vermont, Griswald v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
107 Vt. 367, 180 A. 649 (1935). Other courts have followed the liberal
approach in particular cases without announcing it as a general rule, e.g.,
King v. Travelers Ins. Co., 123 Conn. 1, 192 A. 311 (1937).
11291 U.S. 491 (1934).
12291 U.S. at 501. See Note, "An Accident Is an Accident Is An Accident. . ." or "An Accident By Any Other Name
L. REv. 250, 255 (1957).

....

"

12 N.Y.U. INmRA.

291 U.S. at 499. The term "Serbonian Bog" is from 2 J.
line 392 (1667):
A gulf profound as that Serbonian Bog
Betwixt Damiato and Mount Casius old,
Where armies whold have sunk. ...
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branch of insurance law has become shrouded in a semantical and
polemical maze. .

.

.

The situation is fast approaching a point

where the slight frame of legal theory involved is being smothered."
Part of the confusion is created by the fact that different courts
following the strict approach will often reach contradictory results
on similar fact situations. The Michigan court allowed recovery
where an insured hunter froze to death on a hunting trip, 5 but
the Montana court denied recovery on similar facts."
Another
example is the division among the courts following the strict approach as to whether sunstroke is caused by accidental means."
The reason for these inconsistent results is that many courts which
draw the distinction have modified the approach in particular cases
in an effort to achieve more equitable results.'" Thus it appears that
some courts have abolished the distinction without repudiating it. 9
Another source of confusion in this area is that the courts which
attempt to achieve a more equitable result often do so by resorting
to a confusing analysis of the case in order to preserve the distinction. An example of such an analysis is found in Traveler's Ins. Co.
v. Ansley." There the insured died from an overdose of a "nerve
remedy." There was no slip or mishap causing the insured to take
a poisonous quantity. He intentionally took the precise amount
involved without knowing it was deadly in that quantity. That the
Tennessee court professes to follow the strict rule is evidenced by
the statement that an accidental means policy "does not insure against
an injury that may be caused by a voluntary, natural, ordinary
movement, executed exactly as was intended.""
Applying this
strict rule to the facts of the case, there would normally be no recovery since the insured voluntarily, intentionally, and with an
ordinary movement, took the medicine. But, in allowing recovery
"Annot.,
A.L.R. 469, Life
477 Ins.
(1934).
" Ashley v.166Agricultural
Co., 241 Mich. 441, 217 N.W. 27
(1928).

Tuttle v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 58 Mont. 121, 190 P. 993 (1920).
The Landress majority held sunstroke not to be by accidental
means, but the Wisconsin court holds that it is. O'Connell v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 220 Wis. 61, 264 N.W. 253 (1936).
1" Kirsch, Accidental Means, 1953 IxsuR. L.J. 545, 547 [hereinafter cited
as Kirsch].
10 Thompson, The Judicial Approach to "Accidental Means" Policies in
California, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 255 (1961) (suggests that California has done
just that).
"022 Tenn. App. 456, 124 S.W.2d 37 (1938).
1
1Id. at 459, 124 S.W.2d at 39.
1

'E.g.,
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the Tennessee court reasoned that while insured intentionally consumed the medicine taken, and in the precise quantity taken, his
real intent was only to take a "harmless nerve remedy."2 2 The apparent meaning of this is that while the insured intentionally took
an amount that was toxic, in the sense that the taking was a deliberate act, he unintentionally took a toxic amount, in the sense
that death was not his desire. In other words, an intentional act
is intentional only up to the point that it has the effect that the actor
thought it would have. From that point on, to the actual result
that follows the intentional act, the act is unintentional and the
means are therefore accidental. It is apparent that this logic could
be used to allow recovery in spite of the distinction in any case
where the insured does an intentional act that has an unintended
or unexpected result. For example, if applied to Henderson, recovery would be allowed since the insured there was doing a voluntary and intentional act, but he did not intend the result that followed that act.
While many courts following the strict rule have become bogged
down in the confusion and have given only lip service to the distinction, the North Carolina Supreme Court has, for the most part,
been consistent in denying recovery on the basis of the distinction
whenever insured did an intentional act without a slip or mishap.
The Henderson case is only the most recent example. 23 The North
Carolina court has not, however, escaped the confusion entirely. In
several cases the court has employed a natural and probable consequence approach to the problem.2 4 The use of this approach by
22 Id. at 462, 124 S.W.2d at 41.
3 Other cases include Chesson v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 268 N.C. 98, 150
S.E.2d 40 (1966) (insured, without warning, "jumped straight backward,"

hit is head on a cement floor and died of a cerebral hemorrhage) ; Langley
v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 261 N.C. 459, 135 S.E.2d 38 (1964) (insured lay
face down on his bed, went to sleep, and suffocated); Allred v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of America, 247 N.C. 105, 100 S.E.2d 226 (1957) (insured lay in
highway to show his companions how brave he was, was hit, and died);
Fletcher v. Security Life & Trust Co., 220 N.C. 148, 16 S.E.2d 687 (1941)
(insured received a spinal anesthesia preparatory to gall bladder operation
which unexpectedly caused a collapse of his respiratory system and death) ;
Scott v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 208 N.C. 160, 179 S.E. 434 (1935) (insured had
a tooth pulled and germs entered the hole and caused swelling which necessitated an operation and insured died from a blood clot following the operation) ; and Mehaffey v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 205 N.C. 701, 172
S.E. 331 (1934) (insured died from liquor poisoning).
"Allred v. Prudential Ins. Co., 247 N.C. 105, 100 S.E.2d 226 (1957);
Scarborough v. World Ins. Co., 244 N.C. 502, 94 S.E.2d 558 (1956) ; Mehaffey v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 205 N.C. 701, 172 S.E. 331 (1934);
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some courts is another factor causing confusion in the accidental
means area because, as will be seen by an examination of the rule,
it is the very antithesis of the strict approach which these courts profess to follow. 2 5
The rule concerning natural and probable consequences in this
area of law has been stated as follows:
An effect which is the natural and probable consequence of an
act or course of action is not an accident, nor is it produced by
accidental means. It is either the result of actual design, or falls
under the maxim that every man must be held to intend the natural and probable consequences of his deeds. On the other hand,
an effect which is not the natural and probable consequence of
the means which produced it, an effect which does not ordinarily
follow and cannot be reasonably anticipated from
the use of these
26
means ..

.,

is produced by accidental means.

Examining the rule, it can be seen that the natural and probable
consequence approach is the antithesis of the strict approach since
results, instead of means, are being tested by its use.17 Courts, in
using it, are examining the result to determine if it is the natural
and probable consequence of the act producing it. If it is not, recovery is allowed. Thus, if the result is unexpected and unintended
and does not ordinarily follow the act, then that result is produced
by accidental means, and this is in effect a restatement of the liberal
approach.
The North Carolina court has never stated the natural and
probable consequence rule as explicitly as set out above. But, in
Harrisv. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co." the insured died as a
result of pneumonia which developed from a chest injury received
in a high school basketball game when he attempted to block a
shot by an opponent. In allowing recovery, the court reasoned that
although he "engaged voluntarily in the game .. . , and while he
anticipated collisions during the progress of the game . . . , no such
injury as that which he suffered . . .was probable as the result of

the game."2

In Mehaffey v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co.3 0 the

Harris v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 204 N.C. 385, 168 S.E. 208
(1933).
"Kirsch 547.
"'Western Commercial Travelers Ass'n v. Smith, 85 F. 401, 405 (8th
Cir. 1898) (emphasis added).
27 Kirsch 547.
28204 N.C. 385, 168 S.E. 208 (1933).
Id. at 388, 168 S.E. at
0205 N.C. 701, 172 S.E. 210.
331 (1934).
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court, referring to poisoning of the insured from consumption of
alcohol, said that "any poison in the stomach of the deceased was
the natural and probable consequence of an ordinary act in which
he voluntarily engaged.""
These cases show the court's implicit
acceptance of the natural and probable consequence rule. The
Mehaffey decision, perhaps, is not surprising. Recovery would have
been denied without the use of the natural and probable consequence
rule by merely following the normal strict rule, since the means by
which insured died was an intentional act and not accidental. The
Harris decision, however, would have been different without the
use of the natural and probable consequence rule. There the means
was as much an intentional act as in Mehaffey, but recovery was
allowed. A possible explanation for the court's use of the natural
and probable consequence rule in Harris is that the court had not
accepted the strict rule at that time. But it did accept it one year
later in Mehaffey by saying that "[i]f the result, although unexpected, flows directly from an ordinary act in which the insured
voluntarily engages, then such is not deemed to have been produced by accidental means.""2 Despite this acceptance of the strict
rule, the court proceeded to deny recovery by using natural and
probable consequence language.3 8 Thus, it can be seen that the
court was not using the natural and probable consequence rule in
Harrismerely because it had not accepted the strict rule as yet, since
it later applied it in Mehaffey after acceptance of the strict rule.
Although the court did not accept the strict rule in Harris, it discussed it and its acceptance by other courts, concluding that "if
conceded to be sound, [it] is not applicable to the instant case." 8 4
It would seem that if the court considered the rule applicable in
any case, it would be applicable in Harris since the facts seem to
present a clear case for its application. The insured was injured as
a result of a voluntary and intentional act although the result was
not intended.
Since the court employed the natural and probable consequence
rule in Harriswhere the facts seem to call for application of the
strict rule, it is not clear why it failed to employ the rule in other
11d. at 705, 172 S.E. at 333.
2 Id. at 705, 172 S.E. at 333.
'OId. at 705, 172 S.E. at 333.
,204 N.C. at 388, 168 S.E. at 210.

1967]

ACCIDENTAL DEATH

cases.8 5 As much confusion as the approach has caused, however,
it does provide a means of achieving a fair result without the necessity of repudiating the strict rule.36
There seem to be only three possible justifications for distinguishing between the terms "accidental means" and "accident."
The first is that the parties are free to contract as they desire."
This argument has lost its appeal in insurance cases and the Utah
court disposed of it properly in Browning v. Equitable Life Ass.
Soc.88 by stating that
[i]nsurance policies, while in the nature of written contracts, are
not prepared after negotiations between the parties, to embrace
the terms at which the parties have arrived.... They are prepared
beforehand by the insurer. Normally, the details and provisions are not discussed. He seldom sees the policy until it has
been issued and delivered to him. He signs an application blank
in which the policy sought is described either by form number or
by general designation, pays his premium, and in due course
thereafter receives... his policy. Many of the terms and all of its
defenses and super-refinements he has never heard of and would
not understand them if he read them ....
9
The second possible justification is that there is a technical difference between the terms. They are not in fact synonymous. But,
insurance policies do not give the reader an opportunity to distinguish between the terms. Policies do not say that "coverage is
provided against death or injury by 'accidental means'-as opposed
to death or injury by 'accident.' " They contain only the term
"accidental means" or the term "accident," not both. The average
" If it were applied to other North Carolina cases where the strict rule
was applied and recovery was denied, recovery could have been allowed
and a more equitable result achieved. For instance if applied to Fletcher v.
Security Life & Trust Co., 220 N.C. 148, 16 S.E.2d 687 (1941), recovery
would surely be allowed since a collapse of the respiratory system and death
are not the natural and probable consequences of a normal spinal anesthesia;
neither is death the natural and probable result of a tooth extraction as
occurred in Scott v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 208 N.C. 160, 179 S.E. 434 (1935) ;
nor is death the natural and probable consequence of a fireman fighting an
ordinary fire in an ordinary manner with no great risks taken, as occurred in
Henderson.
" This fair result is attained by merely not applying it. The Texas court
uses this natural and probable consequence analysis in accidental means cases
although it purports to follow the strict rule, e.g., Perry v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 380 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
'31 N.C.L. REv. 319, 324 (1953).
"94 Utah 532, 72 P.2d 1060 (1937).
"Id. at 561-62, 72 P.2d at 1073.
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person would not stop to distinguish between the terms upon seeing
one of them, although he probably would if he saw them together.
Even if the insured realized that there is a distinction between the
terms, that they are not the same, he would not know of the legal
ramifications of this distinction.
And yet-despite the entanglement in the decisions, the difficulty
which even courts of last resort in several of the states have had
with the distinction, and the fact that the problem appeared to
so eminent a jurist as Mr. Justice Cardozo to be in such a muddie-the rationale of the courts drawing the distinction would
hold the insured to a full knowledge of the distinction and of its
ramifications and implications. Certainly, as a practical matter,
it can safely be said that the average person taking out accident
insurance assumes that he is covered for any fortuitous, undesigned injury, and it can hardly be wondered at that the average
person purchasing a policy from an insurance company-even
if such person had the time, acumen, and energy to cope with the
matter thoroughly-has no conception of the judicial niceties of
the problems and no idea of what coverage he is not getting under
the term 'accidental means.' 40
For this reason many courts feel that the term should be given its
ordinary meaning. 1 After all, "[i] t is the layman, not the insurance
attorney, who is insured .... ))42
The third and final justification for distinguishing between the
terms is that by using the term "accidental means" rather than
"accident," the insurance company is attempting to restrict liability.
To fail to distinguish between the terms would be to provide greater
coverage than was intended. While this is undoubtedly the intent
of the insurance company, it is hardly the intent of the ordinary
policyholder. To make the distinction is to assume the insured
43
intended to make it when, in actuality, he knowns nothing of it.

Also, courts should be unwilling, as the Pennsylvania court now is,
"to recognize such a restriction on the basis of the ambiguous language . . . which the company knew was susceptible of different

"oAnnot., supra note 14, at 478.
"Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Hemenover, 100 Colo. 231, 67 P.2d
80 (1937); Murphy v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 141 Neb. 41, 2 N.W.2d 576
(1942); Scott v. New Empire Ins. Co., 75 N.M. 81, 400 P.2d 953 (1965);
Mansbacher v. Prudential Ins. Co., 273 N.Y. 140, 7 N.E.2d 18 (1937);
Griswald v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 107 Vt. 367, 180 A. 649 (1935).
2 1A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 5, at 23.
,Annot., supra note 14, at 478.
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interpretations."4 4 To continue to make the distinction would condone ambiguity.4 5 By a judicial ruling that the terms are legally
synonymous, the insurer would be forced to clarify the restriction.
The insurer has the power to remove all doubt by using clear and
simple language to explain all policy exclusions.4 6 Also in this
connection, many courts give as a reason for not distinguishing
between the terms the well settled rule that since the insurance company prepared the contract, it is to be construed strictly against
47
it in the case of ambiguities and uncertainties.
For the above reasons, many courts have rejected the strict approach and there is a definite trend away from it.4" The Pennsylvania court recently decided "to confront the issue directly and to
expressly abandon the artificial distinction. . . ,"' The court noted °
that both Florida5 ' and New Mexico,52 the only courts to consider
the question as one of first impression in the past decade, have
chosen the liberal approach. So definite is the trend that one authority flatly states that the majority of jurisdictions no longer
maintains the distinction.53 In light of the highly unjust result
achieved in Henderson and other North Carolina cases in which
the distinction was applied and recovery denied, and in light of the
fact that the reasons for removing the distinction far outweight the
very tenuous justifications for it, it is submitted that North Carolina
"Beckham v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 424 Pa. 107, 110, 225 A.2d 532, 537
(1967).
"1Id. at 108, 225 A.2d at 535.
'" Murphy v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 141 Neb. 41, 2 N.W.2d 576 (1942);
Scott v. New Empire Ins. Co., 75 N.M. 81, 400 P.2d 953 (1965).
"' Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Hemenover, 100 Colo. 231, 67 P.2d
80 (1937); Mansbacher v. Prudential Ins. Co., 273 N.Y. 140, 7 N.E.2d 18
(1937); Carter v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 65 Utah 465, 238 P. 259 (1925).
The North Carolina court accepts this well settled rule of insurance law:
"when any provision, condition, or exception is uncertain or ambiguous in
its meaning or is capable of two constructions . . . it should receive that
construction which is most favorable to the insured." Penn v. Standard
Life Ins. Co., 158 N.C. 24, 26, 73 S.E. 99, 100 (1911). However, the court
refuses to admit that the term "accidental means" is ambiguous or capable
of two constructions. In light of all the confusion caused by the term and
the fact that the courts and legal scholars are divided as to its meaning, it
is not understood how the term could be said to be anything other than
ambiguous and uncertain in its meaning.
Kirsch 554.
"Beckham v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 424 Pa. 107, 108, 225 A.2d 532, 535
(1967).
10Id. at 108 n.2, 225 A.2d at 534 n.2.
Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Nash, 97 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1957).
Scott v. New Empire Ins. Co., 75 N.M. 81, 400 P.2d 953 (1965).
2 G. RIcH mAs, supra note 4, at 734.
'
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should cease to allow such a spurious distinction to stand between
the injured insured and the compensation for which he paid his
premium dollar."
PATRIciK H. POPE

Local Government-Airport Not a "Necessary Expense" within
Meaning of Article VII, Section 6, of North Carolina
Constitution
The "necessary expense" exception contained in article VII,
section 6, of the North Carolina Constitution' affords county and
municipal governments limited relief from the onerous burden of
submitting proposed expenditures to a vote of the people before
taxes can be levied and collected or debts contracted. No clear test
exists for determining what expenses of local governments are
necessary, and the North Carolina Supreme Court has proceeded
in catalogue fashion, classing some public functions as necessary
within the meaning of the constitution and others as unnecessary.'
In the recent case of Vance County v. Royster,3 the court de-

clined to overrule thirty years of precedent and declare a public
airport to be a "necessary expense" within the meaning of article
VII, section 6. The decision attracted widespread attention
throughout North Carolina when the Federal Aviation Agency immediately suspended payment on all grant agreements with airports
" See Clifford, Insurance, Survey of N.C. Case Law, 45 N.C.L. REv.
955, 962 (1967) (suggests that it is time for North Carolina to get out of
the "Serbonian Bog").

'No debt or loan except by a majority of voters.-No county,

city, town, or other municipal corporation shall contract any debt,
pledge its faith, or loan its credit, nor shall any tax be levied or
collected by any officers of the same except for the necessary expenses thereof, unless approved by a majority of those who shall
vote thereon in any election held for such purpose. (emphasis added).
Prior to an amendment adopted in the general election of 1948, the last
clause of the section read "unless by a vote of the majority of the qualified
voters therein." The amendment reduces the number of voters necessary
to approve any proposal submitted. Also note that this section was formerly section 7 of article VII; by amendment adopted November 6, 1962,
sections 6, 9, and 10 were deleted from article VII, and the remaining
sections numbered accordingly.
2 See Coates & Mitchell, "Necessary Expenses" within the Meaning of
Article VII, Section 7, of the North Carolina Constitution, 18 N.C.L. REv.
93, 94-105 (1940) [Hereinafter cited as Coates].
8271 N.C. 53, 155 S.E.2d 790 (1967).
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in the state; the suspension was ordered because FAA attorneys
feared that the Royster decision cast doubt on the lawfulness of the
agreements under the constitutional provision.' Upon intervention
by members of the North Carolina congressional delegation, the
suspension was revoked at the end of August.'
Royster involved a condemnation proceeding. The county commissioners had joined with the City of Henderson and the Henderson Township Airport Authority in submitting a "project application" and executing a grant agreement with the FAA, in order to
secure federal funds. A site for the airport was chosen, and the
county, together with the city and the airport authority, entered into
a twenty-five year lease with the Secretary of the Army. At no
time was the proposed airport put before the voters of the county
in an election. The land of respondents adjoined the airport site,
and the county attempted to condemn three and three-tenths acres
of it to remove the trees and thereby provide a safe approach to
the runway. The condemnation proceedings were contested in
superior court, where condemnation was approved and damages
awarded.6
The supreme court reversed, denying the county's right to exercise the power of eminent domain on behalf of the airport. It was
conceded that the proposed airport was a public use for which private property could be taken,7 but the court held that the power of
eminent domain failed for lack of authority to construct and maintain the airport.' The terms of the twenty-five year lease and cer'Durham Morning Herald, Aug. 3, 1967, § A, at 3, col. 1.
Id., Aug. 31, 1967, § C, at 1, col. 5.
O 271 N.C. at 54-59, 155 S.E.2d at 792-95.
It is clearly established by the decisions of this Court that the
acquisition of land for, and the construction and operation of, an
airport for use by the public is a purpose for which a city or a
county or both may appropriate and expend public funds and for
which it or they may acquire land by the exercise of the power of
eminent domain.
Id. at 60, 155 S.E.2d at 795-96.
8
It is clear upon the record before us that the proposed taking
of the land of respondents is to provide a safe approach to an airport
which is to be constructed pursuant to the lease of the land for the
airport proper, the 'grant agreement' and the 'project application,'
and not otherwise. If the petitioner does not have authority to
construct and operate the contemplated airport pursuant to the provisions of these documents, the taking of the land of the respondents
so as to provide a safe approach to such airport is beyond the
authority of the petitioner.
Id. at 61-62, 155 S.E.2d at 796-97.
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tain provisions of the grant agreement were found to obligate the
county's credit in violation of article VII, section 6.1
The court refused to preserve the constitutional validity of the
airport project by bringing airports within the ambit of the "necessary expense" exception. Without discussing the merits of including airports in the list of "necessary expenses," the opinion dismissed the question in three sentences, citing precedent from 1938
and 1946:
[I]t is the duty of the court to determine whether the proposed
indebtedness is for a "necessary expense" within the meaning
of the above provision of the Constitution .. . Pursuant to

this authority and duty, this Court has determined that the construction of a public airport is not a "necessary expense" in
that sense. Airport Authority v. Johnson, supra;1O Sing v.
Charlotte, supra." Thus a county or city may not contract a
debt or pledge its faith for the construction or operation of such

an.airport without first submitting the question to a vote of the
people of such county or city.' 2
Thus the court declined to review the holding made thirty years
ago, when aviation was in its infancy, notwithstanding the progress
and development made in the intervening years, and the resultant
demand for airport facilities.
Article VII, section 6, was inserted into the constitution of 1868
as a popular check on the discretion of the legislature and local
officials. It was largely motivated by dissatisfaction with the financial chaos occasioned by the failure of railroads and other internal
improvements in which local governments had heavily invested;
prior to 1868, counties and municipalities had been free to levy
taxes and issue bonds upon approval by the General Assembly.',
Since adoption of the constitution of 1868, the North Carolina
SThe court found that the "full credit" of the county was pledged to

pay the annual rent of 1,250 dollars under the lease, and that even though
there was a provision for termination of the lease, the provision did not
permit unilateral termination by the county. Also stressed were covenants
contained in the project application and incorporated into the grant agreement which obligated the county to complete construction, and operate and
maintain the airport. According to the court, neither the obligation to
construct nor the obligation to maintain the airport was limited in the terms
of the
documents. Id. at 62, 155 S.E.2d at 797.
10226 N.C. 1, 36 S.E.2d 803 (1946).
1213 N.C. 60, 195 S.E. 271 (1938)
12271 N.C. at 63-64, 155 S.E.2d at 798.
1"See University R.R. v. Holden, 63 N.C. 410, 426, 431-32 (1869); 30
N.C.L. Rnv. 313 (1952).
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Supreme Court has been perplexed by the challenge of devising a
formula by which the expenses of county and municipal government could be divided into those "necessary" and those unnecessary
to local governmental administration.' 4 By and large, it has been
a problem of weighing the democratic, libertarian principles of
article VII, section 6, against the modern demands of efficient,
effective local government."6 Among other definitions, "necessary
expenses" have been held to be those "ordinary and usual expenditures reasonably required to enable a county to properly perform its
duties as part of the State Government."'" A subsequent attempt
at precision sheds little more light:
The decisions heretofore rendered by the Court make the test
of a 'necessary expense' the purpose for which the expense is
to be incurred. If the purpose is the maintenance of the public
peace or the administration of justice; if it partakes of a governmental nature or purports to be an exercise by the city of a
portion of the State's delegated sovereignty; if, in brief, it
involves a necessary governmental expense-in these cases the
expense required to effect the purpose is "necessary" .. . 17
One writer, commenting on this definition, noted, "Reasonable
judges as well as reasonable men may reasonably differ on the
meaning of these shibboleths."'
None the less, the court has reviewed local expenditures, finding some "necessary" and others unnecessary. Among those functions for which taxes can be levied
" "'It would be difficult or impossible to draw a precise line between
what are and what are not the necessary expenses of the government of a
city,' said the court in Wilson v. Charlotte, 74 N.C. 748, 759 (1876); and
court decisions from that day to this have demonstrated the truth of this
observation." Coates 100. This article gives excellent treatment to judicial
interpretation of the "necessary expense" clause prior to 1940.
"*An absolute prohibition to contract a debt is a prohibition to
contract at all, for every contract may and naturally does end in a
debt. We cannot suppose that the Constitution intended to deprive
these great and necessary public corporations of a power which is
usual to all corporations, which these have possessed, and which is
necessary to their usefulness, if not to their very existence ....
Wilson v. Charlotte, 74 N.C. 748, 758-59 (1876). Compare with that, this
statement from Royster: "When the Constitution puts into, or leaves in, the
hands of the people a checkrein upon the discretion of their duly elected
officials, it is not a true Liberalism which would give to the constitutional
provision an interpretation such as to loosen the hold of the people upon
the checkrein." 271 N.C. at 63, 155 S.E.2d at 797.
"Keith v. Lockhardt, 171 N.C. 451, 456, 88 S.E. 640, 642 (1916).
" Henderson v. Wilmington, 191 N.C. 269, 279, 132 S.E. 25, 30-31
(1926).

" Coates 105.
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and debts contracted without a referendum are abattoirs, 1 payment of interest on bonds already issued,20 construction of a courthouse and jail, 21 building and maintenance of public roads, 2 2 lighting of streets,2 3 training and paying of policemen, 24 water and sewer systems,2 5 medical treatment for indigents,28 construction of
jetties and boardwalks, 27 and construction of a garbage incinerator.2 8

Among purposes which have been classified as unnecessary

are parks, playgrounds and recreational centers, 20 public libraries, 0
municipal auditoriums, 8 ' urban redevelopment programs,3 2 construction of a public hospital,83 and, of course, airports.
Goswick v. Durham,34 the first case involving the legitimacy of
local expenditures for construction of an airport, came before the
court in 1937. The City of Durham had purchased land for the
airport from funds derived from non-tax revenues, and was preparing to construct the airport, without submitting the project to
a referendum. The court upheld the land purchase, but granted an
injunction against expenditure of funds for construction. The
city made no claim that the airport was a "necessary expense"
within the meaning of article VII, section 6; but the court noted:
While there is no contention that the construction, equipment,
and maintenance of an airport and landing field is a necessary
municipal expense within the meaning of Article VII, sec. 7,
of the Constitution . . . yet it may not be improper to say that
man's constantly advancing progress in the conquest of the air
as a medium for the transportation of commerce and for public and private use indicates the practical advantage and possible
future necessity of adequate landing facilities for the use of the
"argosies of magic sails . . . dropping down with costly bales"

"9Moore v. Greensboro, 191 N.C. 592, 132 S.E. 565 (1926).
"" Wilson
Charlotte,
N.C.
748 14,
(1876).
Wilson v.
v. High
Point,74238
N.C.
76 S.E.2d 546 (1953).
2.Ellis v. Greene, 191 N.C. 761, 133 S.E. 395 (1926).
Ellison v. Williamston, 152 N.C. 147, 67 S.E. 255 (1910).
" Green v. Kitchen, 229 N.C. 450, 50 S.E.2d 545 (1948).
25 Eakley v. Raleigh, 252 N.C. 683, 114 S.E.2d 777 (1960).
2 Martin v. Raleigh, 208 N.C. 369, 180 S.E. 786 (1935).
",Storm v. Wrightsville Beach, 189 N.C. 679, 128 S.E. 17 (1925).
28
Id.
29 Purser v. Ledbetter, 227 N.C. 1, 40 S.E.2d 702 (1946).
Westbrook
Southern
215 N.C. 20, 1 S.E.2d 95 (1939).
3 Greensboro v.
v. Smith, 241Pines,
N.C. 363, 85 S.E.2d
292 (1955).
2Horton v. Redevelopment Comm'n, 262 N.C. 306, 137 S.E.2d 115
(1964).
Barbour v. Carteret County, 255 N.C. 177, 120 S.E.2d 448 (1961).
3'211 N.C. 687, 191 S.E. 728 (1937).
23
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to the same extent that paved streets and roads are now refor purposes of communication and transportation on
garded
35
land.

3 6 the court faced the question
A year later, in Sing v. Charlotte,
of whether a municipality could transfer money in a contingent
fund derived from tax revenues to a fund for the maintenance and
operation of its municipal airport; the issuance of bonds and levying of additional taxes to finance construction had been approved
by the people, but no referendum was held on the transfer of funds
for maintenance and operation. The supreme court affirmed the
order granting an injunction, applying the test laid down in Henderson v. Wilmington, and concluding, "When thus tested, an airport is not a necessary governmental expense."' 38 Justice Clarkson
dissented vigorously from the determination that the airport was
not a "necessary expense" for Charlotte. The dissent pointed to
the initial referendum approving construction, and argued that it
imposed an implied obligation upon the city to make expenditures
necessary to maintain the airport.3 9 Seeking to limit the inclusion
of airports within "necessary expenses," the Justice argued that an
expense might be necessary for one municipality, but not for another.40 He concluded, "I think that the overwhelming logic of the
instant case compels the recognition that a municipal airport at
Charlotte, under the conditions set out in the judgment, is a 'neces-

sary expense.'

"4

In subsequent cases involving airports and article VII, section
6, the court has resolved the question with a brief restatement of
Id. at 689-90, 191 S.E. at 729.
213 N.C. 60, 195 S.E. 271 (1938).

If the purpose is the maintenance of the public peace or the
administration of justice; if it partakes of a governmental nature or
purports to be an exercise by the city of a portion of the State's delegated sovereignty; if, in brief, it involves a necessary governmental
expense-in these cases the expense required to effect the purpose is
"necessary" within the meaning of art. VII, sec. 7, and the power
to incur such expense is not dependent on the will of the qualified
voters. 191 N.C. at 279, 132 S.E. at 30-31.
38213 N.C. at 65, 195 S.E. at 273.
Id. at 74, 195 S.E. at 279.
For a full discussion of the role of the courts in determining what are
necessary expenses, particularly in relation to the power of the courts to
declare an expenditure to be a necessary expense for a narrowly-drawn
municipalities, see Coates 112-15.
of countiesat and
class"213
76, 195 S.E. at 280.
N.C.
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the Sing holding.4 The dictum in Goswick and Justice Clarkson's
dissent in Sing have gone unnoticed in later cases.
Today, North Carolina airports are constricted in their development and operation by the constitutional prohibition. Common
sense would dictate that the costs incidental to minor improvements
and operation hardly justify resort to the cumbersome and expensive machinery of county-wide referendum; yet the developed case
law requires that a referendum be held before a local government
can appropriate money out of a contingent fund,43 or contract any
debt, 44 for its airport--even if acquisition of the airport was previously approved by a vote of the people.4"
A survey of the constitutions and statutes of neighboring states
indicates that the constitutional disability under which public airports labor in North Carolina is unique to the state. South Carolina permits its counties and cities to levy taxes and issue bonds for
construction and maintenance of airports, upon approval of the
legislature. 6 In Virginia, the constitutional prohibitions relating
' Vance County v. Royster, 271 N.C. 53, 64, 155 S.E.2d 790, 798 (1967) ;
Yokley v. Clark, 262 N.C. 218, 222, 136 S.E.2d 564, 567 (1964); Airport
Authority v. Johnson, 226 N.C. 1, 7, 36 S.E.2d 803, 808 (1946).
'Sing v. Charlotte, 213 N.C. 60, 65, 195 S.E. 271, 273 (1938), proceeds on the theory that the money in such funds was derived in whole or
in part from ad valoren taxes; the county or municipality is free to appropriate moneys derived from non-tax sources for airport purposes. Airport Authority v. Johnson, 226 N.C. 1, 36 S.E.2d 803 (1946).
"Yokley v. Clark, 262 N.C. 218, 136 S.E.2d 564 (1964). The indebtedness cannot be rendered constitutional by providing for its payment from
non-tax funds. Id. at 222, 136 S.E.2d at 567; Vance County v. Royster, 271
N.C. 53, 64, 155 S.E.2d 790, 798 (1967). The dangers of a literal, tooexacting construction of the phrase "contract a debt" were pointed out in
Wilson v. Charlotte, 74 N.C. 748, 758 (1876): "Such a prohibition would
be unreasonable. The duties of a county or city government cannot be
performed without often contracting debts ....

An absolute prohibition

to contract a debt is a prohibition to contract at all, for every contract may
and naturally does end in a debt." So long as the court construes "debt"
restrictively, so that almost any contract made by a city or county is held
to incur a debt within the meaning of article VII, section 6, the opportunity
for North Carolina local governments to secure federal aid may be curtailed. Most federal grants have "strings" attached; the local government
is called upon to make certain covenants, contractual in nature (as in
Royster, to operate and maintain the airport). Unless the particular purpose for which federal aid is sought falls within the perimeter of "necessary
expenses," the county or municipality may find itself without the authority
to execute the grant agreement. Yokley v. Clark, supra at 224, 136 S.E.2d
at 568, cited in Vance County v. Royster, supra at 65, 155 S.E.2d at 799.
"Sing v. Charlotte, 213 N.C. 60, 195 S.E. 271 (1938).
"S.C. CoNsT. art. 10, § 6. This section was amended in 1945, by insertion of a clause which reads "[T]he General Assembly shall have power
to authorize a county or township to levy a tax or issue bonds for the pur-
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to debt apply to borrowing by local governments, rather than to
the assumption of contractual obligations per se;4 and by statute,
local governments are empowered to appropriate funds for the
construction and maintenance of airports.48 Under the Georgia
Constitution,4 9 the General Assembly is authorized to permit counties to levy taxes to construct, improve, and maintain airports; and
a general enabling statute was enacted.," Another section of the
Georgia Constitution permits counties and municipalities to contract debts up to a value equal to one-fifth of one percent of the
assessed value of taxable property on the county or city's books. 1
The Mississippi Constitution 5 2 provides that the General Assem-

bly is to make laws to prevent abuse by local governments of their
powers to tax and assume debts; there is no provision in the constitution comparable to article VII, section 6. Legislation enabling
counties and cities to acquire and maintain airports has been enacted. 3 In other states, the constitutional limitations on debt are
directed to the amount of the debt, rather than to the purposes for
which the debt is incurred.-4
The growth of commercial aviation and the comparative lack
of constitutional restrictions on airport development in other states
seem to suggest a need for a fresh examination of airports as "necessary expenses." That examination was not undertaken in Royster.
Any contention that the airport contemplated by Vance County is
presently necessary for the county would be dubious at best ;5 the
court declined, however, to limit its holding to the airport in quesposes of construction and maintenance of an airport or the construction and

maintenance of landing strips." For the law prior to the 1945 amendment,
see Parrott v. Gourdin, 205 S.C. 364, 32 S.E.2d 14 (1944).
"'VA. CONST.

art. 7, § l15a.

§§ 5.1-43, 45 (1966).
" GA. CONST. art. 7, § 2-5701.
"0GA. CODE ANN. § 11-206 (1933).
" GA. CONST. art. 7, § 2-6001.
2 MISS. CONST. art. 4, § 80.
' Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 7537-7539 (1957).
' CAL. CONST. art. 11, § 18; ILL. CONsT. art. 9, § 12; IND. CoNsT. art. 13,
§ 1; OKLA. CONST. art. 10, § 26; W. VA. CoNsT. art. 10, § 8.
"' At the time of the arguments in Royster, there were only a few
"'VA. CODE ANN.

privately-owned aircraft in Vance County, and there was no indication that
the airport would be served by commercial airlines.

No feasibility study was

undertaken; the principal benefit argued by proponents of the airport
that it would increase the use of recreational facilities at Kerr Lake
thereby boost the county's economy. 271 N.C. at 57, 155 S.E.2d at
The failure of the county commissioners to hold a referendum was
explained.

was
and
793.
un-
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tion. Instead it reapplied the rule of thirty years ago, that airports
are not one of those purposes which may be considered "necessary"
within the meaning of article VII, section 6.
In Goswick v. Durham, the first of the "airport cases," the
opinion noted that "The law is an expanding science, designed to
march with the advancing battalions of life and progress and to
safeguard and interpret the changing needs of a commonwealth or
community."" 6 It is questionable whether the court in Royster has
stayed in step with those battalions.
WILLIAM VANN MCPHERSON, JR.

Securities Regulations-Convertible Debentures Not
A Class of Equity Security
In Chemical Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp.,' the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals was for the second time2 faced with construing
the meaning of "any class of any equity security" in section 161 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Chemical Fund is an open
end diversified investment company. Early in December 1962, the
Fund owned 91,000 shares which represented 2.36 percent of the
Xerox common stock.' In 1961 the Fund acquired four and one
50 211 N.C. at 690, 191 S.E. at 730.
'377 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967).
'In Ellerin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 270 F.2d 259 (2d Cir.
1959), the court held that the ten percent holder of a series of stock was
not the ten percent holder of a class of equity security for the purposes of
section 16(b).
' Section 16(a) of the statute defines insider for the purposes of the
statute as "Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner
of more than ten percentum of any class of any equity security . ..or who
is a director or an officer of the issuer of such security. . . ." Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1964). The section under consideration in the principal case reads:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may
have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by
reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from
any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security
of such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period
of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith
in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be
recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of
such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the
security sold for a period exceeding six months. ...
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
'At that time Xerox had 3,851,844 shares of common stock outstanding.
Chemical Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 377 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1967).
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half percent convertible subordinate debentures due May 1, 1981.
Each 1,000 dollar debenture was convertible into approximately nine
and one half shares of common stock and was protected against dilution of the conversion right, but carried no immediate participation
in the equity of Xerox. From December 4 through 20, 1962 and
again from April 24 through August 2, 1963, the Fund purchased
debentures convertible into 3,029 shares of common and sold 3,000
shares of common stock. Besides this sale of 3,000 shares offset
by the purchase of debentures, the Fund sold an additional 13,500
shares of common. These purchases and sales were part of a program designed to increase Chemical Fund's secured position and
improve its yield from its Xerox investment without sacrificing its
ability to take advantage of the continuing appreciation of Xerox
common stock. With the purchase of 11,000 dollars principal amount
of debentures on December 4 and again on December 12, 1962, however, Chemical Fund became the holder of more than ten percent
of the outstanding convertible debentures, a position it held until
November, 1963.' As a result, Chemical Fund sought declaratory
judgment in the district court as to whether the profits made from
the sales of common stock and purchases of debentures between
December 1962 and November 1963 would inure to Xerox as a violation of section 16(b). The district court granted summary judgment to Xerox for 153,922.43 dollars without interest.
On appeal the court of appeals reversed, holding that Chemical
Fund was not liable under section 16(b) for short swing profits
as a beneficial owner of ten percent of "any class of any equity
security," for had Chemical Fund converted its debentures, it would
have commanded only 2.72 percent of the Xerox common stock.
Reasoning that a convertible debenture is an "equity security" only
because of its convertible nature, the court held that the debentures
alone would not be a "class of equity security."8 According to the
court, the holder of convertible debentures would not normally have
standing with officers, directors or large stockholders to be the recipient of inside information.' Consequently, Chemical Fund would
be outside the purview of the statute, for, as the court states, "the
'The Fund continued to hold more than ten percent of the convertible

debentures until November 22, 1963, when pursuant to a call for redemption
it converted the debentures into 17,180.95 shares of common stock. Id.
o 377 F.2d at 111.
7Id.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

purpose of section 16 to impose liability on the basis of actual or
potential control is clear, and we should give it effect.""
By exempting the holder of ten percent of the convertible debentures, it is questionable whether the court gave effect to the
stated purpose of the statute-to prevent the unfair use of inside
information.9 The court based its decision on control and seemed
to equate "control" for the purposes of section 16(b) with ownership
of ten percent of the common stock. This note is thus directed to
the question of whether ownership of ten percent of the underlying
common stock is necessary for the convertible debenture holder to
be party to the abuses which 16(b) was designed to prevent.
At the time the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was passed,
"profits from 'sure thing' speculation were regarded by members of
the financial community as one of the usual emoluments of office."' 0
As cases indicate, the entire purpose of section 16(b) is "to discourage corporate insiders from trading for short swing profits on
the basis of information about corporate circumstances, plans and
prospects not available to the public,"" and "to establish a standard
so high as to prevent any conflict between the selfish interest of a
fiduciary officer, director, or stockholder and the faithful performance of his duty. 11 2 To put teeth into the statute Congress required that profits made on short swing-six months-transactions
be forfeited to the corporation. Congress indicated its desire to
minimize misuse of confidential information, without unduly discouraging bona fide long term investment, by basing forfeiture of
profits on the length of the insider's investment commitment.13 The
statute is remedial in operation, and regardless of whether the in8
Id.
'Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
10 Cook and Feldman, Inider Trading Under the Securities Exchange
Act, 66 HARV. L. REv. 385, 386 (1953) [Hereinafter cited as Cook].
" Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156, 172 (3d Cir. 1965).
12 Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d
Cir. 1943); see
Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006
(1966) (In this case the court commented that "[airned with information
not available to ordinary stockholders, these 'insiders' brought about artificial,
but predictable, fluctuations in the market and, in so doing, were able to reap
substantial profit with little or no investment risks to themselves-all at the
expense of outside stockholders. . . ." 367 F.2d at 352) ; Perfect Photo, Inc.
v. Grable, 205 F. Supp. 569, 571 (1962).
1 Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 892 (1965). In this decision the court pointed out that confidential
information is valuable for just a short period and that the attractiveness of
trading is enhanced if the capital is invested for only a short time. 342 F.2d
at 308.
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sider actually uses information, he must forfeit profits from short
term speculation. 14
On the issue of whether convertible debentures are a "class of
equity security"' 5 Chemical Fund was a case of first impression.
However, an examination of the Second Circuit's interpretation of
16(b) in relation to other issues such as conversion as a purchase
and sale, recapitalization, and stock options reveals an interesting
trend in the court's attitude toward and application of this seemingly
absolute, arbitrary statute. When the court first interpreted the
rule in Smolowe v. Delendo Corp.'6 and later in Park & Tilford v.
Shulte, Inc.,' 7 it adhered to the idea that the statute was an absolute "crude rule of thumb."'"
There was little consideration of
surrounding factors which might justify or delimit the application
of this somewhat harsh rule. The fact that the Shulte brothers in
Park & Tilford could have prevented the dividend declaration because of the control which they exerted over the corporation was
mentioned as a collateral point; nevertheless, the court based its
decision on the broad language of the statute designed to deprive
the violator of all possible profit.' 9 In its later decisions the Second
Circuit moved away from this automatic application of 16(b) and
began to inquire into the possibility for speculation in a given situation."
Blau v. Lamb,2 a 1966 case, involved controlling insiders
"'According to Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Rheem, 295 F.2d 473, 475 (9th Cir.
1961), "[the excuses of various insider transactions which were presented
to Congressional Committees convinced the authors of the legislation that
civil liability and an objective measure of proof were indispensible ingredients of an effective remedy for the proven vice." See Western Auto Supply
Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc. 348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1965); B.T. Babbit, Inc.
v. Lachner, 332 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1964).
" In Ellerin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 270 F.2d 259 (2d Cir.
1959), the issue involved a series of stock, not convertible debentures.
135 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943).
17 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
18
Thomas G. Corcoran, the draftsman of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 used the term "crude rule of thumb" to describe 16(b). Hamilton,
Convertible Securities and Section 16(b): The End of an Era, 44 TEXAs L.
REV. 1447, 1448 n.6 (1966) [Hereinafter cited as Hamilton].
10 160 F.2d 984, 988 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
See Blau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1960), affirmed, 368 U.S.
403 (1962) ; In this opinion the court declared, "There is no rule of thumb,
nor would it be wise to attempt to formulate such a rule." 286 F.2d at 792.
Where the defendant became a director after his initial purchase and then
sold stock, the court applied its original test, stating: "it [the statute] must
be strictly construed in favor of the corporation and against any person who
makes profit dealing in the corporation stock." Adler v. Klawans. 267 F.2d
840, 846 (2d Cir. 1959). In Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954), involving a reclassification in which full
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who clearly had the power to misuse inside information. The court
asked whether there was the slightest opportunity to exercise that
power and stated:
[W] e reject the possible suggestion in the lower court's opinion
that the existence of an opportunity for speculative profits can
be inferred from the fact of control alone, because such a suggestion is inconsistent with our responsibility to analyze the conversion in order to determine whether the possibility of unfair
speculative profits
might have existed at all even with full cor22
porate control.
Other circuits interpreting the statute have followed the pattern
of the Second Circuit with one notable exception.28 In spite of the
Second Circuit's bold declaration in Blau v. Lamb, the court in
Chemical Fund seems to have expanded the test requiring "opportunity for speculation" by the requirement that in order for there
to be inside information for "speculation" there must be control
over the common stock, thus moving completely away from the
broad remedial application of the rule in Park & Tilford which
would make the officer, director, or ten percent beneficial holder
liable irrespective of actual knowledge, speculation or control.
As a practical matter, it is possible for the ten percent convertible debenture holder to have inside information and to engage
in the abuses that rule 16(b) was intended to halt. An examination of three factors may aid in understanding this problem. In
the first place, the convertible debenture holder by the very nature
of the security has the opportunity for speculation and quick profitthe evils prohibited by the statute. Many investors view convertible
issues as an opportunity for profit with small risk.2 4 In a sense
disclosure had been made, the court said that "[t]he reclassification at bar
could not possibly lend itself to the speculation encompassed by § 16(b)."
212 F.2d at 86. One opinion states, "And speculation, actual or potential,
is the only vice within the purview of § 16(b)." Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d
426, 427 (2d Cir. 1954); see also Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140, 142 (2d

Cir. 1949).
2 363
22

F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967).

1d. at 521.

" In Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F. 2d 156, 166 (3d Cir. 1965), the

court applied the crude rule of thumb. For cases in which courts looked for

the speculative aspect, see Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1966); Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d

304 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965); Ferraiolo v. New-

man, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958).
"See generally, B. GRAHAm, D. DODD & S. COTTLE, SECURiTIES A
PRINcIPLE AND TEcHNiguE 602 (4th ed. 1962).
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these securities are favorable to both the investor and the corporation since the investor has the protection of a bond or preferred stock
plus the possibility of participation in any substantial rise in the
value of the common.25 Using the six months limitation, Congress
drew a practical line prohibiting profit made with the aid of inside
information while simultaneously permitting bona fide investment
by the insider.26 The person holding convertible debentures is in a
position analogous to the holder of preferred stock with warrants or
option privileges. Until the option is exercised, the holder does not
bear the same risk as the owner of the junior security even though
the market price of the security may at times be based upon the
value of the junior security."
Similarly, until the convertible debenture holder converts, he does not have the same risk as the owner
of the underlying security. Although the court in Chemical Fund
treated the purchase of the convertible debentures as the purchase
of the underlying securities,2" a purchase of convertible securities is
not considered such for all purposes.2 9 As some authorities indicate, the fungible nature of convertible securities makes them attractive for insider speculation in situations such as Chemical Fund
where the owner purchases the convertible security and offsets the
purchase with a transaction in the conversion security."0 Thus with
limited risk the convertible debenture holder can make considerable
profit through speculation. Therefore, the holder of ten percent of
the convertible debentures of a corporation should not be allowed
to escape the burden of section 16(b) unless he holds for the required six months necessary to make his purchase a bona fide investment.
In the second place, when compared with preferred stock, which
would certainly be a "class of equity security" within the scope of
16(b), there is little reason not to label convertible debentures as a
class of equity security. From the standpoint of control, the rights
' Id. at 601.
" Meeker and Cooney, The Problem of Definition in Determining Insider
Liabilities Under Section 16(b), 45 VA. L. REv. 949, 963 (1959) [Herein-

after cited as Meeker].
2 Id. at 964.
28 377 F.2d at 110. The court said that a convertible debenture was "an
equity security only because it can be converted," and that to determine if

ten percent of the convertible debentures would be ten percent of a class of
equity security, there must be a hypothetical conversion.
"' Hamilton 1491.
so Id. at 1488; Meeker 960-61.
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held by each are relatively equal. Although neither usually has
voting rights, some states permit the corporation to give the debenture holder voting and inspection rights."' While the preferred
stockholder can bring a derivative suit, the debenture holder can
sue in case of default in payment.3 2 Also the debenture holder has
a degree of control over the corporation through the restrictions
on corporate activities set forth in the indenture.8 3 Given these
circumstances, to include preferred stock under 16(b) and exclude
convertible debentures seems slightly inconsistent.
Finally, the holder of ten percent, and for -that matter lesser
amounts, of the convertible debentures in a corporation will probably
have access to inside information, especially if the debenture holder
is a large institutional investment company such as Chemical Fund.
Institutional investment companies are powerful, holding in the
aggregate approximately thirty to forty percent of the aggregate
value of all common stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange.8 4 These companies can be quite helpful to portfolio companies in locating needed capital and furnishing expert advice on
financing and management. As one authority points out, investment company officers and analysts are often in contact with the
officers and directors of the companies in which the investment
company has holdings.3 5 Such contact creates relationships of confidence which permit the art of gentle persuasion and result in the
institutional investor being sought for advice."6 Thus, although this
authority contends that the investment company shuns favoritism
and direct involvment in the control of the portfolio companies,3 1
31
E.g., Del. Code Ann. Title 8, § 221 (1953); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law
§ 518c (McKinney 1963).
" As a practical matter instead of suing, the debenture holder usually
reaches a compromise with the corporation, a point which illustrates the give
and take between the corporation and the debenture holders.
'"As stated in the XERox ANNUAL REPORT at 40 (1962), "Under the
terms of the several loan agreements and the indenture, varying restrictions
exist. At Dec. 31, 1962 among other conditions, the company was required
to limit investments in other subsidiaries and additional indebtedness and
to maintain consolidated working capital (as defined) equal to consolidated
aggregate indebtedness (as defined). In addition, restrictions exist on the
payment of cash dividends on common stock."
"'See generally, Brown, The Inzstitutional Investor As a Shareholder, in
CONFmENCE ON SECURiTiEs REouLATIoIs 209 (R. Mundheim ed. 1964).
3 Id. at 215-16.

so Id.
37

Id. at 213.
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they are in a strategic position for access to inside information which
may be valuable in speculation.
The use of ten percent in the statute is an arbitrary figure. From
the legislative history it is evident that Congress recognized the
possibility that the holder of less than ten percent of an equity
It should be noted,
security might be in control of the corporation.3
did
not
mention
"control."
however, that in the statute Congress
Instead it chose the arbitrary ten percent beneficial owner of any
class of any equity security, thereby making a distinction between
control and the use of inside information. In Gratz v. Claughton,39
Judge Hand emphasized the idea that the legislature may adopt
whatever measure is necessary to deal with the harm although
4
sometimes it applies to situations where the evil is not present. 1
For authority that the legislature's intent in passing the Act was
for the convertible debentures to be an equity security only in relation to the conversion security, the court in Chemical Fund cited
the legislative hearings pointing out that in the original draft bondholders were mentioned specifically, but were omitted in the final
bill.4 1 As one writer has stated:
What constitutes an equity security has been the subject of considerable difference of opinion. Any definition must be couched
in broad language if it is to be applicable to the infinite variety
of security
issues and is to thwart ingenious attempts to escape
42
its terms.

" 78 CONGRESSIONAL REcomn 8037 (1934) (Mr. Lea answering Mr.
Pettingill's motion to strike out "beneficial owner" in the bill) :
I recognize the fact that the five percent [later changed to ten percent]
line is an arbitrary one. It is variable in its effects in reference to
different corporations. As to all corporations listed on the great exchanges of the country, five percent represents an important part of the
stock of such corporations. It is so commonly the case that a man
who owns a large amount of stock, but nothing like a majority, controls the directors of the corporation that the committee thought it
was advisable to require these large stockholders who may be trafficking in the stock of the corporation to reveal the facts.
Mr. Rayburn, speaking before the House, said: "We know, however, that
in the case of any corporation having widely scattered stockholders the concentration of five or ten or twenty or thirty percent of stock ownership is
control; they can always get the proxies." Id. at 8038.
" 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1951).
"If the plaintiff had the burden of proving that the defendant had a
bargaining advantage, the purpose of the statute would be defeated. Id. at
49.
"377 F.2d 107, 111 n. 6 (2d Cir. 1967).
"Cook 393.
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The definition of an equitable security as "any stock or similar security; or any security convertible. .

.

. into such a security . . .,,43

could represent a compromise position in which Congress recognized
the possibility that holders of convertible debentures might engage
in speculation and thus fall within the policy of the statute.
Interpreting section 16(b) in cases from Smolowe through
Chemical Fund, the court used three basic tests 4 -- the automatic
"crude rule of thumb," the opportunity for speculation, and finally
control. The validity of these tests must be governed by the policy
and purpose of the statute-to prevent the unfair use of inside information. The court in Chemical Fund held that ten percent of the
convertible debentures alone would not constitute a class of equity
security. In light of the purpose of the statute, did the court reach
a result in harmony with the statutory objectives by basing liability
on control-actual or potential? An affirmative answer to this
question is doubtful. The facts disclose that an institutional investment company holding convertible debentures could have access to
inside information and could use this information for speculation to
the detriment of outside shareholders.45 Furthermore, the legislative history reveals that Congress drew an arbitrary line of ten
percent and did not intend control as the criterion. Thus had the
Second Circuit used the Blau test-opportunity for speculationthe decision would probably have been more in keeping with the
legislative purpose and policy of the statute. Section 16(b) is
remedial, not penal, and the interpretation must be given which is
most consistent with the legislative intent.4 6 As one writer has
commented: "[I]n view of the history and apparent purpose of this
legislation, the fundamental consideration in all doubtful cases should
be 'not whether the defendant actually used inside knowledge to
profit, but rather whether the situation was one in which such in'SSecurities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(11) (1934).
"The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
certificate of interest or participation ... " Securities Exchange Act of

1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1934).
"For commentary on the various tests applied by the courts see Hamilton
1454-58.
' For a discussion of the ability of institutional investors to control the
market, See generally, Henderson, Institutional Investors in the Equity Market, in CONFRMMNCE ON SEcURITIEs REGULATION 136 (R. Mundheim ed.
1964).
"8 Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1959).
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side knowledge could have been advantageously used.' ""
To require control in terms of ten percent of the common stock diminishes
the effectiveness of the statute. The statute itself vests the power
in the Securities Exchange Commission to exempt certain securities
and transactions, 4s and exceptions to the statute should not be created by narrow judicial interpretation 9 One authority is of the
opinion that "the express purpose of preventing the unfair use of
inside information might suggest an application of the statute to
all cases which may come literally within its scope." 50 By virtue
of the ten percent and six months arbitrary cut off points, the statute
is already limited, and the court should not limit further what is
remedial legislation 5 when, as in Chemical Fund, -there is the slightest possibility for unfair use of inside information.
SARAH

E.

PARKER

Torts-Dignity As a Legally Protectable Interest
A recent New Jersey decision' presents the question of what
injury, if any, has been suffered by a mother who has been denied
the opportunity to obtain an abortion. Plaintiffs, a defective infant and his parents, brought a malpractice action against the
mother's obstetricians alleging that they negligently assured Mrs.
Glietman that her recent illness of German measles would not
affect the infant then in gestation.2 The basis of plaintiffs' claim
was that defendants' repeated assurances induced Mrs. Glietman
""Painter, The Evolving Role of Section 16(b), 62 MIcE. L. REv. 649, 678
(1964).
,8 Cook 387.
'9 Hamilton 1455.
8 Meeker 958.
81Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959). As the opinion
states,

"One can speculate on whether the moral or ethical values are altered by the

passage of 24 hours, but the statute makes an honest if not an honorable man
out of the insider in that period." Id. at 845. A line had to be drawn somewhere by the lawmakers as in any other area governed by statute.

'Glietman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).

'At present it is well established that rubella virus can cause malformations of the eye (cataract and microphthalmia); internal ear
(congenital deafness due to destruction of the Organ of Corti) ; heart
(persistence of the ductus arteriosus as well as atrial and -ventricular
septal defects) ; and occasionally of the teeth (enamel layer). The
virus may also be responsible for some cases of brain abnormalties
and mental retardation.
J. LANGMAN, MEDIcAL EMBRYOLOGY 73 (1963).
In the principle case the
infant had substantial defects in sight, hearing, and speech.
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to forego an abortion which, plaintiffs asserted, would have freed
the infant from a life with defects, the mother from emotional
harm, and the father from added expenses. Defendants denied
plaintiffs' allegations and testified that they had advised Mrs. Glietman of a twenty per cent chance of some deformity. The trial
court, on motion by defendants, dismissed the suit for want of
proximate cause and because it felt the New Jersey statute prohibited the suggested abortion. The factual dispute, therefore, was
not resolved by the jury.
On appeal the New Jersey Supreme Court took plaintiffs' evidence as true4 and further assumed that Mrs. Glietman could have
obtained an abortion unattended by any criminal sanctions and
failed to do so in reliance upon defendants' assurances. The decision of the lower court was affirmed, three justices dissenting.
The reason for affirmance as to the infant was that he had suffered
no damages cognizable at law.' The parents were denied recovery
8

Any person who maliciously or without lawful justification, with
intent to cause or procure the miscarriage of a pregnant woman,
administers or prescribes or advises or directs her to take or swallow
any poison, drug, medicine, or noxious thing, or uses any instrument or means whatever, is guilty of a high misdemeanor.
N. J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 87-1 (1953).
'This assumption will also be made throughout this note. It might be
proper to suggest that the court's decision may be due, in part, to the improbability of plaintiffs' allegations. It has been stated that a large percentage of malpractice litigation is without foundation, Regan, Medical Legal
Problems-The Physician's and Lawyer's Viewpoint, in MEDICOLEGAL
SYmposium 17 (1955), and the likelihood that a practicing obstetrician
would either not know of the possible effects of rubella during pregnancy or

would lie about them does indeed seem small.

'Although our prime concern is the mother, the issue raised by the
infant's claim warrants mention. Since there was no evidence that measures could have been taken to improve the infant's chances of a normal
life, see, e.g., Sylvia v. Gobeille, 220 A.2d 222 (R.I. 1966) ; First Nat'l Bank
v. Rankin, 59 Wash.2d 288, 367 P.2d 835 (1962), the decision seems correct
because to recover he must maintain that he should not have been born,
and it does seem impossible to "[W]eigh the value of life with impairments
against the nonexistence of life itself." Glietman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22--,
227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967). Two cases were cited in support. In Zepeda v.
Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), an illegitimate child
sought recovery against his father for damages caused by his birth out of
wedlock. Although the court found the existence of a tort, recovery was
denied on the grounds that recognition of such a claim should come from
the legislature. In Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276
N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966), plaintiff's mother was raped while a patient at a state
hospital for the mentally ill, and plaintiff sued for damages caused by the
state's negligence in failing properly to protect its patient. The court found
no wrong was done to plaintiff. For more on the "wrongful life" action see
notes, 43 N.D.L. REv. 99 (1966); 11 S.D.L. Rav. 180 (1966); 18 STAN. L.
REv. 859 (1966).
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because 1) they also suffered no damages cognizable at law and
2) even if there were legal damages, policy considerations "prevent
this Court from allowing tort damages for the denial of the opportunity to take an embryonic life."6 It is submitted that the court
should have determined whether the abortion was legal in New
Jersey before affirming the dismissal and that, in any event, Mrs.
Glietman suffered an injury to her dignity for which she should be
compensated.
The court's assumption was only that plaintiff could have obtained a non-criminal abortion, the place being undetermined, and
policy reasons were still found to prevent recovery. This is a
logical conclusion if the abortion were illegal in New Jersey. If,
however, such abortions were legal in that state,' then it does not
follow that public policy is a bar to plaintiff's recovery as the law
would have weighed the relative rights of the mother and the embryo, and concluded that the mother's was the superior one. Otherwise, the abortion should be illegal. Thus, the fact that the infant
"would almost surely choose life with defects as against no life at
all"' would be of no moment as the choice would not be his at that
time. The choice would be the mother's and compensation for the
denial of that right should not be withheld because an exercise
thereof might result in the termination of an embryonic life. The
right to end that life would be the very right impliedly given if the
abortion were legal. It seems, therefore, that a determination of
the legality of such an abortion in New Jersey was necessary to decide the case correctly. Given the other elements of liability, the
decision would depend on whether plaintiff could have obtained the
abortion had she been correctly advised by the defendants.
As to the issue of damages, the plaintiff may encounter some
difficulty. In a majority of the cases where the question has been
considered, recovery to the parents for harm resulting from the
birth of a child was denied on the grounds that it was either too
remote9 or was against public policy. 10 Although plaintiff is seeking damages for emotional harm, the event which gave rise to that
Glietman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22,--, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (1967).

'The assumption must be that the abortion is legal in New Jersey for

even if plaintiff could have easily been aborted in a nearby state, the court
would be reluctant to lend its aid to the circumvention of its own law.
But see, dissenting opinion, id. at-, 227 A.2d at 703.
Id. at -, 227 A.2d at 693.
Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (1957).
0
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harm was the birth of her child. Several factors, however, are in
her favor. In the first place, it seems without reason to establish
a right in the parents to decide that they do not wish to risk a deformed child and then deny recovery when that right is wrongfully
taken from them. Secondly, a recent California decision, Ciustodio
v. Bauer," may well be indicative of a new trend. In that case
plaintiff-wife, after bearing nine children and being advised that
another might threaten her health, underwent a sterilization operation. The operation was apparently unsuccessful, as a year and
a half later Mrs. Custodio gave birth to her tenth child. The decision of the lower court which had sustained defendants' demurrer
was reversed. The court stated, "It is clear that if successful on the
issue of liability, they [the plaintiffs] have established a right to
more than nominal damages." 2 Doerr v. Villate,'8 wherein plaintiff sued for breach of an oral contract to sterilize her husband,
was discussed in the opinion. Although the sole issue there was
whether the two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries
or the five-year statute for oral contracts applied, the Custodio
court observed that Doerr does demonstrate, "that the birth of a
child may be something less than the 'blessed event' referred to in
those cases [those denying recovery].
Of course this reasoning
is of no avail unless the abortion were found to be legal in New
Jersey.
But if the abortion were illegal in New Jersey, has Mrs. Glietman then suffered no injury? It is suggested that she has, that the
real injury is an affront to her dignity as a human being, and that
this is true regardless of whether she could have obtained an abortion. Mrs. Glietman, by virtue of the fact that she is a human
being, had a right to know that she might become the mother of
a defective child. To the extent that she was uninformed of that
possibility, she was that much less an individual.
In examining plaintiff's injury it is helpful initially to inquire
into the nature of defendants' corresponding duty under these
facts. In general, a fiduciary relationship exists between a physician and his patient.'- A necessary extention of this is the duty
Cal. Rptr. 463 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
"1Id. at 477.
174 III. App. 2d 332, 220 N.E.2d 767 (1966).
"'59 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
"See, e.g., Batty v. Dental Bd., 57 Ariz. 239, 112 P.2d 870 (1941);
Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962).
1159
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of the physician to give accurate, truthful information in -the absence of any justification not to do so. 6 Alleged breaches of this
duty are most frequently encountered in the so-called "informed
7 is an example. There plaintiff
consent" cases. Natanson v. KlineV
was injured by radiation therapy following a mastectomy. The
claim was that since Mrs. Natanson had not been advised of the
risks inherent in the treatment, her consent to it was not informed.
In reversing a judgement for the defendants, the court observed,
Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thorough-going
self-determination. It follows that each man is considered to
be the master of his own body, and he may, if he be of sound
mind, expressly prohibit the performance of life-saving surgery,
or other medical treatment. A doctor might well believe that
an operation or form of treatment is desirable or necessary but
the law does not permit him to substitute his own judgenent
for that of the patient by any form of artifice or deception.' 8
Here, as opposed to Glietman, it is easy to see why the defendant had the duty to inform plaintiff because with this information
the latter could make an intelligent decision. But does the law
require such disclosure merely to avoid a technical battery? The
better analysis, and the one which the quoted material tends to
support, is that as a matter of human dignity an individual should
be accorded the right to have such information. The right goes
beyond the right to determine one's own course in that it embraces
our very identity as individuals. 9 Performing an operation without valid consent is only one way to offend the dignity. On the
basis of this analysis plaintiff's legal inability to obtain an abortion
should neither preclude her from this same right to know, nor
should it excuse defendants from the performance of their duty.
(1967), lists nine factors which have
1 Note, 20 OKLA. L. REv. 214
affected the duty: likelihood of injury, seriousness of injury, feasibility of
alternative methods, certainty of particular method, interest of patient,
knowledge of patient, emotional stability of patient, necessity of treatment,
and existence of emergency.
, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, aff'd on rehearing, 187 Kan. 186, 354
(1960).at 406-07, 350 P.2d at 1104.
P.2d18 670
186 Kan.
19 Perhaps the poet made this distinction between merely determining
one's own course and the broader concept of dignity when he wrote,
"It matters not how straight the gate,
How charged with punishment the scroll
I am the master of my fate:
I am the captain of my soul."
Henly, "Invictus," A TREASTJRY OF G"AT POEMS ENGLISH AN AMERICAN
985 (1942).
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An analogous situation is presented in United States v. Kalish."
There petitioner, as a tactical move advised by counsel, refused to
take the required step forward at his induction and was arrested.
As a result of the arrest, he was photographed and fingerprinted,
and after his aquittal and subsequent induction into the service,
he sought to have these fingerprint and photograph records destroyed. The government resisted, contending that since the Army
had these same records on petitioner, the destruction of only one
of the files could be of no benefit to him. The court held that as a
matter of privacy and personal dignity petitioner had the right to
have the records destroyed. Here petitioner stood to lose only a
dignitary sense if the requested relief were denied, just as Mrs.
Glietman lost when the requested information was denied her. The
destruction of the records did not free petitioner from having
records kept on him, just as the requested information would not
have freed Mrs. Glietman from having a defective child. This,
however, is unimportant because both have been injured in their
dignity; and for this there should be some legal redress.
Dignity is protected in other contexts, although few courts have
expressly acknowledged that dignity is, in fact, the interest being
safeguarded. In assault a cause of action arises for the mere
insult of being threatened, 1 while in battery an offensive touching
with no physical harm is sufficient. The true injury in being spit
on 22 is the indignity of it-the dignity is more battered than the
person. The recent recognition of mental distress as a cause of
action rather than as an element of damages resulting from some
other tort2 3 represents an increasing concern for the dignity of man.

Privacy is perhaps the best example with which to demonstrate that
dignity is an interest worthy of the law's protection. This expanding tort is a judicial recognition of the citizen's need to be secure
in his thoughts, and unfettered in his customs and beliefs. It is
the law's response to the stimulus of an ever-encroaching society.
If state intrusion into marital affairs 24 does not offend the dignity
of the citizen, then in what manner is he offended? If peeping
tom laws are not designed to protect the integrity of the individual
in his home, then what is the protected interest?
"0271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967).
W. PRossER, TORTS § 10 (3rd ed. 1964).
" Draper v. Baker, 61 Wis. 450, 21 N.W. 527 (1884).
" W. PRossEa, TORTS § 11 (3rd ed. 1964).
" Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
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Perhaps it is because dignity and individuality are so intangible
that damages are rarely given on these express grounds. Yet it is
clear that this has not impeded courts from granting relief in the
assault, battery, mental distress, and privacy contexts. In the assault situation the plaintiff need not actually be afraid, for the
protection is against a purely mental disturbance of his personal
integrity.25 In the medical setting, an operation which exceeds that
for which consent is given may subject the physician to liability
even though the operation was beneficial.2 6 Surely dignity is being
protected here, albeit in the form of personal security. And once
dignity is recognized to be the real injury to Mrs. Glietman, damages
no longer present a problem. Professor Bloustein expresses the
concept best by concluding that in privacy actions,
Unlike many other torts, the harm caused is not one which may
be repaired and the loss suffered is not one which may be made
good by an award of damages. The injury is to our individuality,
to our dignity as individuals, and the legal remedy represents
a social vindication of the human spirit27 thus threatened rather
than a recompense for the loss suffered.
It is submitted that Mrs. Glietman, simply because she is a
human being, had a right to know facts which so vitally concerned
her. The defendants, having accepted her as their patient, had the
duty to respond truthfully to her inquiries. That duty was breached
and, for this, there should be some legal remedy." Recovery should
not be made to depend upon what use, if any," the mother may
have made of this information, since this is pure conjecture. She
"' See note 20 supra.
2o See, e.g., Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905).
Bloustein, Privacy As an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 962, 1002-03 (1964). See also Westin,
Science, Privacy, and Freedom; Issues and Proposals for the 1970's, 66
COLUM. L. REv. 1003, 1205 (1966).
Compare, Kalven, Privacy in Tort
Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw & CONTEmp. PROB. 326

(1966).
"' It could be argued that by granting Mrs. Glietman a recovery, the
court would be indirectly punishing defendants for not aiding in the circumvention of state law. To whatever extent this reasoning is valid, the
policy of protecting the individual in his dignity should outweigh such a
consideration.
"' One use may have been to prepare, emotionally and financially for
the possible tragedy. See, Smith, Therapeutic Privilege to Withhold Specific Diagnosis From Patient Sick with Serious or Fatal Disease, 19 TENN.

L. REv. 349 (1946).
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should have been informed regardless of whether it would be of any
benefit to her. That a decision favorable to plaintiff may deter
other such abuses by a powerful profession is additional grounds
for recovery.
LAURENCE V. SENN, JR.

